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Campaigning and Governing: An Analysis of Berlusconi's Rhetorical Leadership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2016

Franca Roncarolo
Franca Roncarolo*
Affiliation:
Università di Torino, Facoltà di Scienze, Politiche, Via Verdi 25, 10124 Torino, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
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Summary

This article explores the communication strategy of Silvio Berlusconi through the analytical framework of the ‘permanent campaign’ model. Beginning with the distinction between ‘personal popularity’ and ‘political consensus’, the article looks at the different aspects of Berlusconi's political communication strategy since his election victory in May 2001 and assesses the rationale and effectiveness of his permanent campaign. The author concludes that, despite Berlusconi's strong commitment to the communication process, his leadership appears more similar to the rhetorical Presidency model than to the experiences of leaders who have shown that campaigning can also be used to govern. The article identifies two key limits: (1) the link between the drive for personal popularity and the building of support for the government's main policies appears weak; (2) all communication strategies are undermined by deep divisions within the ruling coalition.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 10 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Italy under Berlusconi , May 2005 , pp. 75 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

1. See Blumenthal, Sidney, The Permanent Campaign , Simon & Schuster, New York, 1980. According to Blumenthal, the permanent campaign erases all distinctions between the electoral phase and the period of government, so that every night is election night.Google Scholar

2. According to Samuel Kernell, contemporary leaders cannot avoid permanent campaigning and ‘going public’ in order to keep alive the very volatile consent of uncommitted voters and govern in the turbulent environment that continually challenges their leadership. See Kernell, Samuel, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership , C.Q. Press, Washington DC, 1986. On the concept of ‘postmodern politics’, see Rose, Richard, The Prime Minister in a Shrinking World, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001.Google Scholar

3. For a recent account of Berlusconi's role in Italian politics, see the special issue of Comunicazione politica , ‘Il grande comunicatore: dieci anni di Berlusconi sulla ribalta’, New Series, 4, 1, 2004.Google Scholar

4. This distinction is developed in more detail in Roncarolo, Franca, Controllare i media. Il presidente americano e gli apparati nelle campagne di comunicazione permanente , F. Angeli, Milan, 1994.Google Scholar

5. According to some authors, one of the most effective ways of keeping presidential popularity high is to create a climate of ‘permanent crisis’. See Tulis, Jeffrey K., The Rhetorical Presidency , Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1987.Google Scholar

6. See Neustadt, Richard E., for example, who changed his mind about this issue after the first edition of Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership , Wiley, New York, 1960. On the concept of ‘rhetorical presidency’, see Tulis, , The Rhetorical Presidency , and Hart, Roderick P., The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987.Google Scholar

7. Among the many analyses of Berlusconi's communication and rhetorical strategies, see Amadori, Alessandro, Mi consenta: metafore, messaggi e simboli. Come Berlusconi ha conquistato il consenso degli italiani , Scheiwiller, Milan, 2002 and, by the same author, Mi consenta: episodio II. Silvio Berlusconi e l'esercito dei cloni, Scheiwiller, Milan, 2003; D'Agostino, Emilio, ‘Osservazioni sul discorso politico di Silvio Berlusconi’, Quaderni di Scienza politica, 11, Nuova serie, 4, 2, 2004; Fedel, Giorgio, ‘Parola mia. La retorica di Silvio Berlusconi’, Il Mulino, 3, 2003, pp. 463–73. For reflections on Berlusconi's government from a political perspective, see Tuccari, Francesco, (ed.), Il governo Berlusconi: Le parole, i fatti, i rischi, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2002 and the special issue devoted to the effects of Berlusconi's government on the Italian political system by the journal Democrazia e diritto, ‘Il sistema Berlusconi’, 41, 1, 2003.Google Scholar

