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The Conduct of Fiscal Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

David Currie
David Currie*
Affiliation:
Queen Mary College, University of London and NIESR
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Extract

The central focus of this paper is on the conduct of fiscal policy. But the influence of fiscal policy cannot sensibly be examined separately from other aspects of macroeconomic policy, such as monetary, exchange rate and incomes policies. Because of this, we the opportunity to range quite widely. Two broad themes emerge. The first concerns the consequences of consistent forward-looking expectations for the design of policy. The second concerns the global consequences of adopting generally in many countries policy rules designed in the single open economy context. Since policy appraisal is usually conducted in the single economy context, and policy design with consistent expectations is still relatively underdeveloped, it is useful to take stock of these two issues.

Type
Articles
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 113 , August 1985 , pp. 81 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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