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Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Andrew Selth
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The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom … respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

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Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , July 1986 , pp. 483 - 507
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

References

1 Janke, P., Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography (Harvester Press, Brighton, 1983), pp. 135et.seq.Google Scholar See also the Annual of Power and Conflict 1978–79: A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1979), pp. 416–19.Google Scholar

2 Before 1948, the term ‘Burmese’ was usually given to ethnic Burmans with the various hill peoples identified by their ethnic names, such as Kachins, Chins, Shans etc. After 1948, when the independent state of Burma demanded an adjective to describe its citizens, the name ‘Burmese’ was used for all the population of the Union, while the term ‘Burman’ was reserved for members of that particular ethnic stock. To complicate matters, however, the British administration in Burma prior to 1948 often used to include the Mons and Arakanese, and at times the Shans, in the term ‘Burmese’ and the same term is still the only one which adequately describes the kingdom which the British conquered in the nineteenth century, despite the fact that it was dominated at times by a Burman monarch and at others by a Shan. Wherever possible, the various racial distinctions made in this paper reflect the established usage.

3 Taylor, R. H., ‘Burma in the Anti-Fascist War’, in McCoy, A. W. (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980).Google Scholar

4 Silverstein, J., Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity (Rutger's University Press, New Brunswick, 1980), p. 50.Google Scholar

5 Crozier, B., The Rebels: A Study of Post War Insurrections (Chatto and Windus, London, 1960), p. 84.Google Scholar

6 Kachin, Chin and Karen soldiers were used, however, to help quell the Hsaya San rebellion of 1930–32. This rebellion, inspired by a complex mixture of economic, social and religious factors, was later appropriated by the more politically conscious Burmans in the cities as an example of widespread nationalist feeling against the British. Both the rebels and the politicians in question were overwhelmingly Burman. See, for example, Herbert, P., The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–32) Reappraised, Working Paper no. 27, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (Monash University, Melbourne, 1982)Google Scholar, and by Solomon, R., Saya San and the Burmese Rebellion, Rand Paper P-404 (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1969).Google Scholar

7 This description of the ethnic composition of Burma is necessarily very brief. Southeast Asia is one of the world's most complicated linguistic regions-linguistic criteria being the most common basis for the classification of tribes and ethnic minorities. One survey has claimed 242 different spoken languages and dialects in Burma, or by ethnographical analysis, 172 different ‘tribes’. For a scholarly study of this question, see Kunstadter, P., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967), vol. 1 pp. 75et. seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 These figures are based on the wartime estimates used by Cruickshank, C., SOE in the Far East (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983), p. 163.Google Scholar Different estimates are given elsewhere, but as the 1941 Census figures for race were lost as a result of the Japanese invasion all such information must be considered approximate only. Crozier gives a figure of 1,367,673 for the number of Karens in 1949, although the Karens themselves claimed over 2 million. Crozier, , The Rebels, p. 85.Google Scholar

9 The coastal strips of Arakan and Tenasserim were lost to the British in the First Burmese War of 1824–26. In the Second Burmese War of 1852 Britain won control over the Irrawaddy delta and Pegu district as far north as Prome. The remainder of the country (and the Burmese monarchy) fell in the Third Burmese War of 1885. See, for example, Trager, F. N., Burma: From Kingdom to Independence: A Historical and Political Analysis (Pall Mall Press, London, 1966).Google Scholar A more partisan account is given in Htin Aung, The Stricken Peacock: Anglo-Burmese Relations 1752–1948 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965).Google Scholar

10 For an account of this period see Crosthwaite, C., The Pacification of Burma (Frank Cass, London, 1968).Google Scholar Sir Charles Crosthwaite was Chief Commissioner of Burma during the period 1887–90. The Burmese did in fact occupy the Shan States for a period.

11 The chief executive of Burma was elevated to Lieutenant Governor in 1897. At that time a small Legislative Council was established, consisting of four officials and five nominated non-officials. In 1909 the Morley-Minto reforms for India were applied to Burma and the Lieutenant Governor's Council was enlarged to fifteen with two elected members. One of the nominated members of the Council was drawn from the Indian community, another from the Shan chiefs. A Shan chief had been on the 1897 council also.

