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Developmental Planning in ‘Retreat’: Ideas, instruments, and contestations of planning in India, 1967–1971*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2014

MEDHA KUDAISYA
MEDHA KUDAISYA*
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore, Singapore Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article concerns the history of economic planning in India in the late 1960s, when a vigorous debate took place on the institutions, instruments, and ‘personnel’ of developmental planning. Examining the years from 1967 to 1971, this article shows how dramatic attempts were made by warring politicians with the help of technocrats to decentralize economic planning, grant states more fiscal autonomy, and drastically reduce the powers of the Planning Commission. This article examines how these critical economic initiatives unfolded but were ultimately overshadowed by political power struggles in which the planning process and the Planning Commission became important tools in attempts for centralization.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2015 , pp. 711 - 752
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank Anthony Low for his support and advice over the years and Gurcharan Das for encouraging me to explore the theme of planning.

References

1 The 1967 election was in many ways a landmark election. Almost half of the electorate was under 35 years of age, and for them, both Gandhi and Nehru were figures of the past. The election was held in a seriously deteriorating economic atmosphere of rising prices, drought conditions, and food shortages which approached near-famine conditions in parts of Bihar. The preceding year was sometimes described as ‘the worst since independence’; it had witnessed the devaluation of the rupee—a move that aroused widespread hostility against the leadership. The period was marked by an atmosphere of ‘frustration, despondency, uncertainty, and recurrent—almost continual—agitation’. ‘The most striking aspect of the Indian election’, reported the New York Times, ‘was not so much that it was for anything as it was against something. . . the vote was against rising prices, food shortages and the inefficiency of government services. It was a vote of youth against age.’ New York Times, 27 May 1967. For the first time since independence, the Congress's one-party dominance ended and its strength was eroded. Old hands such as S. K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh, and even ‘kingmaker’ Kamaraj lost their seats. For an assessment of the elections, see Norman D. Palmer, ‘India's Fourth General Election’, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May 1967), pp. 275–91, and Paul Wallace, ‘India: The dispersion of political power’, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1967: Part II (February 1968), pp. 87–96. For an analysis of these years see Guha, Ram, India After Gandhi. The History of the World's Largest Democracy (London: Picador, 2007), pp. 416–31Google Scholar. For an analysis of Kamaraj's politics, see Forrester, Duncan B., ‘Kamaraj: A study in percolation of style’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1970), pp. 43–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 On this, see Desai, Morarji, The Story Of My Life, Vol. II (New Delhi, Macmillan, 1979), pp. 257–63Google Scholar. On the story of the 1967 succession, see Brecher, M., ‘Succession in India 1967: Routinisation of political change’, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1967), pp. 423–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Ghosh, Atulya, The Split. Indian National Congress (Calcutta: Ananda Publishers, 1980)Google Scholar.

3 See Kudaisya, Medha, ‘“A Mighty Adventure”: Institutionalizing the idea of planning in post-colonial India, 1947–60’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2009), pp. 939–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an account of the history of the Planning Commission in the 1950s and 1960s, see Hansen, A. H., The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five-Year Plans (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

4 See Byres, Terence J., ‘From Ivory Tower to the Belly of the Beast: The academy, the state and economic debate in post-independence India’ in Byres, Terence J. (ed.), The Indian Economy. Major Debates since Independence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 74–115Google Scholar.

5 Such was the extent of the critique and ‘intense rethinking at several official and non-official levels on the most suitable economic policies for the future’ in the lead-up to the publication of the draft that it appeared that dramatic changes would be included in the final version of the plan document. Noted economist K. Rangachari saw these debates as ‘the silver lining to the cloudy economic outlook’. Seeing the widespread critique of the draft plan, he felt that ‘1966 may well mark a turning point; unrealistic planning has been widely criticized in quarters where apathy was once the rule. Devaluation may also bring its delayed effects and Governments, State and Central, may act more purposefully after they get over the distractions of the general election. . . Stability, with the maximum rate of growth consistent with its maintenance will now be widely accepted as the motto valid for at least the next five years. This year may, therefore, come to be regarded as the Great divide in planning.’ See K. Rangachari, ‘1966 May Be Turning Point in Economy’, Yojana, 25 December 1966.

6 Sovani, N. V.'s Presidential address at the 48th All India Economic Conference held in December 1965, ‘Planning and Planners in India’, The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April–June 1966), pp. 477–497Google Scholar. Also see Arthagnani, ‘Decline of Planning Commission’, Economic and Political Weekly, 10 September 1966.

7 See ‘What Is Wrong with Our Planning?’, Link, 11 December 1966. For another discussion of the economists V. K. R. V. Rao, P. S. Lokanathan, and L. K. Jha by the journalist Inder Malhotra, see ‘Does Defense Upset Development?’, Yojana, 4 August, 1963, pp. 2–4.

8 See ‘What Is Wrong with Our Planning?’, Link.

9 For a report of the two-day symposium see ‘What is Wrong with Our Planning’, Link, pp. 16–17.

10 Sovani, ‘Planning and Planners in India’.

11 See interview with J. N. Bhagwati, in Balasubramanyam, V. N., Conversations with Indian Economists (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 2001), pp. 138–54Google Scholar.

12 See Times of India, 17 February 1967.

13 Economic and Political Weekly, 10 September 1966.

14 See Arthagnani, ‘Future of the Planning Commission’, Economic And Political Weekly, 25 February 1967. Also see Subhas Mehta, ‘Wanted: A drastic policy change’, Janata, 3 July 1966, pp. 7–8, S. Y. Krishnaswamy, ‘The Fault with Our Planning’, Swarajya, 12 November 1966, p. 16, and ‘Let's Stop Planning for Doom’, Janata, 6 September 1966, pp. 13–14.

15 See Economic and Political Weekly, 10 September 1966.

16 Capital, 9 March 1967.

17 The only division spared of derogatory remarks was the Perspective Planning Division, headed by Pitamber Pant, which was widely perceived to be responsible for many concrete suggestions. See, for instance, ‘Who Will Do the Planning?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 11 February 1967.

