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The Freerider and the Cartel: Siam and the International Tin Restriction Agreements, 1931–1941

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

John Hillman
John Hillman
Affiliation:
Trent University
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Extract

Resource cartels face a fundamental organizational problem. While production control can secure higher prices, these are enjoyed by all producers, regardless of whether they are members of the cartel or not. Those who take the benefits without making a contribution to its costs are freeriders, and they can destroy the conditions under which effective collective action is possible. If resource cartels are to make an important contribution to improving the terms under which peripheral nations participate in the world economy, it is important for them to find ways of resolving the freerider issue.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , May 1990 , pp. 297 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

1 The freerider problem has received extensive attention in the theory of collective action which starts with Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965). The literature has tended to concentrate on the way this problem establishes the foundations of coercive forms of collective action.Google Scholar

2 Baldwin, William L., The World Tin Market (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 71.Google Scholar This judgement is derived from all the major studies of the cartel: Knorr, Klaus E., Tin Under Control (Stanford: Food Research Institute, 1945), pp. 112–13;Google ScholarFox, William, Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement (London: Mining Journal Books, 1974), pp. 131;Google ScholarHoong, Yip Yat, The Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969), pp. 238, 241, 282–3. These studies share a common theoretical perspective which has been critically examined byGoogle ScholarHillman, John, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in the International Arena: An Institutional Analysis of the Tin Cartel of 1931–1941’, Ph. D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1989.Google Scholar

3 The British Colonial Office was responsible for the administration of the cartel and the Foreign Office acted as a channel of communication with Siam. Their files have been preserved in the Public Record Office, Kew, and constitute the main source for this research.

4 Cartels are very fragile institutions. A review of the experience of 51 resource cartels shows that their median duration was 5.4 years, their mean duration only 2.5 years, cited by Behrman, J. R., ‘Integrated Commodity Agreements’, in Policy Allenatives for a New International Economic Order, ed. Cline, W. R. (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 83.Google Scholar

5 The United States had laid up a large stockpile during 1940–41, which enabled it to conduct the war without any serious tin shortage. The stockpile was rebuilt as a similar precaution for any subsequent hostilities.

6 Knorr, , Tin Under Control, p. 130.Google Scholar

7 The Governments of Portugal and French Indo-China together with the producers association of Cornwall joined the Second Agreement in 1933. Only French Indo-China remained as a member of the Third Agreement, renewed in 1936.

8 Article 20 of the Second Agreement set the permissible level of outside production at 25% of world production over six consecutive months, Knorr, p. 133. For the Third Agreement this was reduced to the lower of 15% or 12,500 tons, Knorr, p. 155.Google Scholar

9 Fox, , Tin, pp. 75–7.Google Scholar

10 FO371/W9697/809/50, Harding (Consul, Yunnanfu) to Peking Legation, 28 September 1934. In any case had the warlords been prepared to join, the cartel would have found itself dealing with the problem of chiselling, given the difficulty of monitoring levels in tin output.

11 CO852/33/6/15020/B81, Houwert report on Congo visit, 16 May 1936. Negotiations focused on containing the rate of expansion.Google Scholar

12 Ingram, James C., Economic Change in Thailand since 1850 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 97–100. By the end of the 1930s, 66% of tin output came from British and Australian companies, 9% from small local enterprises and 25% from native producers. Spens, Short Review of the Tin Industry of Thailand, 1945, CO852/625/19697/68.Google Scholar

13 Tin, September 1930, p. 9.Google Scholar

14 FO371/18493, Dormer to FO, 2 February 1934. Royalties were substantially increased in 1934; as a result the government took over half the marginal price increase.Google Scholar

15 FO371/13981, Wingfield to FO, 4 July 1929; Coultas to Whitfield, 18 June 1929.Google Scholar

16 Tin (September 1930), p. 9, for data on Siamese dredging, and Yip, Development of Tin Mining, p. 163, for data on dredging in the FMS. This rapid rate of expansion continued into the early 1930s.Google Scholar

17 Ingram, Economic Change, p. 94, for export data; p. 329 for 1929 Government income to which estimate of tin royalties applied.Google Scholar

18 These attempts were sponsored by the Dutch who were successful in getting the ITC to form a buffer stock in 1935. This stock was soon liquidated at the insistence of the Bolivians. A second attempt was successful in 1938, and this was liquidated with the onset of World War II.