12 Furnivall, J. S., Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York University Press, New York, 1956), p. 168.Google Scholar

13 Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, p. 29.Google Scholar

14 San, Aung, The Political Legacy of Aung San, compiled by Silverstein, J., Data Paper no. 86, Southeast Asia Program (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1972), p. 6.Google Scholar

15 Maung, Maung, From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements in Burma 1920–1940, ANU Monographs on South Asia no. 4 (Manohar, Delhi, 1980), pp. 197, 230et. seq.Google Scholar

16 As early as 1930 the Karen leaders realized that reserved Parliamentary seats alone would not protect them from the Burman majority, and began to agitate for a separate Karen state (Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, pp. 45–6Google Scholar). This constituted a radical change in Karen policy at the time.

17 The Simon Commission was charged with investigating the operation of the 1922 reforms. The Burma Round Table discussions were on the future political development of Burma.

18 Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, pp. 43–4.Google Scholar

19 Nu, U, Saturday's Son (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975), p. 164.Google Scholar

20 Furnivall, , Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 180.Google Scholar See also Furnivall's, shorter The Governance of Modem Burma (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958), p. 10Google Scholar and Harvey, G. E., British Rule in Burma 1824–1942 (Faber, London, 1946), p. 40et. seq.Google Scholar

21 Maung Maung claims that Burman members of Parliament agitated for the creation of more representative military units not from an awareness of the country's needs but from feelings of nationalism and Burman pride. Maung, Maung, Burma in the Family of Nations (Djambatan, Amsterdam 1956), p. 90.Google Scholar F. S. V. Donnison described the problem in quite different terms: ‘The majority race would be unrepresented in the military forces of the new state. And the disadvantage of this would not be merely sentimental or psychological: the loyalty of the tribesmen from whom the army was constituted would be in the last resort not to the Burma of the Burmans but the tribal communities of the mountain fringes of Burma, communities whose interests were often sharply divided from those of Burma proper, and most of whom regarded the Burman with a blend of distrust, contempt and fear.’ Donnison, F. S. V., Public Administration in Burma: A Study of Developments During the British Connection (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1953), p. 97.Google Scholar

22 Furnivall, , Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 183.Google Scholar See also Than, U. Ba, The Roots of the Revolution (Director of Information, Rangoon, 1962), p. 23.Google Scholar

23 Furnivall, , Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 184.Google Scholar

24 Maung, Maung, Burma in the Family of Nations, p. 90.Google Scholar

25 Than, U Ba, Roots of Revolution, p. 24.Google Scholar His claim that some members of the Burma Rifles were ‘won over’ is confirmed by Slim, who reported desertions from ‘Burman units’. Slim, W., Defeat into Victory (Cassell and Co., London, 1956), p. 34.Google Scholar

26 See, for example, Won-zoon, Yoon, Japan's Scheme for the Liberation of Burma: The Role of the Minami Kikan and the ‘Thirty Comrades’, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 27 (Ohio University, Athens, 1973).Google Scholar

27 Most of the Thirty Comrades were drawn from a secret sub-group of the Dobama Asiayone formed in 1939 and known as the Burma Revolutionary Party. At least one appears to have been of mixed race. One of the Thirty Comrades died during training in China, and only 29 returned to Burma in the BIA.

28 Mahabandoola was the celebrated Burmese general who won a resounding victory over the British forces in 1824, during the First Burmese War. See Stewart, A. T. Q., The Pagoda War: Lord Dufferin andthe Fall of the Kingdom of Ava (Faber, London, 1972), pp. 37–8.Google Scholar

29 Estimates of the size of the BIA vary greatly depending on the political sympathies of the source. The figure of 10,000 is from Won-zoon, Yoon, ‘Japan's Occupation of Burma 1941–1945’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1971), p. 173.Google Scholar Some estimates range as high as 200,000 (Lebra, J., Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II (Heinemann, Hong Kong, 1977), p. 65.Google Scholar Trager, citing a rather unreliable Burmese source, claims 50,000 (Trager, , Burma: From Kingdom to Independence, p. 59).Google Scholar U Ba Than seems safe in claiming 23,000 BIA members by May 1942, Roots of Revolution, p. 33.Google Scholar

30 In 1941 there were about 1 million Indians in Burma, most in the cities. In 1930 there had been severe anti-Indian riots in Rangoon and in 1938 severe anti-Muslim riots. Racial hatreds were fuelled on both occasions by economic difficulties faced by the predominantly Burman agriculturalists in the districts. See Collis, M., Last and First in Burma (1941–1948) (Faber, London, 1956), p. 106Google Scholar, and Maw, Ba, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution 1939–1946 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968), p. 198.Google Scholar

