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Italy and the politics of European defence: playing by the logic of multi-level networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2016

Paolo Foradori  and
Paolo Rosa
Paolo Foradori
Affiliation:
Paolo Foradori, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Università di Catania, via Vittorio Emanuele 49, 95131 Catania. E-mail: [email protected].
Paolo Rosa
Affiliation:
Facoltà di Sociologia, Università di Trento, via Verdi 26, 38100 Trento. E-mail: [email protected].
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Summary

The article looks at the role of Italy in the decision-making arena of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), analysing the initiatives it put in place to address and influence the construction of a common defence. The article aims to explain the ability or inability of Italy to build up a consensus around its proposals. By studying two initiatives in the field of European defence and security, it seeks to determine the factors which resulted in the differing outcomes of Italian actions at the European level.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 9 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Italy in the EU: pigmy or giant? The role of Italian actors in EU policy-making , November 2004 , pp. 217 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

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