19 There were naturally differences injudgement about consumption trends, but the meetings of the ITC almost invariably arrived at a consensus in setting quotas. Predictions of consumption often proved to be erroneous, forcing frequent meetings to revise initial quotas.

20 Both countries had adopted similar policies towards their industries and permitted unrestricted expansion during the boom of the 1920s. Malaya was forced to restrict at a higher rate than the other members since such a policy was considered to have been a cause of the tin crisis.

21 For the remainder of the period it is assumed that capacity was 14,000 tons in 1931 and rose at 750 tons per annum until 1936.

22 The issue is explored more fully in Hillman, John, ‘Malaya and the International Tin Cartel’, Modern Asian Studies 22, 2 (1988). The Dutch ran their industry as an effective government monopoly; the Malayans permitted an open competitive environment in which more than one thousand separate mining operations flourished.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 CO323/1108/71462/II, Memo on Conference held on 26 November 1930.Google Scholar

24 FO126/65, White (President, Siam Chamber of Mines) to Ministry of Commerce, 15 May 1931. Many of the recently formed companies had been financed through debentures and had obligations to meet payments on this debt.Google Scholar

25 CO323/1155/81298/5, Campbell to Calder, 1 June 1931.Google Scholar

26 Howeson, John (Head of Anglo-Oriental and a main supporter of the cartel) considered this factor sufficiently strong that he anticipated that Siam would join on the same basis as the others. Howeson to Wilson, 22 November 1930, CO323/1108/71462/1.Google Scholar

27 CO323/1155/81298/5, Campbell to Calder, 1 June 1931.Google Scholar

28 The difficulty of forming the pool was raised at a meeting between Edwards, representing ITC, and the Minister of Commerce, Bangkok, 11 June 1931. FO126/65.Google Scholar

29 Ibid., Siamese Chargé d'Affaires to Campbell, 8 July 1931. Siam refused to participate in the research scheme.Google Scholar

30 The figure of 13,200 tons is taken from Campbell's conversation with Craig; however, five years later the Siamese authorities claimed that 1931 output was running at a rate of 14,221 tons. If this is correct then Siam's reduction at the time of her adherence would be 30% or 90% of the level of the others.

31 Fox, , Tin, p. 151.Google Scholar

32 CO323/1242/11730/III, Minutes of 26th ITC meeting, 23 May 1933. The variable rate principle meant that Siam would expand at a slower rate than the others as quotas were increased, in return for the benefits of a guaranteed minimum level of production.Google Scholar

33 The revolution of July 1933 naturally complicated negotiations though it did not make a difference to Siam's strategy.

34 CO323/1242/11730/5, Special ITC meeting, 10 October 1933; also cited in Fox, Tin, p. 156.Google Scholar

35 CO323/1242/11730/6, 30th ITC meeting,27 October 1933.Google Scholar During the first agreement most members controlled the exports of ore on the basis of an assumed metallic content of 72%, which permitted producers to exceed their quotas by increasing the quality of their ore to as much as 75%. The Second Agreement closed this loophole by requiring that control be exercised on the basis of true assay values. Siam refused to do this, and was permitted to control ore on the basis of its assumed content. Since the actual content was higher than this, the minimum had to be slightly reduced to ensure comparability with the others.

