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When a pigmy acts as a giant: the role of the Italian representatives in the Brussels Constitutional Convention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2016

Sergio Fabbrini
Sergio Fabbrini*
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Socologia e Ricerca Sociale, Università di Trento, via Verdi 26, 38100 Trento. E-mail: [email protected].
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Summary

The Italian representatives in the Brussels Constitutional Convention played a greater role than expected. The Italians, who many thought would be destined to a role as pigmies in the Convention because of ideological differences and the personal mistrust they carried from their domestic arena, acted mostly as giants in the contributions they provided to the final text. The representatives of both the government and the opposition identified a series of points upon which they agreed and which were introduced in the final document. These positions, although not federalist, were much more advanced than those described as ‘intergovernmental’ or ‘confederal’. There were many reasons for this. The deliberative method adopted in the Convention probably helped this convergence. Certainly, the Italians wanted to keep open the dialogue with the main EU member-states at a moment when the war with Iraq was undermining it, and the Italian representatives in the Convention shared a pro-European attitude, while this attitude was being called into question in the domestic arena by the Berlusconi government.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 9 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Italy in the EU: pigmy or giant? The role of Italian actors in EU policy-making , November 2004 , pp. 233 - 245
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

1. The exact representation was: Presidency (three); representatives of member-states (fifteen); representatives of member-state parliaments (thirty); from the EP (sixteen); from the European Commission (two); government representatives from candidate countries (thirteen); parliamentary representatives from candidate countries (twenty-six). Added to this were alternates and thirteen observers (six from the Committee of the Regions (CoR); three from the Economic and Social Committee; three from European social partners and one from the European Ombudsman).Google Scholar

2. The praesidium members were: Michel Barnier and Antonio Vitorino (for the European Commission), John Bruton and Gisela Stuart (for the national parliaments), Klaus Hansch and Inigo Mendez de Vigo (for the EP) and Alojz Peterle as invited observer and the three representatives of the countries holding the rotating chairmanship of the EU (Henning Christiansen for the Danish Presidency, Alfonso Dastis and Ana Palacio for the Spanish Presidency, Giorgos Katiforis and Giorgos Papandreu for the Greek Presidency). And of course there were the three members of the Presidency of the Praesidium (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Deheane). Thus the only Italian in the Praesidium was Giuliano Amato, who was appointed not only for his talents but also for his ties with the European socialists.Google Scholar

3. From the interviews (as well as from a comment by Alberta Sbragia) it emerged that the project of a Constitutional Treaty inspired by Prodi and known as ‘Penelope’ ended up undermining the Commission's position in the Praesidium, rather than strengthening it.Google Scholar

4. My argument is based on an examination of the Convention's public documents and in-depth interviews with some of the Italian representatives and their consultants. With the collaboration of Daniela Sicurelli, interviews were held with Giuliano Amato, Valdo Spini, Francesco Speroni, Luigi Gianniti (responsible for relations with the EU in the Italian Senate and consultant for Lamberto Dini), Nicola Verola (Italian diplomat to the EU and responsible for the European Convention and for the IGC) and Giovanni Roma (member of the Observers for the European Convention of the Department for European Affairs of the Italian government and consultant to Antonio Tajani). I would like to thank all the interviewees for their availability and readiness to discuss their experiences. I would also like to thank Alessandro Giordani, official for the European Commission charged with monitoring the work of the Convention. This article is part of a broader research project on ‘Italy in the European Union’ (with the Universities of Siena and Pavia), financed by MIUR, which I am coordinating.Google Scholar

5. As noted by Alberta Sbragia, this research project has investigated the influence of the Italians according to the perception of Italian representatives. It will be necessary, thus, to check this perception with interviews of non-Italian members of the Convention.Google Scholar

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10. There is now a vast literature on this method. See Ziller, Jacques, La nuova costituzione europea , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003.Google Scholar

11. http://www.ueitalia2003.it/ITA/ConferenzaIntergovernativa/dettaglio_conferenza.htm.Google Scholar

12. The first IGC was held from 9 September 1985 to 28 February 1986, when the Single European Act (SEA) was signed. The second and third IGCs were held from 15 December 1990 to 15 December 1991 (the Treaty of Maastricht was signed on 7 February 1992). The fourth IGC took place between 29 March 1996 and 17 June 1997, resulting in the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on 2 October 1997). The fifth IGC took place between 14 February 2000 and 11 December 2000 (resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Nice on 26 February 2001).Google Scholar

13. Interview with Giuliano Amato.Google Scholar

14. Norman, Peter, The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the European Convention , Eurocomment, Brussels, 2003.Google Scholar

15. See Mastropaolo, Alfio, ‘La democrazia deliberativa’, Reset , 78, 2003, pp. 13–16.Google Scholar

16. Space considerations limit my discussion to Part I of the Treaty.Google Scholar

17. Interviews with Luigi Gianniti, Spini, Valdo and Verola, Nicola.Google Scholar

18. Interview with Nicola Verola.Google Scholar

19. Interview with Valdo Spini.Google Scholar

20. Interviews with Giuliano Amato, Valdo Spini, Nicola Verola and Luigi Gianniti. See also Commission Européenne, Secretariat general, Task Force Avenir de l'Union et questions institutionnelles , Bruxelles, le 19 mai 2003, SEC (2003) 576/2, OJ 1613-point 6, Note à l'attention des membres de la Commission, Objet: Vingtième session plenière de la Convention, les 15 et 16 mai 2003. Compte rendu détaillé du débat sur les institutions.Google Scholar