18 ‘A Gambler's Throw’, Eastern Economist editorial, 2 September 1966; ‘The Swatantra Symbol’, Eastern Economist, 6 January 1967; and ‘No Time for Petty Criticism’, Economic And Political Weekly, Annual Number, February 1967.

19 See Statesman, 1 August 1966; The Times of India, 1 August 1966; Hindustan Times, 1 August 1966; and ‘Lead, Kindly Lamp’, Eastern Economist, 20 January 1967.

20 Hindustan Times, 31 August 1966.

21 Statesman, 31 August 1966.

22 Ibid.

23 Eastern Economist, 2 December 1966.

24 See Kudaisya, Medha, ‘“Reforms by Stealth”: Indian economic policy, big business and the promise of the Shastri years, 1964–1966’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies (New Series), Vol. 25, No. 2 (August 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a speech in Calcutta in February 1967, Birla claimed that the Fourth Five-Year Plan had been put forward not for implementation but as an election tool by the Congress. ‘Planning Commission Does Its Bit’, Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, February 1967.

25 ‘The earlier the Planning Commission is abolished the better it would be for the moral and material health of the community’, announced the Hindustan Times. See the Hindustan Times, 22 November 1966.

26 Eastern Economist, 29 July 1966.

27 The Times of India, 17 February 1967.

28 In January 1965, Kamaraj said, ‘Impatient as we are to eliminate the poverty, misery, unemployment and ignorance that surround us, and anxious as we are to transform ourselves into a modern society in the shortest possible time, we may be eager to embark on larger and larger plans. But prudence should guide our actions and should help us assess realistically whether the intended benefits should be secured as envisaged. Any inflationary pressure arising out of large investment would again have its impact on the poor and weaker sections of society.’ See Subbaraman, P. S., Kamaraj. Symbol of Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Popular Prakashan, 1966), p. 33Google Scholar.

29 Hindustan Times, 13 September 1967.

30 ‘Return of Planning Commission’, Link, 21 May 1967, pp. 23–24.

31 Asoka Mehta had been a leading figure of the Praja Socialist Party before he joined the Congress in 1963. He was appointed deputy chairman of the Planning Commission by Nehru in 1963. He had advised Shastri to introduce a fixed term for members of the Planning Commission and to end the secretarial link between the Commission and the Cabinet. He was one of Indira Gandhi's closest advisers in the lead-up to the 1966 devaluation of the rupee and remained an important member of her ‘kitchen cabinet’ until he resigned in August 1968. After the 1967 elections, he was appointed minister for petroleum and chemicals. Later, he became a critic of Mrs Gandhi's policies.

32 The decision to commence work on the Fourth Five-Year Plan had been announced by the Planning Minister to the Congress Parliamentary Party, without the prior knowledge of the Commission. On these years, see Sivaram, B., Bitter Sweet: Governance of India in Transition: Memoirs of B. Sivaraman (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1991), pp. 301–30Google Scholar.

33 Rao, S. L. (ed.), The Partial Memoirs of V. K. R. V. Rao (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 82–86Google Scholar.

34 See ‘Our Delhi Letter. Pressures on the Plan’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 12 (5 November 1966), pp. 482–83.

35 Administrative Reforms Committee, Final Report of the Study Team on the Machinery of Planning (Delhi, 1967). Also see Frankel, Francine, India's Political Economy 1947–1997. The Gradual Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 310Google Scholar; Singh, Tarlok, ‘Planning and Implementation. Gap Must Be Narrowed’, Yojana, Republic Day Special Number 1963, pp. 3–4 and Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, February 1967. A different analysis has put forth by Vivek Chibber, Locked in Place. State-building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), Chapter 8, pp. 193–221Google Scholar.

36 It professed that it could end all channels of communication between the Planning Commission and the government, as well as the common link between the Planning Commission and the National Development Council—the prime minister. See ‘Planning and Politicians’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 May 1967.

37 See Economic and Political Weekly, 22 July 1967.

38 ‘Return of Planning Commission’, Link. On the Administrative Reforms Committee, also see H. K. Paranjape, ‘Centre-State Relations in Planning’, Asoka Mehta, ‘Indian Federalism and Economic Development’, and Chanda, A. K., ‘Financial Aspect of Union–State Relations in Planning’, all in Kashyap, Subhash C. (ed.), Union–State Relations in India (New Delhi: Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1969), pp. 136–45, pp. 124–35, and p. 136 respectivelyGoogle Scholar; and Administrative Reforms Committee, Final Report.

39 As the following sections of this article show, the only significant changes that occurred were due to the intervention of D. R. Gadgil. Also see Paranjape, H. K., ‘Planning Commission as a Constitutional Body’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 45 (10 November 1990), pp. 2479–81Google Scholar.

40 New York Times, 24 September 1967.

41 Ibid. Also see Kudaisya, ‘Reforms by Stealth’.

42 Malhotra, Inder, Indira Gandhi. A Personal and Political Biography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), p. 107Google Scholar. Also see The New York Times, 24 September 1967.

43 V. K. R. V. Rao was a Cambridge-trained economist. He had been vice chancellor of Delhi University from 1957–60 and was instrumental in setting up the Institute of Economic Growth and Delhi School of Economics. In 1967, he stood for election and won; he served in Gandhi's Cabinet as transport minister and, later, education minister. Rao (ed.), The Partial Memoirs, pp. 99–101. On his years as minister, see ibid, Chapter 10, pp. 122–38. For a biographical account of Rao, see Mishra, Kiran, V. K. R. V. Rao. His Life and Times (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1996)Google Scholar.

44 C. Subramaniam had been close to Jawaharlal Nehru, whom he had served from 1962 as steel and mines minister. Thereafter, under Lala Bahadur Shastri, he headed the Food and Agriculture Ministry. Having recently lost in the general election, Subramaniam was divested of his position as agriculture minister. He was highly interested in a position at the Planning Commission, hoping it would give him ‘some influence in the functioning of the Agriculture Ministry also’. Subramaniam, C., Hand Of Destiny, Vol. II, The Green Revolution (Bombay: Bharatiya Viya Bhavan, 1995), pp. 243–44Google Scholar. For speculations over the vacancy, see Eastern Economist, 13 May 1967.