36 SirCrosby, Josiah, Siam: The Crossroads (London: Hollis & Carter, 1945), p. 103.Google Scholar

37 CO852/4/6/15020/B8, Campbell notes on meeting with Luang Pradit, 18 October 1935.Google Scholar

38 CO852/33/1/15020/BII, Siam statement to 53rd ITC meeting, 23 September 1936.Google Scholar

39 See Hillman, ‘Malaya and the International Tin Cartel’, for a full discussion of the way in which the 1929 data were used to effect an agreement between the Malayans who argued for 1931 capacity, and the Dutch who argued for the average output during 1922–28. The way in which this resulted in a major benefit for Bolivia is discussed further in Hillman, John, ‘Bolivia and the International Tin Cartel’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 20 (1988).Google Scholar

40 Siam statement to 53rd ITC meeting.

41 CO852/4/6/15020/B8, Howeson to Campbell, 20 October 1935.Google Scholar

42 Ibid., Henggeler to Lowinger, 16 August 1935.Google Scholar

43 Ibid., Howeson to Campbell, 20 October 1935.

44 Ibid., Campbell, to Thomas, Shenton (High Commissioner to FMS), 29 April 1935. The rubber negotiations had seen Siam nearly triple an already generous quota, largely as a result of the intransigence of the Assembly,Google ScholarThompson, Virginia, Thailand, the new Siam (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 480–3.Google Scholar

45 CO852/4/6/15020/B81, Lowinger to Thomas, 14 November 1935. The object lesson contemplated was an increase in quotas to depress price. Once the lesson was over Siam would then be told: accept the ITC offer, otherwise there would be a period of unrestricted production, and the experience of all members under free market conditions would become the basis for the allocation of restriction in any subsequent agreement.Google Scholar

46 Ibid., FO to Calder, 31 March 1936. Campbell commented on the use of the term ‘shabbily’: ‘No informed person can think so.’Google Scholar

47 Ibid., Campbell proposals to Siam, 12 November 1935.

48 Ibid., Campbell report on meeting with Sraha, Phra Brana, 17 March 1936. The formal proposals were contained in a letter dated 23 March 1936, and added the demand for the retention of the formula for upward adjustment should quotas exceed 60%. They also insisted on the maintenance of the existing standard tonnages for the signatories. This was designed to prevent the maintenance of the existing ratios of restriction through inflation of the nominal bases. The principle of an increasing flat rate was conceded to the Congo, but with some justification, given the fact that the deposits there had been but recently developed.Google Scholar

49 At a meeting between Nai Prawat of the Siamese Department of Mines and representatives of the industry, the Chinese are reported as demanding a flat rate of 25,000 tons; this must be a mistake for a standard tonnage of that amount. CO852/4/6/15020/B81, Boyd to Thomas, 26 December 1935. An article in Sri Krung, 21 December 1935, argued that Siam should get a standard tonnage of 25,000.

50 CO852/33/1/15020/BII, Siam statement to 53rd ITC meeting, 23 September 1936.Google Scholar

51 Ibid.. At the 54th ITC meeting,21 November 1936, the Siamese delegation proposed 19,000 with a minimum of 12,500.Google Scholar

52 Ibid., Shenton Thomas to Lowinger, 21 December 1935.

53 Ibid..

54 Ibid.. Lowinger replied to Thomas on 9 January 1936 and reasserted his position claiming that anything over the 15,000 tons would be a complete surrender, that it would be unfair to Nigeria and would increase demands from the Congo.Google Scholar

55 CO852/4/6/15020/B81. ‘As an FMS miner I think we might well throw Siam a sop of a few 000 tons over 15,000 and as a Siamese miner I would be glad to receive it.’ Boyd to Thomas, 26 December 1936.Google Scholar

56 FO371/21226/816, Crosby to Orde, 1 March 1937.Google Scholar

57 CO852/33/7/15020/B8, Campbell to Calder, 30 October 1936.Google Scholar

58 Ibid.. This was written at the eleventh hour of negotiations, but Campbell had long come to this conclusion. CO852/4/6/15020/B81, minute, 25 March 1936.Google Scholar

59 The article in Sri Krung (12 December 1935) advocated leaving the cartel altogether. Because no assessment could be made of the position of the Assembly, the ITC generally supposed that negotiations would inevitably fail.

60 Without access to any Siamese sources, this characterization of the three factions is inevitably impressionistic. However, the fact that negotiations really only proceeded once they were taken over from the Department of Mines by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests Siamese policy was motivated by other concerns thanjust tin. It should be noted that the Ministers of Finance and Lands & Agriculture were also prepared to compromise to secure renewal according to Agnew (Consolidated Gold Fields), notes on conversation with Connell (adviser to Siam Department of Mines) 13 October 1936, Bank of England Archives, G1/245.

