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Bargaining Community exemptions: the role of Italian actors in the negotiation of state aid to labour and industry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2016

Giorgio Giraudi
Giorgio Giraudi*
Affiliation:
Ricercatore in Scienza Politica, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Sociologia e Scienza Politica, Ponte P. Bucci, Cubo 0B, 87036, Arcavacata di Rende, Cosenza. E-mail: [email protected].
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Summary

This article analyses the role of Italian (institutional and non-institutional) actors in the area of state aid to labour and industry, two particularly sensitive European policies. The comparison between two decisions—the one concerning state incentives for youth employment and the other concerning the double recapitalization of Alitalia—allows the author to conclude that Italian policy preferences are best promoted when a viable compromise solution is first reached domestically and then pushed through the Union, and when Italian actors manage to argue their case in EU-compatible terms.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 9 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Italy in the EU: pigmy or giant? The role of Italian actors in EU policy-making , November 2004 , pp. 189 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

1. In December 2002, the Italian state officially instituted the procedure to recover the illegally granted aids. However, until now, the only action taken was a notification to firms advantaged by illegal YTCs. At the same time, the Italian state stressed that the recovering of these amounts could be opposed by legal action before Italian courts. In short, the Italian state's strategy was deliberately inefficient. In April 2004, the Commission brought an action against the Italian state on the grounds that Italy had failed to adopt all necessary measures to recover the illegal aids. The Italian state has been sentenced to pay the legal expenses, but has still not fulfilled the obligation.Google Scholar

2. GU C 334, p. 4. The document stated that the Commission, although it was generally in favour of aid aimed at creating employment in small and medium-sized firms and in regions eligible for aid for youth employment and the long-term unemployed, would ascertain if the level of aid did not exceed the amount needed for the creation of new jobs. In any case, aid was to be temporary and decrease over time. Aid for the maintenance (and not an increase) in employment could be authorized by the Commission in regions where the standard of living was unusually low or where there was serious underemployment. GU C 74, p. 9.Google Scholar

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