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9. During the long campaign that ended in 2001 with the victory of the centre-right coalition, Berlusconi exploited all the tools of political marketing in a truly strategic way. He gave new importance to a traditional medium of political communication (Cheles, Luciano, Picture Battles in the Piazza: The Political Poster’, in Cheles, Luciano and Sponza, Lucio (eds), The Art of persuasion. Political Communication in Italy from 1945 to the 1990s , Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2002, pp. 124–79) and, beginning in 2000, covered the walls of Italian cities with various versions of huge posters (6 by 3m) that promoted the image of a leader who is deeply involved in politics, but also close to the public's interests and concerns (see Cheles, Luciano, ‘L'image au pouvoir: Les portraits de Berlusconi’, Vingtième Siècle, 80, 2003, pp. 113–22). In the following spring, he reinforced this message in his flattering photo-autobiography Una storia italiana (‘An Italian Story’) which was sent to every Italian family (see Amadori, Alessandro, Mi consenta: metafore, messaggi e simboli, pp. 21–32). Finally, a few days before the vote, during a popular television programme Porta a porta, Berlusconi signed his famous Contratto con gli italiani putting himself forward as the one true, accountable leader. As a result, he succeeded yet again in capturing the media's attention (see Roncarolo, Franca, ‘Virtual Clashes and Political Games’, in Newell, James (ed.), Berlusconi's Victory: The Italian General Election of 2001, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002, pp. 143–61). On the electoral strategies of Berlusconi, see Marletti, Carlo, ‘The Election Campaign: Political Actors, the Media and Voters’ in Bellucci, Paolo and Bull, Martin (eds), Italian Politics: The Return of Berlusconi, Berghahn Books, New York, Oxford, 2002, pp. 68–84 and Paolucci, Caterina, ‘Campaign Strategies and Tactics: Leaders, Experts and the Media’, in Newell, (ed.), Berlusconi's Victory, pp. 127–42).Google Scholar

10. See http://www.governo.it/Presidente. In addition to the 783 press releases by the Prime Minister, one should consider the 1,441 (as at the end of October 2004) delivered by the government as a whole.Google Scholar

11. The labels are those used on the government website. The messages that are stored under the label ‘interventi’ are addresses to Parliament, statements by the Prime Minister, letters to other foreign leaders about specific problems etc.Google Scholar

12. The first Italian premier to run social advertising, creating a specific Department to do so, was Bettino Craxi. This is not surprising given the well-known attention of the Socialist Party leader to political communication, as demonstrated by the fact that he was the first Italian politician to appoint a personal photographer (see Cheles, Luciano and Sponza, Lucio, ‘Introduction: National Identities and Avenues of Persuasion’, in Cheles, and Sponza, (eds.), The art of persuasion , pp. 1–20). For a short history of ‘public advertising’ in Italy, see Rolando, Stefano, Un paese normale: La comunicazione pubblica negli anni del cambiamento, delle autonomie territoriali e delle reti, Etas libri, Milan, 1998, pp. 83–94). An analysis of Berlusconi's use of political advertisements on television is in Pezzini, Isabella, ‘Advertising Politics on Television: The Party Election Broadcast’, in Cheles, and Sponza, (eds), The Art of Persuasion, pp. 180–95.Google Scholar

13. See, for example, the campaign regarding tax concessions for businesses and the advertisements about the rights of low-income, elderly people to an increased social security pension at http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Campagne/index.html.Google Scholar

14. A good example can be found in the advertisements aimed to fight one of the first effects of the rising cost of living (that is less consumption) with a rhetorical strategy emphasizing the public utility of individual buying (in the advertisements, everybody who met the leading character, a man who was shopping, told him ‘Thanks!’).Google Scholar

15. As is well known, Kennedy was the first to use press conferences as a way of ‘going public’. Regarding the ‘Kennedy system’ and the relationship with the media, see Kernell, , Going Public , pp. 69–70.Google Scholar

16. Ceccarelli, Filippo, ‘Echi da Casa Bianca, discorso presidenziale, scenografia da re’, La Stampa , 22 December 2001.Google Scholar

17. See http://www.governo.it/Presidente/Dichiarazione/senato/senato1.html Google Scholar

18. See De Fiores, Claudio, ‘Uso e abuso del popolo sovrano nella vicenda costituzionale italiana dell'ultimo decennio’, in Dogliani, Mario (ed.), Democrazia e populismo, special issue of Democrazia e diritto , 41, 3, 2003, pp. 11–40. Regarding the relationship between the media and populism, see Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Stewart, Jiulianne and Horsfield, Bruce, (eds.), The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis, Praeger, Westport, Conn., 2003.Google Scholar