31 See in particular Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, pp. 187–96Google Scholar and Morrison, I., Grandfather Longlegs: The Life and Gallant Death of Major H. P. Seagrim (Faber, London, 1947), pp. 70et. seq. and 183 et. seq.Google Scholar

32 Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, p. 155.Google Scholar Even communities of loyal Burmans sought Japanese protection from BIA mobs. See U, U Ba, My Burma: The Autobiography of a President (Taplinger, New York, 1959), p. 160.Google Scholar

33 The term is Maung Maung's, in his hagiographical Burma and General Ne Win (Asia, Bombay, 1969), p. 122.Google Scholar

34 Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, p. 200.Google Scholar Also, Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, p. 54.Google Scholar U Ba Than is incorrect when he states that the BIA never went into the Shan, Kachin or Chin areas. They made one foray into the Shan States in 1942, referred to above. Than, U Ba, Roots of Revolution, p. 32.Google Scholar

35 The Burma Independence Army was disbanded by the Japanese in the middle of 1942, largely because of its unruly behaviour but also because the Japanese feared that such a rapidly growing force could constitute a threat to their own position in Burma. In July 1942 a smaller, more disciplined force of some 3000 BIA men was selected to form the Burma Defence Army (BDA) and steps taken to make this the core of an independent Burmese military force under Japanese control. Aung San was placed in command and Thakins Ne Win, Yan Naing and Ze Ya commanded its three battalions. A Military Academy was established outside Rangoon. When Burma received its ‘independence’ from the Japanese in September 1943, Aung Sang was made Minister for Defence and the army renamed the Burma National Army, under Ne Win.

36 Donnison, F. S. V., British Military Administration in the Far East 1943–1946 (HMSO, London, 1956), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

37 Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, p. 202.Google Scholar

38 Ibid., p. 203–4.

39 Ibid., p. 321.

40 Ibid., p. 195, Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 92.Google Scholar Burmese, for example, was made the official language of instruction in all the country's schools, instead of English.

41 Nu, U., Burma Under the Japanese: Pictures and Portraits (Macmillan, London, 1954), p. 98Google Scholar, and Maung, Maung (ed.) Aung San of Burma, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962), pp. 49et. seq. and 72 et. seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 Because the Shans were often counted among the Burmans (as were the Mons and Arakanese, assimilated to a large degree since they were included in Britain's Indian possessions in 1826) it is difficult to specify how many Shans actually took an active part in the AFO. Silverstein's figure of 5000, however, seems too high. Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, p. 60.Google Scholar

43 Some accounts sympathetic to the Karens have tried to suggest that this apparent defection to the Thakins was a ruse, and that the Karen battalion of the BNA planned to turn on its Burman fellows when the Japanese hold was weakened. In addition, some authors have painted the two Karen officers concerned either as unscrupulous turncoats or innocents duped by Aung San. Neither explanation seems plausible, although one Karen officer may have become a Kempeitei informer. The Karen battalion served Aung San faithfully after March 1945, helping to fight the Japanese, but otherwise to keep the peace among the delta communities. See for example Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 115Google Scholar and Maung, Maung (ed.), Aung San of Burma, p. 50.Google Scholar

44 Quoted in Trager, F. N. (ed.), Burma: Japanese Military Administration: Selected Documents 1941–1945 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971), p. 15.Google Scholar

45 Quoted in Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, pp. 282–3.Google Scholar

46 Aung, Htin, The Stricken Peacock, p. 111–12Google Scholar and Won-zoon, Yoon, Japan's Occupation of Burma, p. 189.Google Scholar It should be remembered here that the Japanese were at some pains to win over anti-British elements in India, and needed to demonstrate their comradely attitude to this other oppressed' Asian people.

47 Ba Maw speaks in particular of the ‘Korea men’ ie Japanese who had served in Korea and viewed them (and presumably other subject races) with undisguised contempt. It is not clear whether or not he included in this term Koreans who had joined the Japanese armed forces and were serving in Burma. They, too, earned an unenviable reputation among the local population and Allied prisoners of war alike. Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, p. 206Google Scholar and Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 95.Google Scholar

48 Maw, Ba, Breakthrough, p. 205.Google Scholar

49 Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, p. 49.Google Scholar

50 Taylor, , ‘Burma in the Anti-Fascist War’, p. 167.Google Scholar

51 This complex period of political manoeuvring and development is perhaps dealt with best by Robert Taylor in his essay, already mentioned. It would seem clear from Taylor's careful research that, while seeking independence from Britain, the communists were never prepared to work with the Japanese fascists. Once the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were at war, however, an arrangement with the Allies was ideologically possible. Together with the loyal Karens in the delta they made early contacts with SOE and were only joined by the Thakins later, after the latter had become disenchanted with the Japanese and sought assistance in rising against them.