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23. Ansa Sportello Europa , 11 June 2003.Google Scholar

24. The Working Group on the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced a request to extend QMV, with the sole opposition coming from Britain. The British government representative, Peter Hain, said that the ‘footbridge’ was the furthest compromise that could be accepted.Google Scholar

25. According to Luigi Gianniti, ‘Dini invented the ex post recourse and, in parallel, was among the catalysts for consensus, along with Mendez De Vigo, for the early warning mechanism. The system's objective is to give a major role to the national parliaments. The proposal had been drawn from the Italian constitutional system and, during the work of the Convention, it was put up against demands from the British (in favour of a second chamber for the implementation of subsidiarity), the French and the European Parliament (in favour of the extension of the French ex ante method of turning to the national parliament before the Union law comes into effect). Our view was that an ex ante assessment is not appropriate because it would risk politicizing the involvement of the European Court of Justice.’ Google Scholar

26. Interview with Francesco Speroni and Nicola Verola.Google Scholar

27. Interview with Giuliano Amato. Nicola Verola also confirmed the presence of this resistance.Google Scholar

28. The preliminary draft of the constitutional text made public by the Convention on 28 October 2002 introduced the term ‘federal’ among the definitions and objectives of the Union. It affirmed that the aim of the Constitutional Treaty was to create ‘A Union of European States which, while retaining their national identities, closely coordinate their policies at the European level, and administer certain common competences on a federal basis’, Convenzione Europea, Segretariato, CONV369/02, Article 1.Google Scholar

29. Proposed amendment to Article 1 by Andrew Duff, Dimitrij Rupel, Paul Helminger, Lord Maclennan, István Szent-Ivány and Lamberto Dini. Proposed amendment to Article 1 by Olivier Duhamel, Luis Marinho, Anne Val Lancker, Caspar Einem, Pervinche Berès, Maria Berger, Carlos Carnero, Elena Paciotti and Helle Thorning-Schmidt.Google Scholar

30. Commission Européenne, Secretariat general, Task Force Avenir de l'Union et questions institutionnelles , Bruxelles, le 19 mai 2003, SEC (2003) 576/2, OJ 1613.Google Scholar

31. Proposed amendment to Article 1 by Elmar Brok, Joszef Szajer, Erwin Teulfel, Renè Van der Linder, Frantisek Kroupa, Antonio Tajani, Teresa Almeida Garrett, Peter Altmaier, Marco Follini, Piia Noora Kauppi, Göran Lennmarker, Hanja Maij-Weggen and Reihard Rack.Google Scholar

32. Respectively, proposed amendment to Article 1 by Gianfranco Fini; interview with Francesco Speroni; proposed amendment to Article 1 by Cristiana Muscardini.Google Scholar

33. Interview with Giuliano Amato.Google Scholar

34. Spini, Valdo, Contributo al gruppo di lavoro sull'Europa sociale , 21–22 January 2003.Google Scholar

35. Interview with Luigi Gianniti.Google Scholar

36. Spini, Valdo, Informativa sui lavori della Convenzione Europea, 3 June 2003.Google Scholar

37. Spini, Valdo, Informativa sui lavori della Convenzione Europea.Google Scholar

38. Respectively, Commission Européenne, Secretariat General, Task Force Avenir de l'Union et questions institutionnnelles , SEC (2003) 576/2, OJ 1613-Point 6, Bruxelles, le 19 mai 2003; proposed amendment to Article 18 by Andrew Duff, Lamberto Dini, Paul Helminger, Algirdas Gricius, Lone Dybkjaer, Lord Maclennan and Adrian Severin; and proposed amendment to Article 18 by Cristiana Muscardini.Google Scholar

39. Proposed amendment to Article 18a by Andrei Duff, Lamberto Dini, Lord Maclennan and Adrian Severin.Google Scholar

40. Proposed amendment to Article 12 by Lamberto Dini.Google Scholar

41. Proposed amendment to Article 11.1 by Elena Paciotti, Valdo Spini and Carlos Carnero.Google Scholar

42. Proposed amendment to Article 13 by Elena Paciotti and Valdo Spini.Google Scholar

43. Proposed amendment to Article 10 by Gianfranco Fini.Google Scholar

44. Proposed amendment to Article 9 by Cristiana Muscardini.Google Scholar

45. Fini, , L'Europa che verrà , p. 106.Google Scholar

46. Interview with Giuliano Amato.Google Scholar

47. CONV 538/03, ‘Il funzionamento delle istituzioni’, Brussels, 5 February 2003.Google Scholar

48. Statement issued 4 June 2003.Google Scholar

49. Interview with Valdo Spini.Google Scholar

50. Spini, Valdo, ‘Carta UE, pericolose le proposte di Fini’, L'Unità , 27 March 2003.Google Scholar

51. Interview with Nicola Verola.Google Scholar

52. As suggested by David Hine, in reviewing this article.Google Scholar

53. Amato is referring, in his interview, to an informal meeting of the representatives of the EU member-states’ governments, chaired by Katiforis for the Greek Presidency. Contrary to the policy pursued by the Convention (to avoid formal votes on the various proposals), on that occasion Katiforis asked for a formal vote on the question of the Legislative Council.Google Scholar

54. Spini, , ‘Carta UE, pericolose le proposte di Fini’.Google Scholar

55. Interview with Francesco Speroni.Google Scholar

56. Ludlow, Peter, The European Council and ICG of December, 2002 , EuroComment, Briefing Note, No. 2.8, 9 January 2004.Google Scholar