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20. The criticism came in the form of various statements from his ministries and the controversy surrounding events in Genoa during the G8 summit in 2001, in addition to disputes provoked by the rise of terrorism.Google Scholar

21. Cited in Calabresi, Mario, ‘Per quattro giorni ha messo a punto fin nei minimi dettagli la conferenza stampa’, La Stampa , 10 August 2001.Google Scholar

22. Cited in Calabresi, Mario, Domani il primo intervento pubblico del presidente del Consiglio dopo le ferie’, La Stampa , 7 September 2001.Google Scholar

23. Cited in Magri, Ugo, Crisi internazionale e futuro dell'economia’, La Stampa , 12 October 2001.Google Scholar

24. As is well known, Berlusconi not only controls the main commercial television stations (which he owns), but also wields considerable power over public television, which is traditionally under the political influence of the governing majority. On the rationale and consequences of Berlusconi's conflict of interests, see Ferrajoli, Luigi, Il berlusconismo e l'appropriazione della sfera pubblica: Un nuovo caso italiano’, Democrazia e diritto , 41, 1, 2003, pp. 21–34. On the lack of autonomy of the Italian media system from politics, see Roncarolo, Franca, A Crisis in the Mirror: Old and New Elements in the Change of Italian Political Communication’, in Neveu, Erik and Kuhn, Raymond (eds.), Political Journalism, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 69–91.Google Scholar

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26. Although Bruno Vespa, the anchorman of Porta a porta, is a journalist, he does not play any role as an opinion maker.Google Scholar

27. See http://www.governo.it/Presidente/Interventi/testo_int.asp?d=18136 Google Scholar

28. See Edwards, George C. III, Campaigning Is Not Governing: Bill Clinton's Rhetorical Presidency’, in Campbell, Colin and Rockman, Bert A. (eds), The Clinton Legacy , Chatham House, New York and London, 2000, pp. 33–47.Google Scholar

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30. The Plan is detailed and discussed in Tuccari, Francesco (ed.), Il governo Berlusconi: Le parole, i fatti, i rischi , Laterza, Rome–Bari, 2002, pp. xi–xiii, where a first evaluation of Berlusconi's government can be found.Google Scholar

31. Rinforzi, Marco Fabio, ‘Manovra per i 100 giorni in una nube di testi’, Il Sole 24 Ore , 3 July 2001.Google Scholar

32. ‘The trade unions hit back’, The Economist , 30 March 2002.Google Scholar

33. Cited in Sorgi, Marcello, ‘Presidente, si calmi’, La Stampa , 27 March 2002.Google Scholar

34. Cited in Pelosi, Gerardo, ‘Art. 18, un'offensiva contro le bugie’, Il Sole 24 Ore , 4 April 2001.Google Scholar

35. Cited in Palocci, Marco, ‘Senza modifiche la previdenza salta’, Il Sole 24 Ore , 31 December 2002.Google Scholar

36. While many supporters of the post-fascist National Alliance and the former Christian Democrats of the UDC are still wary of trimming the public sector, the Northern League opposed cutbacks affecting what its leader Bossi called ‘northern pensions’.Google Scholar

37. The outcome of Berlusconi's economic policies at the mid-term of the governmental mandate is presented in Degni, Marcello, ‘La politica economica del centrodestra: un bilancio a metà legislatura (II)’, in Democrazia e diritto , 42, 1, 2004, pp. 115–30. To evaluate the Italian socio-economic system and its decline, see the data provided by Ricolfi, Luca in the report L'Italia vista da Nord-Ovest: Rapporto annuo sul cambiamento sociale in Italia, Osservatorio del Nord-Ovest, Università di Torino, 2004.Google Scholar

38. See Barber, Tony, ‘Berlusconi's Burden: Italy's Economy Languishes and Reforms Have Stalled’, Financial Times , 25 May 2004.Google Scholar