52 Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 68et. seq.Google Scholar and Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, pp. 44–6.Google Scholar

53 Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 69.Google ScholarKirby, S. W., in The War Against Japan (5 vols) (HMSO, London, 1965), vol. 4 p. 250Google Scholar puts the number at around 1500.

54 Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 45.Google Scholar

55 Slim, , Defeat into Victory, p. 113.Google Scholar

56 Donnison, , British Military Administration, p. 13.Google Scholar See also Heilbrunn, O., Warfare in the Enemy's Rear (Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 97–101Google Scholar and Fellowes-Gordon, I., The Battle for Naw Seng's Kingdom: General Stilwell's North Burma Campaign and its Aftermath (Cooper, London, 1971), p. 24.Google Scholar

57 Kirby, , in War against Japan, p. 34.Google Scholar

58 Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 148Google Scholar and Tinker, H., The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957) p. 14.Google Scholar Cruickshank states that of the 270 Burmese recruited in India for operations in Burma half were from the hills, the remainder from the plains. It would appear that most of the former were Karens. Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 12.Google Scholar

59 European Resistance Movements 1939–1945: First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements held at Liege-Bruxelles-Breedonk,14–17 September 1958(Pergamon, London, 1960), p. 354.Google Scholar The senior British representative at the conference was referring to SOE's Far Eastern operations as part of an address on SOE's primary theatre of operations, i.e. Europe.

60 Lebra, , Japanese Trained Armies, p. 64.Google Scholar

61 The description is Churchill's, given in the House of Commons in 1947 when speaking against the move to grant Burma independence. There is no reason to doubt, however, that he held the same view during the war when the situation in Burma was so much more desperate. He is quoted in Donnison, , British Military Administration, pp. 369–70.Google Scholar

62 Ibid., p. 71 and Collis, , Last and First, p. 187.Google Scholar That the British civil authorities were not immune from these feelings is clear from U, U Ba, My Burma, p. 177.Google Scholar

63 Quoted in Donnison, , British Military Administration, p. 72.Google Scholar

64 Ibid.., p. 73. There were reports, for example, of acts of ‘ruthlessness’ by members of the Fourteenth Army towards the Burmese population.

65 Collis, , Last and First, p. 207.Google Scholar

66 Ibid., p. 199.

67 Burma: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government, Cmd. 663505 1945 (HMSO, London, 1945).Google Scholar

68 Heilbrunn cites one case of different groups of levies being used in the same area of northern Burma by the United States Army, the Office of Strategic Services and SOE, all without any knowledge of the others. Heilbrunn, , Warfare, pp. 97–8.Google Scholar The only regular American army unit was the 5307th Provisional Regiment, soon christened ‘Merrill's Marauders’ by the correspondents attached to Stilwell's Northern Combat Area Command.

69 Cruickshank names twelve secret organizations in all, but the matter is greatly confused by changes in names, and the use of broad titles which encompass more than one organization. There were also groups like Dah Force, which operated with the Chindit long-range penetration force, and which tended to be viewed by some as a clandestine organization. As far as can be determined, those organizations were as follows:

Force 136 (Special Operations Executive)—responsible for sabotage, subversion and the preparation of resistance groups, also intelligence (controlled from London)

Inter Service Liaison Department (Secret Intelligence Service)—responsible for the collection of secret intelligence from, and counter espionage in, enemy territory (London)

V Force—which operated fighting patrols and collected intelligence deep inside enemy territory (controlled locally)

Z Force—responsible for gathering intelligence up to sixty miles into enemy territory (locally)

Combined Operations Pilotage Parties (sometimes called the Small Operations Group)—controlling maritime raids and special tasks by Combined Operations, the Commandos and others, similar to those functions performed by the Special Boat Squadron elsewhere during the same period

D Division (also D Force)—responsible for strategic deception

E Group-responsible for prisoner-of-war escape matters and some rescue work (formally under London, but largely under local control)

Air Sea Rescue (local control)

Psychological Warfare Division (locally, but under London)

Burma Intelligence Corps—controlling guides, interpreters for forward patrols and assessing information received

Detachment 101 (Office of Strategic Services)—the United States equivalent of the British SOE and SIS (Washington)

Office of War Information—US equivalent of the British Political Warfare Executive (Washington)

