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An Assessment of the Independent Commission on Banking's Recommendations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Angus Armstrong
Angus Armstrong*
Affiliation:
NIESR
*
e-mail:[email protected]
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Extract

The government set up the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) to consider structural and non-structural measures to promote stability and competition in the UK banking system. They have produced a comprehensive assessment covering some of the key issues facing the banking industry. The ICB's three core recommendations are: a ring-fence to separate retail and wholesale banking activities; banks are required to have more lossabsorbing capital; and greater competition in retail banking markets. In some respects, the recommendations are a step back towards an earlier time of compartmentalised banking. The litmus test is whether they deliver a similar period of financial stability and economic growth.

Type
Commentary
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 218 , October 2011 , pp. F4 - F12
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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Footnotes

∗

This commentary has benefited from helpful comments and discussion with Rev. Prof. E. Philip Davis.

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