45 Times of India, 19 May 1967. Indira Gandhi even tried to enlist the support of Kamaraj for C. Subramaniam.

46 Morarji was not new to finance, having held charge of revenue in the Bombay presidency as early as 1937 under provincial autonomy, then again in 1946 and again in 1958. Taking charge at the time of the foreign exchange crisis of 1956–57, Desai had faced the challenge of mobilizing resources for the completion of the ‘core’ of the Second Five-Year Plan. His experience of these years led him to value the path of fiscal prudence. During this difficult time, Desai had argued that the prime need was to avoid deficit financing and prevent outlays appreciably exceeding the limits of foreseeable resources. Desai had then managed to establish the dominance of his ministry over critical planning decisions. His views became well known following a famous meeting on the Third Plan in 1960 at the National Development Council with the then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru, though he knew of the impending resource crunch and the reservations of his finance minister, made a last-minute effort to push for the mobilization of more resources than the Plan had originally budgeted for. The prime minister strongly argued for the need to raise targets. He was supported by influential politicians such as Maharashtra Chief Minister Y. B. Chavan and C. Subramaniam, who was then finance minister of Madras. Taking his cue from Nehru, Subramaniam made a passionate address. He urged for an expansion of the Plan, with the call: ‘We must dare and do.’ Others at the meeting also spoke up in support. Desai, however, refused to yield, taking the stand that arguments for expanding the Plan were not based on realism. Declaring that the ‘Finance Ministry could not adopt the methods of the Stock and Share Brokers Association’, he refused to be party to what he considered ‘speculative’ actions. Desai, The Story Of My Life, Vol. II, pp. 115–17.

47 See ‘The Moving Finger Writes’, Eastern Economist, 1 August 1967.

48 Desai, The Story Of My Life, Vol. II, pp. 267–69.

49 B. K. Nehru later confessed: ‘I myself would have welcomed that position, perhaps even more than the membership of Parliament. It would not only have given me the platform which I so desired but also the opportunity of putting some of my ideas into effect. In the total reshuffle that it was evident would take place after the change at the helm, that position would have been vacant. I did make it known to the Prime Minister that I would be happy to take it.’ Indira Gandhi, however, thought differently and perhaps considered that Nehru's experience in economic diplomacy made him too valuable to move to the Planning Commission. He was informed that he would have to be in Washington, DC to help ensure wheat imports, given that the monsoon had failed yet again. Thus, as ‘the only person who could get us wheat’, Nehru was dispatched to Washington, DC. Nehru had also hoped that a place in the Planning Commission would lead to a more active political career. His reaction to Gandhi's decision to send him to Washington, DC, and her response are best described in his own words: ‘I said, “To phir meri Lok Sabha to gai? (So there goes my Lok Sabha?)”, to which she replied, “Haan lekin Rajya Sabha to hai! (Yes, but there's still the Rajya Sabha!)”' See Nehru, B. K., Nice Guys Finish Second. An Autobiography (Delhi: Viking, 1997), pp. 450–51Google Scholar.

50 Times of India, 19 May 1967.

51 D. R. Gadgil (1901–71) was educated at Nagpur and then Queen's College, Cambridge where he completed both a Master of Arts and a Master of Letters. He started out as a teacher and then took up government service briefly as additional assistant secretary for the Finance Department of Bombay. In 1925, he became the principal of Maganlal Thakordas Balmukundas College, Surat, for five years; then he became the first director of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, which he helped to set up. Thereafter he was vice chancellor of Poona University and professor emeritus of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. He was nominated to the Rajya Sabha in May 1966. Gadgil wrote several books, such as Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); (with Institute staff) Poona: A Socio-Economic Survey (Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1945–52); Economic Policy and Development, Origins of Indian Business Class An Interim Report (New York: Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1959); Women in the Working Force in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965); and Planning and Economic Policy in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965). For details about his life and career, see ‘A Biographical Note on Gadgil’ in Sulabha Brahme (ed.), The Indian Economy Problems and Prospects: Selected Writings of D. R. Gadgil (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. xxi–xxxi.

52 There was a view within the Cabinet that Gadgil's radical economic views may pose a problem. See Times of India, 19 May 1967. In many ways, Gadgil was an ideal candidate at the time. Known for his personal integrity, he was one of the country's foremost economists, respected by all parties, especially the leftists, and one above politics who could salvage developmental planning. See Kamat, A. R., ‘D. R. Gadgil: The last phase’, Economic And Political Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 26 (29 June 1974), pp. 1024–29Google Scholar.

53 See ‘The Moving Finger Writes’ in Eastern Economist.

54 Gadgil had long been interested in ideas of planning, and had been involved with planning since the 1940s. In 1940–41, he was member of the Sangli State Economic Development Committee, then he served as president of the Phaltan State Reconstruction Committee and chairman of the Kohlapur State Development Committee. At the time of the Second Plan, he was a member of the Economists Panel and later became its vice chairman. In 1963, he became a member of the Economic Policy Advisory Committee of the Planning Commission. He had also been involved with regional planning and was chairman of the regional planning committee for Bombay-Panvel and Poona regions.