39. Although all the coalition parties agreed on the principle of tax cuts, the National Alliance and the third-largest government party, the UDC, opposed the scale of the fiscal reform plan and the premier's proposal to direct the cuts at the wealthy as much as at lower-income Italians, and pushed for a fourth bracket for the highest earners. Moreover, Fazio, Antonio, Italy's Central Bank Governor, and the head of Confindustria, Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, have pressed the government to first of all reduce corporate tax in order to halt the decline in the international competitiveness of Italian exporters. See Barber, Tony, ‘Berlusconi Seeks New Minister to Boost Tax Plans’, Financial Times , 8 November 2004.Google Scholar

40. The original plan called for a 12.5 billion Euro reduction in 2005 alone and a reduction to only two brackets.Google Scholar

41. Gianfranco Fini became Italy's Foreign Minister in place of Franco Frattini, who replaced Rocco Buttiglione as Italy's European Commissioner nominee.Google Scholar

42. See Mannheimer, Renato, ‘Fisco risale la fiducia nel premier. “Ma non ha mantenuto le promesse”’, 29 November 2004, Ispo-alaxiagroup poll: http://brunik.altervista.org/20041129085909.html Google Scholar

43. Alongside Berlusconi's image there was a series of large numbers announcing the—more or less true—results of the centre-right government: illegal immigrants down 40 per cent, 1,558 million pensions raised, 21,573 fewer road accidents, 7,646 billion liras for schools and 93 billion liras spent on major new public projects. Note that the largest figures were given in old Liras, not Euros, in order to ensure longer strings of zeros and appeal to Italian nostalgia for the lost currency.Google Scholar

44. The results of the 2004 European and local elections are analysed by the Istituto Cattaneo, http://brunik.altervista.org/20040621192649.html Google Scholar

45. Data from ISPO Limited, one of the leading public opinion pollsters in Italy. This is the Italian branch of the European Election Study Group and its research is published by the best-selling newspaper in Italy, Corriere della Sera. It should be noted, however, that there are no public opinion pollsters equivalent to Gallup in the United States or Sofres in France, and that polls focusing on political problems and actors often produce controversial data.Google Scholar

46. See the data provided by Testa, Silvia in Polena , 1, 1, 2004, p. 175. Regarding the effect of the leader on the success of the centre-right coalition, see Sani, Giacomo, ‘Il fattore B.’, in Caciagli, Mario and Corbetta, Piergiorgio (eds), Le ragioni dell'elettore: Perché ha vinto il centro-destra nelle elezioni italiane del 2001, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, pp. 275–99 and the comments in the article ‘Berlusconi è un vantaggio o un handicap per il centro destra?’, Polena, 1, 1, 2004, pp. 117–21.Google Scholar

47. Cited in Minzolini, Augusto, ‘La forza del cavaliere: nella coalizione non esistono una leadership e una linea politica alternative alla sua’, La Stampa , 27 March 2002.Google Scholar

48. See Mannheimer, Renato ‘Crescono i delusi di FI’, Corriere della Sera , 1 November 2004.Google Scholar

49. Data are quoted in De Gregorio, Concita, ‘Fuga dalla tv se c’è il Cavaliere’, La Repubblica , 8 April 2004.Google Scholar

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51. The Economist , ‘Rose-tinted economics’, 7 December 2002.Google Scholar

52. On the concept of antipolitics see Schedler, Andreas, The End of Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics , New York, St Martin's Press, 1997. An analysis of the role played by antipolitics in Berlusconi's career can be found in Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘L'antipolitica scende in campo’, Comunicazione politica, 5, 1, 2004, pp. 13–24.Google Scholar

53. See Marletti, Carlo, ‘Il ciclo dell'antipolitica e i risultati delle elezioni del 13 maggio in Italia: Verso un nuovo clima d'opinione?’, Comunicazione politica , 3, 1, 2002, pp. 9–31 and Ricolfi, Luca, La frattura etica. La ragionevole sconfitta della sinistra, Naples, L'ancora del mediterraneo, 2002.Google Scholar

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