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He, Who Has Sown the Wind: Karakhan, the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1925–26, and the failure of Soviet policy in northeast China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2014

NIKITA VUL
NIKITA VUL*
Affiliation:
History Department, Peking University, China Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article deals with the Sino–Soviet conflict of 1925–26 over the Chinese Eastern Railway, with special attention given to its background and consequences. In 1924, the Chinese Eastern Railway became a joint venture between the Soviet Union and China, creating fresh friction between the joint Soviet and Chinese managers which culminated in general manager A.N. Ivanov's prohibition on transporting military cargoes and troops, and Ivanov's arrest by Manchurian warlord-general Zhang Zuolin. Some scholars and diplomatists have viewed Ivanov's prohibition and the simultaneous rebellion by Chinese general Guo Songling against Zhang as a Soviet attempt to replace Zhang with a more manageable warlord. But this article argues that although the prohibition—a typical instance of back-and-forth Soviet diplomacy—was a coincidence, it was primarily the result of Soviet ambassador Lev M. Karakhan's tough stance and his rash decision-making, undertaken without seeking advice from Moscow. Zhang's victory in the 1926 clash convinced the Chinese that they had the power to take repressive measures against the Soviet Union's citizens and institutions, which led to the Sino–Soviet conflict of 1929 and exacerbated Japanese alarm over the Soviet's increasing strength in the region. This was to be a factor in the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 by Japan's Guandong Army, which eventually led to global war. This article, therefore, deals with the origins of world-changing events and thus is interesting to Modern Asian Studies’ wider readership.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 6 , November 2014 , pp. 1670 - 1694
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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Footnotes

*

I thank the anonymous referees and the editor. I would also like to thank Michael E. Chapman, associate professor of History at Peking University, for his assistance in the preparation of this article and for proofreading. I would also like to express my gratitude to Bruce A. Elleman, research professor, Maritime History Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College, for valuable comments on the draft.

References

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3 See, for example, Weiyun, Ma (2010). Zhongdong tielu yu Heilongjiang wenhua: Zhong-E (Su) guanxi zhong zhongdong tielu wenti [The CER and Heilongjiang's culture: The problem of the CER in Sino-Russian (Soviet) relations] (Harbin: Heilongjiang daxue chubanshe), pp. 153–59Google Scholar; Changchun, Zheng (1987). Zhongdong tielu lishi bian nian: 1895–1952 [The history of the CER in 1895–1952: Chronological order of the events] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe)Google Scholar.

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9 Karakhan mentions in his letter to Georgy Chicherin, people's commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government, that he threatened Zhang Zuolin with Soviet military invasion of Manchuria. He told Zhang that the Soviet state had an earnest desire to peacefully resolve the Railway issue ‘although the military option will not present any problems at all’. L.M. Karakhan to G.V. Chicherin, Beijing, 11 September 1923, SCKD, p. 73.

10 F5728/5681/10, Weekly Summary of the Events in China, 27 November 1925, in Jarman, Robert L. (ed.) (2001). China: Political Reports, 1911–1960. Vol. 3: 1924–27 (London: Archive Editions), p. 189Google Scholar, cited in Lensen, Damned Inheritance, pp. 85, 87.

11 For the details about the conclusion of these treaties, and the events that preceded them, see Elleman, Bruce A. (1994). ‘The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924–1925’, Journal of Asian Studies, 53:2, pp. 459–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On 20 January 1925, the Soviet Union also signed a convention with Japan. This convention recognized the validity of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, and Japan's authority over the South Manchurian Railway, which helped support the Soviet goal of taking full control of the Railway away from China.

12 See Article I, Article VI, Article IX, clauses (1), (2), (3) and (5) of ‘Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ in Hollington Kong Tong (1929). Facts About the Chinese Eastern Railway Situation (with Documents) (n.p.; n.d.), pp. 132, 134–35.

13 See the ‘Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway’ in Tong, Facts, pp. 137–40.

14 Sladkovskyi, M.I. (1977). Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskih otnosheniyi SSSR s Kitayem: 1917–1974 [The history of trade economic relations between USSR and China] (Moscow: Nauka), p. 63Google Scholar.

15 See the ‘Agreement between the Government of the Autonomous Three Provinces and Soviet Russia’ in Tong, Facts, pp. 141–47.

16 Elleman, ‘The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy’, p. 474.

17 Usov, V.N. (2002). Sovetskaya razvedka v Kitae: 20-ye gody 20 veka [Soviet intelligence in China: The 1920s] (Moscow: Olma-press), p. 127Google Scholar.