55 Venkatappiah was the former chairman of State Bank of India; he had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1932 and had a great deal of experience in financial management, first in the Bombay state secretariat and later in the Reserve Bank of India. R. Venkataramam had been industries minister in the Madras government and was one of the many who did not believe in the ‘tonic effects of devaluation’ in 1966. He had argued against any increase in government financing, whether of the public or the private sector, saying that the need of the hour, after the devaluation, was to restrain government spending as far as possible. For his views, see Eastern Economist, 1 July 1966. Pitambar Pant had been head of the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission since it was founded in 1958. Pant was a physicist with a Master's degree, and he had participated in the Quit India Movement. Close to Nehru, he served as his secretary for some time. Pant served briefly in the Ministry of Rehabilitation after independence, then worked with P. C. Mahalanobis in the Indian Statistical Institute and the two grew to be close friends. Pant's research and later report on the question of changing over to the metric system was responsible for the Government of India's conversion to metric. He was also closely associated with the Indian Statistical Institute, first as is its joint secretary and later as its vice chairman. He joined the Planning Commission in 1956 as head of the Manpower Division. In 1958 he became the head of the newly created Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission, a position he held for 15 years. On Pant's career, see Minhas, B. S., Rudra, A., and Srinivasan, T. N., ‘Pitambar Pant’, Sankhya. The Indian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 36, Series C, Pts 2 and 4 (1974), pp. 1–8Google Scholar. Also see Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, ‘Perspectives of Development: 1961–1976. Implications of planning for a minimum level of living. A decade of development’, Sankhya. The Indian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 36, Series C, Pts 2 and 4 (1974), pp. 9–38. For his work in statistical quality control, see Mahalanobis, P. C., ‘Quality Control for Economic Growth’, Sankhya. The Indian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 29, Series B, Pts 3 and 4 (December 1967), pp. 191–200Google Scholar, and ‘Indian Statistical Institute, 34th Annual Report April 1965–March 1966’, Sankhya. The Indian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 29, Series B (1967), pp. 331–427. Also see Kumar, T. Krishna, ‘An Unfinished Biography: Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 23 (7–13 June 1997), pp. 1321–32Google Scholar.

56 Desai, The Story Of My Life, Vol. II, pp. 269–70.

57 Gadgil took charge of the ‘economic group’ consisting of economic policy, financial resources, employment, international trade, food policy, prices, incomes, and wages policy; Venkatraman was responsible for industry, labour, transport, and the power group; Venkatappiah was in charge of agriculture and rural development; Pitamber Pant had charge of the perspective planning group, and Nag Chaudhury of scientific research. See Hindustan Times, 7 September 1967, and Times of India, 4 August 1967.

58 In his view, the ‘apparatus needed a thorough overhauling’ and should function at the most as an expert body which would ‘merely lay down the manima and maxima of development’. He felt it needed to be ‘left to the government to take a political decision on the feasibility and implementation of the proposals’. He had long argued that the Planning Commission should be a non-political body, composed of experts in natural and social sciences, technocrats, and economists. He blamed the Planning Commission for the ‘total absence of a policy frame and a regulatory framework’, which he attributed to the growing influence in the government of ‘vested interests’ with a laissez-faire bias and of technocrats who believed in ‘automation of development following investment’. For his critique of the Planning Commission, see his Laski Memorial Lecture of 24 March 1958, entitled ‘The Role of the Planning Commission in Indian Planning’ in D. R. Gadgil, Planning and Economic Policy in India, pp. 150–72. Also see Dandekar, V. M., Dhananjay Ramchandra Gadgil. Making of the Man (Poona: Asia Publishing House, 1967)Google Scholar.

59 For his ideas, see Kamat, ‘D. R. Gadgil: The Last Phase’.

60 For Gadgil's views, see Brahme (ed.), The Indian Economy, Introduction.

61 New York Times, 17 September 1967.

62 See Government of India, Planning Commission, Memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan (New Delhi, 1964)Google Scholar. Also see Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan. A Draft Outline (New Delhi, August 1966)Google Scholar. These estimates were revised in the September 1965 draft. Also see Frankel, India's Political Economy, pp. 301–2.

63 See Bhattacharyya, K. N., India's Fourth Plan, Test in Growthmanship (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966), Chapters 9 and 10Google Scholar.

64 See Frankel, India's Political Economy, pp. 301–3. For an analysis of the plan also see Bhattacharyya, India's Fourth Plan, Test in Growthmanship.

65 See ‘The New Polarisation’, Economic and Political Weekly, 1 April 1967.

66 Statesman, 21 August 1966.

67 Capital, Vol. 157, No. 3954 (30 March 1967).

68 Eastern Economist, 6 December 1968.

69 Desai was wary of the Planning Commission's proposal that the central and state governments raise a total of Rs. 4,000 crore by way of additional taxation to make possible a proposed outlay of Rs. 15,000 crore in the public sector during the Fourth Five-Year Plan period.

70 Hindustan Times, 7 November 1967.

71 In addition, the devaluation increased the rupee burden of repayments of foreign credit. See Eastern Economist, 1 December 1967, and K. Rangachari, ‘1966 May Be Turning Point in Economy’, Yojana, 25 December 1966.

72 See Jha, L. K., India's Economic Development. A Critique (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1991), pp. 124 and 163Google Scholar.

73 See Times of India, 8 September 1967.

74 See Jha, India's Economic Development, pp. 124 and 163. On the economic problems of these years, also see Bagchi, A. K., ‘Long-term Constraints on India's Industrial Growth, 1951–1968’ in Robinson, E. A. G. and Kidron, M. (eds), Economic Development in South Asia (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 184–85Google Scholar.

75 See Minhas, Rudra, Srinivasan, ‘Pitambar Pant’. Also see Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, ‘Perspectives of Development’.

76 See Hindustan Times, 7 November 1967.

77 Ibid.

78 Hindustan Times, 27 July 1966.

79 See Hindustan Times, 17 November 1966, and Times of India, 11 November 1967

80 Eastern Economist, 8 December 1967.

81 As Gadgil later recalled in a speech delivered in Bangalore in 1968, ‘The Planning Commission took the view (and I think it was the only view that the Planning Commission could take) that, as on the base of 1966–67 there was little to project. Development projection was just guessing. There was no firm basis and with that state of resources you should not do anything else but get a year's breathing space and see what happens next.’ See text of speech delivered on 4 September 1968, ‘Towards Self-Reliance’ in Brahme (ed.), The Indian Economy, p. 91.