61 CO852/4/6/15820/B81, Crosby to FO, 6 March 1936.Google Scholar

62 CO852/33/7/15020/B8II, Crosby to FO, 19 November 1936.Google Scholar

63 Ibid., Lowinger cable, 13 October 1936.

64 CO852/33/7/15020/B811, cable from Campbell, 13 October; reply 14 October 1936: ‘Malaya not prepared to break scheme having regard to compromise offered by Siam.’Google Scholar

65 The new head of Anglo-Oriental, Bunbury, commented to Montagu Norman (Governor of the Bank of England): ‘The Dutch attitude against making any concessions to S has strengthened in the last month and since the guilder was devalued …’ 23 October 1936, G1/245.Google Scholar

66 CO852/33/7/15020/B8II, Crosby to FO, 27 October 1936.Google Scholar

67 Securing this compromise was not straightforward. As late as 3 November 1936, Agnew was trying to secure Norman's intervention. Norman's marginal comment on the correspondence suggests that he considered Howeson behind this pressure. Van den Broek remained bitterly hostile to any concessions, but was overruled by the Dutch Government delegates on the ITC, Bunbury to Norman, 12 November 1936, GI/245.Google Scholar

68 Ibid., Campbell to Calder, 30 October 1936. France was anxious to see the cartel renewed since it had received such strong backing from the World Economic Conference. Unknown to these parties, the Malayan Government was also considering a similar concession, FO371/21226/816, Crosby to Orde, 1 March 1937.

69 CO852/33/1/15020/BI, 55th ITC meeting,5 November 1936. The terms of the agreement with Siam addressed other issues, including that of means of calculations of the metal content. Siam was placed on a true assay value basis with the others, so that the 18,500 was further increased to 18,988 tons of actual metal.Google Scholar

70 CO852/33/7/15020/B8II, Groothoff to Campbell, 10 November 1936, contains a most serious allegation that Crosby considered that the Dutch would compromise, and that he had allowed the Siamese to learn of this opinion. The Colonial Office subsequently officially complained to the Foreign Office, and while Crosby defended himself, the full Foreign Office file on this matter has ‘not been selected for preservation.’

71 CO852/434/9/18005/B, 79th ITC meeting, 16 September 1941. The Malayans had always been resentful of the generous terms secured by Bolivia, and were axious to see an entirely new basis for the standard tonnages, namely current production levels.

72 Ibid.. The ITC agreed that each member would claim the lower of current output or 130% (nominal quota) of standard tonnage, so that the DEI was granted much less than it would have obtained on the basis of a simple market solution. The total standard tonnages under the Fourth Agreement as a result of this imaginative arithmetic were 29% higher than under the Third.

73 CO852/435/5, Crosby to FO, 19 October 1941. The Foreign Office had insisted that the Fourth Agreement be signed by metropolitan governments rather that the colonies, and Siam felt that this ‘might lead to misunderstanding in the present state of world politics’. Campbell certainly thought that the Siamese had ‘taken the whole thing—hook, bait and sinker’. Minute of 28 October 1941. The expectation that Siam would endorse the new standard tonnages was reported in the New York Times, 27 October 1941.Google Scholar

74 FO371/29129/W14130, Legation, Thai to Campbell, , 20 November 1941.Google Scholar

75 CO852/434/9/18005/B. At the 80th ITC meeting, 1 December 1941, the Dutch and Malayan delegations indicated they were prepared to sign the agreement. Negotiating tactics were fully and inclusively discussed at interdepartmental meetings on 14 November, and 28 November 1941, FO371/29129. In a memo to Clauson, Campbell first argued that ‘If things were normal, I'd be inclined to try a complete break…’ but wondered whether ‘our best course would probably be to accept…the terms Thailand first proposed, disagreeable and unsatisfactory as they are?’ 22 November 1941, CO852/435/5.Google Scholar