18 Although it might seem that the Chinese acted under pressure from the new Soviet administration, it is most likely that the Chinese wanted both to please the Soviets and to execute their own plans—they had expressed great dissatisfaction with Ostroumov as early as February 1924, and had even organized demonstrations demanding his deposition. See F2304/2304/10 China Annual Report, 1924, Palairet to Chamberlain, Beijing, 7 May 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 140. Ostrumov's case ended on 12 September when all prisoners were granted amnesty. See Political Summary of Consular Reports for Quarter, ending 30 September, in ibid, p. 215.

19 Ablova, K.V.Zh.D. i rossiskaya emigratsiya v Kitae, pp. 158–59.

20 See F2304/2304/10 China Annual Report, 1924, Palairet to Chamberlain, Beijing, 7 May 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 141.

21 Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, p. 179.

22 F6107/2/10, Macleay to Chamberlain, Beijing, 28 October 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 255.

23 Elleman, ‘The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy’, p. 476; see F2304/2304/10 China Annual Report, 1924, Palairet to Chamberlain, Beijing, 7 May 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 141; Political Summary for the March Quarter 1925, British Legation, Beijing, 5 May, 1925, in ibid, p. 197.

24 F3028/3028/10 China Annual Report, 1925, Macleay to Chamberlain, Beijing, 2 June 1926, in ibid, p. 306; Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 17.

25 Political Summary for the March Quarter 1925, British Legation, Beijing, 5 May 1925, in ibid, p. 208; Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, p. 184; Ablova, Chinese Eastern Railway, p. 163; Note of USSR Plenipotentiary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Shen Ruilin, 23 May 1925, DUFP, Vol. 8, pp. 327–30.

26 F3028/3028/10 China Annual Report, 1925, Macleay to Chamberlain, Beijing, 2 June 1926, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 307; Note of USSR plenipotentiary in China to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Zhengting 19 January 1926, DUFP, Vol. 9, pp. 37–40; Telegram of Consul General of the USSR in Harbin to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 22 January 1926, in ibid, pp. 43–44; Note of USSR plenipotentiary in China to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Zhengting, 22 January 1926, ibid, Vol. 9, p. 44.

27 Note of USSR plenipotentiary in China to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Zhengting, 23 January 1926, DUFP, Vol. 9, pp. 47–58.

28 On the International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy in 1926, DUFP, Vol. 9, p. 673.

29 F2300/2/1, Palairet to Chamberlain, Beijing, 5 May 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 241; China Express and Telegraph, 11 June 1925, p. 404.

30 Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 15 February 1925, SCKD, p. 429. This plan was put into effect, as John Powell mentioned that Feng's soldiers carried Russian rifles, some of them American made, which had been sold or given to the tsarist government in the First World War. See Powell, Twenty-five Years in China, p. 86.

31 Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 5 December 1924, SCKD, p. 395; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 1 March 1925, SCKD, pp. 462–63; Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 15 February 1925, SCKD, p. 429; Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 21 March 1925, SCKD, p. 477; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 22 March 1925, SCKD, p. 486.

32 Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 22 March 1925, SCKD, p. 492; Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 4 May 1925, SCKD, p. 496; Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, pp. 523–24; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 530.

33 Stalin to Karakhan, Moscow, 29 May 1925, SCKD, pp. 525–27. Feng, of course, did his best to make the region he controlled ‘self-supporting and capable of producing large revenues’ and ‘employed an extraordinary variety of methods to raise funds’. For more details, see Sheridan, James E. (1966). Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-Hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 151–52, p. 157Google Scholar.

34 Memorandum Report of Unshlikht and Borotnovskyi to Stalin, 30 September 1925, AUCP(b), p. 631; Protocol No. 12 of the Session of the Chinese Commission of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of AUCP(b), Moscow, 28 September 1925, AUCP(b), p. 616.

35 In total during April–August 1925, the Political Bureau of AUCP(b) made up their minds to send Feng 16,000 rifles and over 9,000,000 rounds of ammuniton. See Protocols of the Sessions of Chinese Commission of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of AUCP(b): Protocol No. 1, Moscow, 17 April 1925; Protocol No. 2, Moscow, 29 May 1925; Protocol No. 8, Moscow, 29 August 1925, AUCP(b), pp. 548, 567–68, 606.

36 Protocol No. 2 of the Session of Chinese Commission of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of AUCP(b), Moscow, 29 May 1925, in ibid, p. 566. F6107/2/10, Macleay to Chamberlain, Beijing, 28 October 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 254.

37 F5728/5681/10, Weekly Summary of Events in China, 27 November 1925, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 189.

38 V.A. Trifonov was arrested on 21 June 1937 and sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on 15 March 1938 for being a member of a Trotskyist subversive-saboteur organization. He was executed on the same day.

39 ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’ [From Trifonov's Chinese archive] in Problemy dalnego vostoka [Far Eastern Affairs] No. 3 (Moscow: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, 1990) pp. 110–23, p. 115; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 1 March 1925, SCKD, p. 462.