See Cruickshank, , SOE, pp. 169–70Google Scholar; Kirby, , vol. 4, pp. 30–1Google Scholar and Heilbrunn, , Warfare, p. 38 and 97–101.Google Scholar A slightly different overview from the SOE side is given in Sweet-Escott, B., Baker Street Irregular (Methuen, London, 1965), pp. 233–4.Google Scholar None of these sources mention the various groups engaged in collecting electronic intelligence, which to a large degree remain secret. See, for example, Lewin, R., The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983), p. 244et. seq.Google Scholar

70 The most readable account of this campaign is unquestionably Tuchman, B., Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–1945 (Bantam, New York, 1972).Google Scholar

71 Sweet-Escott, , Baker Street Irregular, p. 234.Google Scholar

72 Collis, , Last and First, p. 231.Google Scholar

73 Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 5.Google Scholar

74 Fellowes-Gordon, , The Battle, p. 18.Google Scholar

75 Ibid., p. 58.

76 Morrison, , Grandfather Longlegs, p. 17Google Scholar and Tinker, , Union of Burma, p. 25.Google Scholar

77 Donnison, , British Military Administration, p. 348.Google Scholar

78 Ibid.

79 Cruickshank, , SOE, pp. 175–7.Google Scholar

80 Donnison, , British Military Administration, p. 348Google Scholar and Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 170.Google Scholar

81 Sweet-Escott, , Baker Street Irregular, p. 245Google Scholar

82 Slim, , p. 479et. seq.Google Scholar and Cruickshank, , SOE pp. 170–7.Google Scholar See also Donnison, , British Military Administration p. 349Google Scholar and Sweet-Escott, , Baker Street Irregular pp. 244–5.Google Scholar

83 Callahan, R., Burma 1942–1945 (Davis-Poynter, London, 1978), pp. 147 and 152–3.Google Scholar

84 Beevor, J. G., SOE: Recollections and Reflections 1940–45 (Bodley Head, London, 1981), p. 221.Google Scholar See also Sweet-Escott, , Baker Street Irregular, p. 245.Google Scholar It is ironic, in the light of SOE's confident comparison with the situation in Greece, that the War Cabinet in London should later specifically warn Mountbatten against the creation of another EAM-ELAS in Burma. See Donnison, , British Military Administration, p. 345Google Scholar and Mountbatten's own Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia 1943–1945 (reprinted by The English Book Store, Delhi, 1960), pp. 142–5.Google Scholar

85 Donnison, , op. cit. p. 349.Google Scholar Sweet-Escott, who was based in Kandy with SOE at this time, appears a little confused over this particular matter. He states that it was the Governor of Burma, Dorman-Smith, not CAS(B), who was unhappy about arming the BNA. It seems clear, however, that it was the civil affairs officers of CAS(B) who became so agitated and not the Governor, who was apparently prepared to live with the decision on the grounds of operational necessity (Sweet-Escott, , Baker Street Irregular, p. 244).Google Scholar Beevor is no guide in this matter as he was based in Europe and draws heavily on Sweet- Escott's account in discussing SOE's Burma operations (Beevor, , SOE: Recollections, pp. 220–2).Google Scholar

86 Cruickshank, , SOE, p. 177.Google Scholar

87 Mountbatten, , Report, p. 143.Google Scholar

88 Ibid., pp. 143–5.

89 Taylor has suggested that, had the AFO/AFPFL not been given such recognition in 1944–45, the situation in Burma after the war could have been quite different. There is no escaping the fact, however, that Aung San had won the support of most Burmans and could exercise enormous leverage through them.

90 Silverstein, , Burmese Politics, p. 61.Google Scholar See also Maung, Maung, Burma and Ne Win, p. 137Google Scholar and U, U BaMy Burma, p. 189.Google Scholar

91 Quoted in Maung, Maung, Aung San of Burma, p.98.Google Scholar

92 Donnison, F. S. V., Burma (Benn, London, 1970), p. 127.Google Scholar See also Sweet-Escott, , p. 248.Google Scholar

93 U, U Ba, My Burma, pp. 177–85Google Scholar, Maung, Maung, Aung San of Burma, p. 150Google Scholar and Hall, D. G. E., Burma (Hutchinson, London, 1950), p. 15.Google Scholar Even today it is possible to hear stories from older Burmese about British soldiers who were thought to have joined the Karens in their insurrection against the new Burmese government after 1948.

94 Burma: Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry: Report submitted to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and to the Government of Burma, Cmd. 7138 (06 1947) (HMSO, London, 1947).Google Scholar

95 Quoted in ibid., p. 1.