82 See Times of India, 19 December 1967.

83 See Hindustan Times, 2 December 1967. On the debate in parliament, see Hindustan Times, 19 December 1967. Not unexpectedly, there was much disapproval of the deferment of the plan within parliament. Congress party deputy leader S. N. Misra opposed the move, arguing that it would accelerate unemployment and further depress the living standard of the people; among the opposition, too, there was much annoyance at the decision—members of the Praja Socialist Party L. N. Mishra and Banka Behari Das argued against it; Niren Ghosh of the Communist Party (Marxist) called the prime minister a ‘lady liquidator’ in annoyance. See Hindustan Times, 2 December 1967 and 15 December 1967.

84 Until this point the practice had been to formulate five-year plans which were then broken up into yearly plans for purposes of implementation. The first time an annual plan was formulated was in 1966–67 because of the delay in the preparation of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. This was implemented ‘under emergency conditions’ and was later made a part of the Fourth Plan. See Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan. On the annual plan of 1966–67, see Bhattacharyya, India's Fourth Plan, pp. 115–17.

85 Eastern Economist, 9 August 1968.

86 See Desai, The Story Of My Life, Vol. II, p. 244, and Misra, D. P., The Post-Nehru Era: Political Memoirs (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993) pp. 52–53Google Scholar.

87 See Frankel, India's Political Economy, pp. 326–33. Also see Khan, Mohammad Shabbir, Planning and Economic Development in India (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, 1970), pp. 79–83Google Scholar.

88 See Gadgil, Planning and Economic Policy in India, p. 108. Also see Chanda, Asok, Federalism in India. A Study of Union–State Relations (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1965)Google Scholar.

89 See Rao, M. G. and Singh, A., The Political Economy of Federalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially pp. 205–7Google Scholar.

90 See Iqbal Narain and Arvind K. Sharma, ‘Emerging Issues and Ideas in Indian Federalism. A Post Fourth General Election Review’ in Kashyap (ed.), Union–State Relations in India, pp. 175–93

91 See Rao, Hemlata, Centre–State Financial Relations (New Delhi: Allied, 1981), Chapter 2Google Scholar.

92 Gadgil, D. R., ‘The Finance Commission and Development Planning’, in Gadgil, D. R., Planning and Economic Policy in India (Poona, Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 299Google Scholar.

93 Opinion, Special Number 1961. Also see ‘Finance Commission and Development Planning’ in Gadgil, Planning And Economic Policy In India, pp. 294–300. For Gadgil's views also see his ‘Preparing for the Fourth Plan’, Yojana, 17 March 1968, pp. 2–4. For the larger picture, see Rao and Singh, Political Economy of Federalism.

94 On this, see Arthagnani, ‘Planning in the New Federal Balance’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 12 (25 March 1967), pp. 599–600Google Scholar.

95 As K. Santhanam recalls: ‘Normally, this would be a major constitutional issue because they were taxes which have been assigned to the States. Under normal federal political conditions, there would have been discussions in every State legislature and in the press, as to whether the States should surrender or not. I believe the decision to surrender these taxes and substitute them by additional excise duties was taken at a single sitting (of the National Development Council) at which many of the chief ministers had not even fully consulted their own Cabinets.’ See Santhanam, K., Union–State Relations in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 46–47Google Scholar.

96 Santhanam, Union–State Relations in India, p. 47.

97 A. K. Chanda, ‘The Financial Aspect of Union–State Relations’ in Kashyap (ed.), Union–State Relations in India, p. 136. Mrs Gandhi asked E. M. S. Namboodiripad to be a member of the Planning Commission, an invitation he refused.

98 Ibid. Also see Sastri, K. V. S., Federal–State Fiscal Relations in India. A Study of Finance Commission and the Techniques of Fiscal Adjustment (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Mehta, ‘Indian Federalism and Economic Development’. For an overall view see Rao, M. Govinda, ‘India: Intergovernmental fiscal relations in a planned economy’ in Bird, T. and Vaillancourt, F. (eds), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 78–114Google Scholar. Hindustan Times, 6 May 1971. Also see Rao, Hemlata, Fiscal Federalism Issues and Policies (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2006)Google Scholar.

99 Times of India, 15 April 1967.

100 Times of India, 18 January 1969.

101 Times of India, 18 January 1969.

102 ‘Planning should be done more in accordance with the tastes and desires of the people. Only then will our Plan yield better results. Plans should be formulated in the villages, then in the states capitals and in the final state, at the Centre.’ See Times of India, 19 April 1967.

103 On this, see Eastern Economist, 19 July 1968 and 20 September 1968.

104 See Frankel, India's Political Economy, p. 313.

105 On the Gadgil formula, see Vithal, B. P. R. and Sastry, M. L., The Gadgil Formula: For Allocation of Central Assistance for State Plans (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002)Google Scholar. Also see Rao, M. Govinda and Sen, Tapas K., Fiscal Federalism in India. Theory and Practice (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1996)Google Scholar, and Gurumurthi, S., Fiscal Federalism in India: Some Issues (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1995)Google Scholar. A number of suggestions were put forth to deal with the overlapping of functions between the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission which was set up every five years. Thus economists D. R. Khatkhate and V. V. Bhatt suggested the setting up of a National Development Bank through which central assistance could be given to the states. See Khatkhate, D. R. and Bhatt, V. V., ‘Centre–States Financial Relations in context of Planned Development’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 8 (21 February 1970) pp. 367–76Google Scholar.

106 For details, see Bhargava, P. K., ‘Transfers from the Centre to the States in India’, Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 6 (June 1984), pp. 665–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107 See Rao, Fiscal Federalism. Issues and Policies, pp. 50–51 and Frankel, India's Political Economy, p. 313.

108 Rao, Fiscal Federalism. Issues and Policies, pp. 50–52.

109 See Hindustan Times, 6 May 1971.

110 Gadgil's plea for spatial planning went back to the 1940s. See H. K. Paranjape, ‘Gadgil's Basic Approach to Indian Development’ in Brahme (ed.), The Indian Economy, pp. 391–97.

111 Before taking up the deputy chairmanship, he had prepared a plan for Wardha district and also been a member of the Goa Planning Commission. He was also involved in the establishment of Panchayati Raj institutions at the district and lower levels in Maharashtra. This had been an important recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Committee Report, which had wanted state planning boards to take the initiative in the assessment of state resources and determining plan priorities. See Frankel, India's Political Economy, pp. 310–11.

