A Member of Parliament, representing Orissa State, once said in the course of a debate: ‘My first ambition is the glory of Mother India. I know it in my heart of hearts that I am an Indian first and an Indian last. But when you say you are a Bihari, I say I am an Oriya. When you say you are a Bengali, I say I am an Oriya. Otherwise I am an Indian’ (cited in Harrison, 1960). The same words could plausibly be spoken by a Ceylonese or Burmese with other labels substituted. If we succeed in unravelling the meaning of this statement we shall understand a major aspect of South Asian politics.

In the late autumn of 1868 political events in Japan were no longer focused exclusively on Edo, Ōsaka and the lands of the south-western han; all of which could be easily visited by British sailors and diplomats. The Imperial armies had won important victories at Fushimi and Ueno but they had still not gained control of the whole of Japan. The last Shōgun had retired from the conifict but his supporters still mounted stubborn military resistance in Northern Honshū. At this stage it was important for Britain to know the state of this civil war and its likely outcome.

This paper was first presented by Academician Natsagdorj at the XIV International Congress of Orientalists at New Delhi in 1964. As it was presented in Russian, one of the internationally recognized languages at the conference, I have translated it here from the Russian text rather than the underlying Mongol original. The translation has been approved by the author.

In September 1963, with the formation of Malaysia, British military establishments situated on either side of the Johore Straits were brought within the compass of a single polity. Within less than two years the Malaysian union was put asunder and those military establishments were divided by national frontiers. Such a situation was viewed with displeasure by the British Government which had supported the establishment of Malaysia in part to avoid such a prospect. To add to the problem of dealing with two governments, there was the complicating factor of the unhappy relationship between them and with it the danger of Britain being caught up in the interplay of differences to the extent of prejudicing the value of her military presence.