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The Evolution of Foreign Policy in Laos since Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

E. H. S. Simmonds
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Extract

A Small voice from Laos made itself heard in 1945 amid the clamour of the nations of South-east Asia, striving to free themselves from colonial rule. The first essential moves towards unity and independence were made in Vientiane after the capitulation of Japan and during the temporary stalemate that followed, as Chinese troops occupied Laos down to the 16th parallel and French forces began to re-enter the southern provinces. The Protectorate Treaty of August 1941 was denounced (29 August), a proclamation of independence was made (1 September), and the northern and southern parts of Laos were declared to be united (15 September).1 During October a Provisional Government began to prepare a Constitution and provide for a National Assembly. Taking its first halting steps in the field of foreign affairs, this Provisional Government appealed to the Allied Governments to recognize the independence of Laos.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , January 1968 , pp. 1 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1968

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References

1 The provisions of the 1941 Treaty extended the area under the control of the small, but ancient, French-protected state of Luang Prabang to include the whole of upper Laos, Xieng Khouang province to the east and Vientiane in central Laos. The important southern provinces, whose leaders were traditional rivals of the northerners, remained under direct French administration though Lao territory on the right bank of the Mekong was occupied by Thailand (until January 1947) as a result of the Japanese-arbitrated Franco-Thai agreement of June 1941.

2 Details of Souphanouvong's contacts with the Viet Minh at this time are to be found in Dommen, Arthur J., Conflict in Laos, London, 1964, pp. 23–30. In the early stages Souphanouvong also attempted to enlist American sympathies against French re-occupation.Google Scholar

3 Le Monde, 25 November 1950.

4 Sasorith, Katay D., Le Laos, Paris, 1953, p. 92.Google Scholar

5 It is well known that the Viet Minh thought in terms of a unified Communist Indochina. Katay and other Lao politicians were aware of this and, Communism apart, had long suspected Vietnamese intentions in general. Sisouk na Champassak quotes from La Patrie Annamite (1939) ‘We will have the space we need… One day, Indochina will no longer be a collection of separate and distinct countries, but a single country impregnated with Vietnamese blood, inspired by Vietnamese dynamism and power of action’. Storm over Laos, New York, 1961, pp. 23–4. Souphanouvong founded the Pathet Lao Resistance Movement with Vietnamese connivance late in 1950, though it did not set up headquarters in Laos until 1953.Google Scholar

6 See Burchett, Wilfred G., Mekong Upstream, Seven Seas Books, East Berlin, 1959.Google Scholar

7 Lancaster, Donald, The Emancipation of French Indochina, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 311.Google Scholar

8 Details in Simmonds, Stuart, ‘Independence and Political Rivalry in Laos 1945–61’, in Politics in Southern Asia, Rose, Saul ed., London, 1963, pp. 175–6.Google Scholar

9 Halpern, Joel M., Government, Politics and Social Structure in Laos: A Study of Tradition and Innovation, (South-east Asia Studies, Monograph Series, No. 4), New Haven, 1964, contains the best available account of the Lao élite.Google Scholar

10 Dulles, John Foster, quoted in Fifield, R. H., The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945–1958, New York, 1958, p. 362.Google Scholar

11 New York Times, 27 January 1961.

12 Le Populaire, 2 November 1955.

13 Text in Kahin, G. Mc. T., The Asian-African Conference,Ithaca, 1956, p. 27.Google Scholar

14 Crozier, Brian, ‘The International Situation in Indochina’, in Pacific Affairs, 29, 1956, p. 317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Souvannaphouma, , ‘Le Laos: avant-garde du monde libre’, in France-Asie, 17, 1960, pp. 1427–34.Google Scholar

16 Lao Mai, 18 July 1956.

17 Text in Third Interim Report of the International Control Commission, Cmnd. 314.

18 Hsinhua, Peking, 21 August 1956.

19 Ibid., 24 August 1956.

20 Souvannaphouma, , ‘Laos: le fond du problème’, in France-Asie, 18, 1961, pp. 1824–6.Google Scholar

21 There are indications that Souvannaphouma was aware before the calling of the Vientiane Conference that an invitation from Peking would be forthcoming. He is reported to have mentioned such an invitation in the Assembly on 15 June (Hsinhua, 2 July 1956, quoting Siang Lao). Ngon Sananikone, who was in Bangkok in July to persuade Prince Phetsarath to return to Laos, is reported to have mentioned a visit to Peking scheduled for late August.Google Scholar

22 Text in Fourth Interim Report of the International Control Commission, Cmnd. 541.

23 Sisouk na Champassak, op. cit., pp. 63–9.

24 Smith, Roger M., ‘Laos’, in Government and Polities in Southeast Asia, Kahin, G. Mc. T. ed., Ithaca, 1963, pp. 545–6.Google Scholar

25 General Assembly of the United Nations, 30 September 1958.

26 Quoted in Fall, B. B., ‘The Laos Tangle’, in International Journal, 16/2, 1961, p. 142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 General Assembly of the United Nations, 2 October 1957.

28 Sisouk na Champassak, op. cit., pp. 68–9.

29 Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Communiqué 11 February 1959.

30 Le Bar, F. and Suddard, A., Laos, New Haven, 1960, pp. 142.Google Scholar

31 E.g. Communiqué of 14 August. ‘Every previous government has stated that it followed a policy of neutrality, but I have yet to see this applied. It is time to put an end to this policy of hesitation. This is an urgent matter and I wish Laos to stand aloof from either bloc, no matter whether it is communist or capitalist. These two blocs are like two scorpions in a bowl. One cannot touch them without the risk of being stung for both of them are full of venom.’ Lao Presse, 15 August 1960.

32 Hsinhua, 25 August and 31 October 1960.

33 Detailed accounts of the coup period appear in Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘A Cycle of Political Events in Laos’, in World Today, 17/2, 1961;Google Scholar Roger Smith, op. cit; Dommen, op. cit. (1964).

34 See Dommen, op. cit., for a full account.

35 The term Pathet Lao is now less used. Perhaps to emphasize their right to membership of the Coalition Government set up at Geneva in 1962, the Lao Communist leaders work under the title of their political party, the Lao Patriotic Front (NLHX). In October 1965 the Pathet Lao fighting units were renamed the Laotian Peoples Liberation Army.

36 The re-appearance of the ‘colonial’ term Indochinese in this new context is of interest.

37 Daily Telegraph, 14 August 1967.

38 See the interesting article by Dommen, A., ‘Laos: the troubled “neutral”’, in Asian Survey, 7/1, 1967, PP. 74–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39 Hsinhua, 24 July 1962.

40 Le Monde, 15–16 September 1963.

41 Jacobson, Max, ‘Finland's foreign policy’, in International Affairs, 38, 1962, pp. 196–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 Gunnar Hägglof, H. E. M., ‘A test of neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War’, in International Affairs, 36, 1960, pp. 153–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 E.g. in the Lao Government White Paper distributed at the United Nations in December 1964 and in the Prime-Minister's policy statement of 5 April 1967.

44 For valuable comments on the history and organization of Pathet Lao, see Fall, B. B., ‘The Pathet Lao. A “Liberation Party”’, in The Communist Revolution in Asia, Scalapino, R. A. ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1965. The late Bernard Fall comments that Western observers have consistently underestimated the organizational power of Pathet Lao, shown overtly by its administration of the areas it controls and in undercover terms elsewhere.Google Scholar