112 See R. Bhaskaran, ‘A Planning Commission for Madras’, Swarajya, 5 August 1967, p. 19. Also see A. R. Kamat and V. M. Dandekar, ‘D. R. Gadgil’, Economic and Political Weekly, 8 May 1971. Also see Boswel, ‘Emasculated Planning’, Economic and Political Weekly, January 1969, and ‘Formula for Oliver Twists’, Eastern Economist, 20 September 1968. For an account of efforts made since the 1950s to involve different sections of the population in the planning debates see Y. W. Blessed Singh, ‘Planning Forums Have Reached Our People’, Yojana, 17 March 1968, p. 2324.

113 Soon after taking up office as deputy chairman, a report was written by a study group set up by the National Credit Council under Gadgil entitled ‘Report on the Organizational Framework for the Implementation of Social Objectives’. This reflected his concern with social objectives. See Hindustan Times, 25 April 1971.

114 As Morarji Desai recalled: ‘I always participated in the discussions which took place in the Planning Commission on mobilizing financial resources, and I used to give them an indication of the maximum limit up to which the resources could be mobilized. . . .I would decide on the maximum limit and discuss this with the members of the Planning Commission and especially with the Deputy Chairman as to how the resources could be mobilized and to what extent it was possible to do so, but as I had to finalize the budget and present it, the final decision was left to me by the Planning Commission. This was the understanding under which we worked in the Planning Commission. The work therefore went on very smoothly and without any misunderstandings.’ Desai, The Story of My Life Vol. II, p. 271.

115 See Times of India, 8 October 1970.

116 ‘Without completing the first stage in the fourth plan’ did not ‘appeal to the Commission’. See Times of India, 17 November 1970.

117 These were countered by the Planning Commission on the grounds that existing refineries such as the Barauni refinery had an idle capacity of one million tonnes and that the Haldia refinery would be ready by 1971 and would add another million tonnes to the refinery capacity. See Times of India, 17 November 1970.

118 The demand for a steel plant in Tamil Nadu was first put forth by Kamaraj, and there had been an agitation for a plant at Salem. C. Subrahmanium, then steel minister at the centre, had ordered a techno-economic study on the feasibility of such a plant, but nothing had come of this. Though the Dravida Munnetra Kazaghagam had been pressing for a steel plant in Tamil Nadu since 1957, the demand grew more vociferous after it became part of its election manifesto in the 1967 elections. In July 1967 the Party marked its Upsurge Day to emphasize this demand and that for a port at Tuticorn. See Kannan, R., Anna. The Life and Times of C. N. Annadurai (New Delhi: Viking, 2010), pp. 317–18Google Scholar. Also see ‘Pressure to Change Steel Policy’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 7 (1 October 1966), pp. 266–67, and ‘Stainless Anyone’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 52 (23 December 1972), pp. 2485–87. For an interesting case study of the allocation of steel plants by the Indira Gandhi government after the Congress split of 1969 and the political compulsions which lay behind their allocation, see Keshabananda Das, ‘Politics of Industrial Location. Indian Federalism and Development Decisions’, Economic And Political Weekly, 20 December 1997, pp. 3268–74. Also see Times of India, 1 December 1967.

119 Times of India, 17 November 1970 and Hindustan Times, 22 March 1971.

120 There was no variation in foreign exchange reserves, which were stable, the general price level was stable, a slight increase in food production had been registered and there were hopes that industrial production would register a six per cent increase. See ‘Speech of Shri Morarji Desai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Introducing the Budget for the Year 1969–70’, delivered on 28 February 1969 in the Lok Sabha, in Mishra, Surendra (ed.), Finance Minister's Budget Speeches 1947–1996, Vol. I (New Delhi: Published for Lok Sabha Secretariat by Surjeet Publications, 1996), pp. 599–614Google Scholar. Also see ‘Speech of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, The Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Atomic Energy and Planning, Introducing the Budget for the Year 1970–71’ in Lok Sabha, delivered on 28 February 1970, Ibid, pp. 615–32. On the overall performance of the economy in the years after the Third Five-Year Plan, see Srinivasan, T. N. and Narayana, N. S. S., ‘Economic Performance Since the Third Plan and Its Implications for Policy’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 6/8 Annual Number (February 1977), pp. 225–39Google Scholar. Also see Storm, Servaas, Macro-Economic Considerations in the Choice of an Agricultural Policy. A Study of Sectoral Interdependence with Reference to India (Amsterdam: Thesis, 1992), especially Chapter 3Google Scholar. For a different view on Gadgil's years at the Planning Commission see Chibber, Locked in Place. State-Building and Late Industrialization in India, pp. 214–21.

121 A number of new measures were introduced. For instance, boards of directors of banks were reconstituted to ensure that half represented specialized fields such as agriculture, rural economy, accountancy, small industry et cetera. The chairman was to be a professional banker, and the government had the power to acquire the business of any bank that failed to comply with the guidelines. See Economic Research Division, Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Banks Since Nationalization (Delhi: Birla Institute of Scientific Research, 1981), IntroductionGoogle Scholar.

122 At meetings where the issue of bank nationalization was raised, the prime minister categorically asserted that a success had to be made of ‘social control’ and of what had already been nationalized, arguing that it did not make sense to take on new responsibilities as yet. It was thus conclusively decided that the principle of ‘social control’ would be given a fair trial. According to I. G. Patel, this discussion was later deleted from the minutes of the Planning Commission. See Patel, I. G., Glimpses of Indian Economic Policy: An Insider's View (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 129–30Google Scholar.

123 Until this point, Indira Gandhi had been completely in favour of social control. Now, she took up the idea of bank nationalization in a note she sent to the Bangalore session of the All India Congress Committee in July 1969, where a showdown was imminent. For a first-hand account of these events, see Patil, S. K., My Years with Congress (Bombay: Prachure Prakashan Mandir, 1991), pp. 114–24Google Scholar. Also see Masani, Zareer, Indira Gandhi. A Biography (London: Hamilton, 1975), p. 186Google Scholar.