40 The same was true about propaganda work. As Sheridan points out: ‘From the very beginning, Feng showed himself reluctant to permit. . . Russian political activity in his army. He gladly accepted Russian assistance, but when it came to anything that threatened to loosen his own tight control over his troops, the Russians found Feng frustratingly obdurate.’ Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 165.

41 ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’, pp. 116, 121.

42 Cited in Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 90; Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova, pp. 116, 121.

43 Although the Soviet state at least had some influence over Feng Yuxiang, it had virtually no means by which to manipulate Guo Songling.

44 Frunze's report on the politico-military situation in China submitted to Political Bureau of the Central Committee of AUCP(b), Moscow, 13 October 1925, AUCP(b), p. 641; Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 4 May 1925, SCKD, p. 497; P.I. Smolentsev's letter of explanation regarding the plan for material support for the Nationalist Army and Canton, Moscow, 7 October 1925, AUCP(b), p. 637; Extract from Frunze's letter attached to the Protocol No. 86 of the Session of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of AUCP(b), Moscow, 29 October 1925, AUCP(b), p. 655.

45 Usov, Sovetskaya razvedka, pp. 128–29.

46 Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 86.

47 Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 25 November 1924, SCKD, p. 371; Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 1 June 1925, SCKD, pp.536–37; Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 2 June 1925, SCKD, p. 538.

48 Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 1 June 1925, SCKD, p. 536.

49 In the beginning of January 1925 Karakhan demanded that Stalin hand over responsibility for the Railway to him, because ‘otherwise the mistakes will be made and precedents established, which will cost us dearly. Not a single direction concerning the CER should be given without consulting with me. . . Now I am watching every step [by the CER's administration] and instruct about everything, including the appointments on major posts because I know well the situation there.’ Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 9 January 1925, SCKD, p. 420.

50 Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 525; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 531.

51 Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 533.

52 Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 525.

53 Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 23 June 1925, SCKD, p. 551.

54 Trifonov mentioned in his diary that Karakhan believed that Chinese people perceived Soviet assistance to Feng as assistance for the popular movement. If the Soviet Union were to be active in Manchuria during conflict between Zhang and Feng (to the extent of sending troops to the Chinese Eastern Railway), Chinese people would perceive it not as an ‘imperialistic attempt of seizure’ but as intervention on behalf of the popular movement. In ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’, p. 123.

55 ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’, p. 117.

56 Trotsky, for example, advocated a less aggressive policy towards China in general and recommended, in particular, ‘that the CER railway administration had to be more responsive to its Chinese partners’. For more details, see Elleman, Bruce A. (1997). Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe), p. 136Google Scholar.

57 ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’, p. 118.

58 Karakhan to Stalin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, pp. 523–24; Karakhan to Chicherin, Beijing, 29 May 1925, SCKD, p. 529.

59 F2300/2/1, Palairet to Chamberlain, Beijing, 5 May, in Jarman (ed.), China: Political Reports, p. 241.

60 ‘Iz kitaiskogo arhiva Trifonova’, p. 122; Letter of L.M.Karakhan to J.V. Stalin, Beijing, 17 July 1925, SCKD, p. 564.

61 Cited in Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 88–89.

62 Cited in Patrikeeff, Felix (2002). Russian Politics in Exile: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924–1931 (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 16 March 1926, SCKD, p. 610. Of course, such a ‘fall of the scales from the eyes’ did not stop certain Chinese political groups, like Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. They went on using the Soviet Union and Soviet help as leverage in their own internal disputes, promising the Soviets much more than they delivered. Once they attained their objectives, they quickly broke with the Soviet Union. For more details, see Conrad Brandt (1958). Stalin's Failure in China, 1924–1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

64 Elleman, ‘The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy’, p. 480.

65 SCKD, p. 611.

66 Ashton-Gwatkin, cited in Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 86

67 Letter of G.V. Chicherin to L.M. Karakhan, Moscow, 5 February 1926, SCKD, p. 599.

68 Letter of G.V. Chicherin to L.M. Karakhan, Moscow, 16 March 1926, SCKD, p. 610.

69 Karakhan's speech at the session of the commission Political Bureau of Central Committee of AUCP(b), Beijing, 11 February 1926, in Leutner, M. and Titarenko, M.L. (eds) (1996). VKP(b), Komintern i natsionalno-revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae: dokumenty t.2 (Ch.1) 1926–1927 [AUCP(b), Comintern and national-revolutionary movement in China: Documents, Vol. 2, (Part. 1) 1926–27] (Moscow: Buklet), p. 71Google Scholar.

70 Ibid, pp. 74–75.

71 Chicherin to Karakhan, Moscow, 16 March 1926, SCKD, p. 611.

72 Cited in Lensen, Damned Inheritance, p. 88.

73 Patrikeeff, Russian Politics in Exile, p. 28.