124 Haksar had urged for a more leftist orientation to economic policy since 1964, when Mrs Gandhi first offered him a position in her secretariat. He had then written to her that: ‘. . .if the Congress wishes to produce bread for the people, gradually adopt the tractor as its symbol rather than the cow or the bullock and do all this while preserving our national dignity and without sacrificing our liberty there is no other choice except one. Otherwise the cow and dung will overwhelm us. All the controversies about private and public enterprise, of socialism vs. capitalism are somewhat arid. Facts are that nearly 85 per cent of our economy is market economy. It develops according to its own laws and we should not unnecessarily clog the channels of flow and expansion. But if some of our industrialists feel that we can in this latter half of the twentieth century have orderly economic growth with political stability by applying antiquated Manchester School of Economics, they must surely be warned against having a Death wish.’ See P. N. Haksar to Indira Gandhi, 20 February 1967, in P. N. Haksar Correspondence—Gandhi, Indira (I and IInd Installment) Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. A confidential report on nationalization had been ready since 1967. In 1967, Chandrashekhar, leader of the young Turks, appointed a committee of four economists, consisting of S. K. Basu of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, H. K. Manmohan Singh from the Punjabi University in Patiala, S. C. Gupta from the University of Delhi, and V. B. Singh from the Department of Economics of Lucknow University, to report on bank nationalization. They made a strong case in its favour and handed it over to the prime minister to be kept confidential until nationalization took place; it was published in October 1969. In July 1969, the young Turks submitted the memorandum to Kamaraj and asked for nationalization. For details on Haksar's support of this, see Dhar, D. P.'s memoirs, Indira Gandhi, The Emergency and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; also see P. R. Brahmanand, ‘Bank Nationalisation: Story of ad hocism and arbitrariness’, Hindu Business Line, 26 July 2000.

125 I. G. Patel, Glimpses of Indian Economic Policy, pp. 135–37.

126 Ibid. For an analysis of the economic impact of nationalization, see Rangarajan, C., ‘Banking Development Since Nationalization and Reduction in Disparities’, Sankhya. The Indian Journal of Statistics, 1974, Volume 36, Series C, Pts 2 and 4, pp. 417–40Google Scholar, and Ketkar, Kusum W. and Ketkar, Suhas L., ‘Bank Nationalization, Financial Savings and Economic Development: A Case Study of India’, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 27 (October 1992), pp. 69–84Google Scholar.

127 Nationalization fuelled fears in the US administration about the future of foreign banks in India. The deputy chief of mission from the US embassy in New Delhi met with the Indian leadership to warn that ‘if India took certain steps to include foreign banks it would have adverse effect on the US aid programme’. So strong were his words that L. K. Jha, then India's ambassador to the US, took up the issue with Henry Kissinger, secretary to the American president. Jha told Kissinger that ‘the style of talking down to the Government of India is inexcusable’. For details, see National Security Council, Memorandum, 18 November 1970. Memo for Henry Kissinger from Jeanne W. Davis, Digital National Security Archives, File No: 1970/11/09.

128 A shocked Desai responded on 17 July: ‘I fail to understand the rationale behind your decision for it gives me an impression that there is something more to it than meets the eye. Guptaji met me this afternoon and told me about his talks with you with regard to me. I was amazed and shocked to hear from him that you told him that I was organizing a party obviously with a view to oust you from leadership.’ Letter reproduced in A. Appadorai, ‘The Recent Political Crisis’, Eastern Economist, 8 August 1969. For the correspondence between Gandhi and Desai, see Hindustan Times, 22 July 1969. On these events also see Patil, My Years with Congress, pp. 128–29.

129 On the 1969 split within the Congress, see Singh, Mahendra Prasad, Split in a Predominant Party. The Indian National Congress in 1969 (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1969)Google Scholar.

130 Much to everyone's surprise, the decision was met with popular jubilation. Inder Malhotra, then correspondent for The Statesman, recalls: ‘Low-paid government and private employees, taxi and auto-rickshaw drivers, educated unemployed and others who had never seen the interior of a bank were so enthused that they danced in the streets with joy. They also joined massive rallies at the Prime Minister's residence, the like of which had never before been held or encouraged.’ There were allegations that many of the demonstrations were organized by the leadership. As Asoka Mehta comments: ‘Previously banks, insurance companies and many other concerns had been nationalized, but without stirring up a campaign. On this occasion, on the other hand, the Prime Minister's Secretariat instigated a number of rallies and mass demonstrations; a personality cult around Mrs Gandhi was launched.’ Mehta, Asoka, A Decade of Indian politics 1966–1977 (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1979), pp. 44–45Google Scholar. The decision was challenged in the Supreme Court, where it was declared invalid. The problem was, however, easily overcome—only ownership changed, while the banks and their management—including staff and structure—remained the same. See Seervai, H. M., The Bank Nationalization Case, lecture delivered at University of Bombay (Bombay, 1970)Google Scholar.

131 See Hindustan Times, 14 May 1971.

132 See Eastern Economist, 13 February 1970.

133 See Frankel, India's Political Economy, p. 334. Discussions commenced on financial resources for the Fourth Plan but were virtually ‘deadlocked’ as state governments refused to play along with the Planning Commission. See, for instance, Times of India, 21 April 1969. E. M. S. Namboodiripad and Ajoy Mukherjee objected because they differed on the scope of the structure and direction of the programme outlined in the draft. V. K. Malhotra called the targets ‘vague’ and wanted a higher allocation for the Union territory. Much discussion took place; there were even proposals by Orissa Chief Minister R. N. Sukhdoeo, who tried to mediate in the deadlock by suggesting that the documents be submitted to parliament without comment by the National Development Council, but finally the National Development Council approved the draft with the three objections. See Times of India, 21 April 1969. The shift in the balance of power made it difficult to get any consensus on the Fourth Plan. For the first time in the 18-year history of planning, a consensus could not be reached, and the draft plan emerged from the National Development Council with a note of dissent. Kerala, West Bengal and the Union territory of Delhi refused to sign the draft and demanded major changes. See Times of India, 21 April 1969.

134 Techno-economic considerations were not taken into account. The Dravida Munnetra Kazaghagam had made the inclusion of the plant a condition of their acceptance of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi had made clear at a meeting of the National Development Council that the state would reject the plan unless it included the Salem steel plant. See ‘Our Delhi Letter. Election Pressures on the Plan’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol., No. 12 (5 November, 1966), pp. 482–83; ‘Green Signal for Steel’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 17 (25 April 1970), p. 686; ‘The Politics of Steel’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 32 (8 August 1970), pp. 1326–27; Das, Keshabananda, ‘Politics of Industrial Location: Indian federalism and development decisions’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 51 (20–26 December 1997), pp. 3268–74Google Scholar. Also see ‘Stainless Anyone’, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 2485–87. See Misra, The Post-Nehru Era: Political Memoirs, p. 114.

135 Indira Gandhi's speech to the National Development Council, New Delhi, 21 March 1970. For the text, see ‘Plans are Indispensable’, Publications Division, The Years of Endeavour. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi. August 1969–August 1972 (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975), pp. 318–24

136 Indira Gandhi, in reply to a debate in the Rajya Sabha on the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 13 August 1970. For details, see ‘A Charter of Progress’, Publications Division, The Years of Endeavour. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi. August 1969–August 1972, pp. 344–52. The liberalization which had been inaugurated with the devaluation of the Indian rupee in the 1966 package was put aside in the revised Fourth Plan.

137 See Ahluwalia, Isher Judge, ‘Contribution of Planning to Indian Industrialization’ in Byres, Terence (ed.), The State, Development Planning and Liberalization in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 254–97Google Scholar.

138 K. Santhanam, ‘An Objectionable Twist’, Eastern Economist, 3 April 1970. According to the recommendations of the fifth Finance Commission, the states were to get Rs. 700 crore as share of income tax, basic excise duties as additional excise duties. They were also to get Rs. 161 crore as non-plan grants. In addition, Rs. 201 crore were kept aside as plan grants and Rs. 847 crore as plan loans. On the other hand, for the next year the states had to pay Rs. 290 crore to the centre as interest and Rs. 600 crore as repayment towards the outstanding debt of Rs. 6125 crore. This meant that as far as capital needs were concerned, the states as a whole got nothing except some book adjustments.

139 See Hindustan Times, 22 and 23 March 1970.

140 Hindustan Times, 22 March 1970 and Statesman, 23 March 1970. Since the passage of the First Five-Year Plan, ‘it had been the accepted practice that the Planning Commission confined itself solely to plan schemes and finances, while non-Plan expenditure was left to various governments concerned, subject to the subventions and grants of the finance commissions’. The new arrangement meant more encroachment on the authority of the Finance Commission and was recognizably ‘a censure on the fifth Finance Commission’. For details on this, see Santhanam, ‘An Objectionable Twist’.

141 As Santhanam put it: ‘After much wrangling in the National Development Council, a formula was arrived at for the distribution of plan assistance on the basis of population, tax effort and backwardness. This new provision tends to bypass that formula and provided large amounts of discretionary assistance.’ Santhanam, ‘An Objectionable Twist’.

142 See Hindustan Times, 13 March 1970.

143 Sanjay Gandhi was allotted the capacity to produce 50,000 cars a year. See Indira Gandhi's reply to debate in Lok Sabha on the General Budget, 17 March 1970. For her speech, see ‘A Significant Beginning’ in The Years of Endeavour, pp. 297–307. The idea of manufacturing a small car went back to the late 1950s when an ad hoc committee on the automobile industry was appointed under L. K. Jha to look into its feasibility. For details on the origins of the small car project see Bhargava, R. C. with Seetha, The Maruti Story. How a Public Sector Company Put India on Wheels (Delhi: Collins Business, 2010)Google Scholar, especially Chapter 1, and Venkataramani, Raja, Japan Enters Indian Industry. The Maruti-Suzuki Joint Venture (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1990)Google Scholar.

144 Frank, Katharine, Indira. The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (London: Harper Collins, 2001) pp. 321–22Google Scholar. On the Maruti-Suzuki project, see Hamaguchi, T., ‘Prospects for Self-Reliance and Indigenization in Automobile Industry. Case for Maruti-Suzuki Project’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XX, No. 35 (1985), pp. M115–M122Google Scholar.

145 Such was the stunning success of the party in the elections and Indira Gandhi's strengthened parliamentary position that it was termed ‘Indira jaal’, a take-off from the word ‘Indra-jaal’, meaning magic. New York Times, 14 March 1971.

146 Gadgil was preparing to meet the prime minister when he received Indira Gandhi's message through T. Swaminathan, the Cabinet secretary. See The Times of India, 27 May 1971.

147 See Kamat, ‘D. R. Gadgil: The Last Phase’, pp. 1024–22.

148 See Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, p. 451.

149 Kamat and Dandekar, ‘D. R. Gadgil’, also see Dange, S. A., Gadgil and the Economics of Indian Democracy (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1971)Google Scholar. Also see Byres, ‘From Ivory Tower to the Belly of the Beast’.

150 Patel, Glimpses of Indian Economic Policy, p. 141–42

151 See Dange, Gadgil and the Economics of Indian Democracy.

152 Kamat and Dandekar, ‘D. R. Gadgil’.

153 ‘Planning Loses Wings but Gets New Teeth’, Hindustan Times, 6 May 1971.

154 Hindustan Times, 10 May 1971.

155 See Hindustan Times editorial, 27 May 1971.

156 Hindustan Times, 25 April 1971 and 6 May 1971.

157 Mohan Dharia belonged formerly to the social democratic Praja Socialist Party, but had joined the Congress in the 1960s.

158 See ‘New Look at Yojana Bhavan’, Statesman, 27 April 1971.

159 New York Times, 7 June 1971.

160 Hindustan Times, 12 May 1971.

161 Subramaniam, C., India of My Dreams (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), p. 17.Google Scholar