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Colonial Defence and British Approach to the Problems in Malaya 1874–1918

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Nadzan Haron
Nadzan Haron
Affiliation:
National University of Malaysia
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Extract

Colonial regimes have frequently shown a preference for sharing the burdens of defence with certain ethnic groups of the countries under their control. The advantages of a policy of this type—the essence of the divide and rule system—were many and varied. Binding natives to the service of colonial defence solved the functional problems of manpower in situations where no adequate corps of white regulars was readily available. The practice was cheaper to maintain and found to be an effective instrument of control. Its employment also drew off warlike elements that might have made trouble.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , May 1990 , pp. 275 - 295
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

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20 The Sultanate of Johore was founded by the last Sultan of Malacca who was driven into exile by the Portuguese in 1511. There were various comings and goings in the early nineteenth century between the Dutch and the English and between rival factions of the Johore royal family, which resulted in the English acquisition of Singapura and the establishment of the pro-British local chief as the new ruling family of the state. Recognition of the chief as Sultan was given after the death of Sultan Ali in 1877. A British gun-boat was purposely despatched to Muar, the royal town, to see that the deceased's son was not appointed as successor. A British Adviser was not assigned to the Johore court until 1914. See also FARELF minute concerning Malay Sultans, 20.7.1945, PSO/SACSEA 5282.

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24 See Morrah, Patrick, ‘The History of the Malayan Police’, Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XXXVI, Part 2, No. 202, 1963, pp. 46–79.Google Scholar

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28 The Rulers were hurried into an agreement which they did not fully understand. Frank Swettenham, who was instructed by the Governor to visit each state and obtained the Rulers' concurrence, reported on his mission as follows: ‘The Sultan of Perak signed and sealed the treaty at once; the Sultan of Pahang returned it to me in four hours; the Sultan of Selangor affixed his seal in an hour; the Datuk Bandar of Sungei Ujung signed and sealed the treaty after an hour's interview; the Yam Tuan Besar of Seri Menanti and the Datuks of Johol, Rembau and Tampin (whom I saw together) returned the treaty duly signed and sealed in three hours; while the Datuk of Jelebu, the last of the signatories, affixed his seal and signature at the end of half an hour's interview.’ Swettenham to Governor of the Straits Settlements, 28.7.1895, encl. Clementi to Cunliffe-Lister, 4.12.1932, CO717/74/13312. George Maxwell, in a memorandum dated 15.10.1920, printed as Eastern No. 135, commented sarcastically on the rapidity with which the signatures were obtained, and that the treaty was a profound secret until it became an accomplished fact.

29 The need to establish a garrison at Taiping was not only derived from the economic importance of that tin belt, but also because of its military strategy during that time. A battalion was required for the defence of British interests bordering with Siam and its vassal states. Taiping with its railway link to Kuala Lumpur, Seremban and even to Singapore would enable the battalion to be deployed wherever required.

30 Treaty of Federation 1895, encl. Clementi to Cunliffe-Lister, 4.12.1932, CO717/94/13312.

31 Hugh Low to Governor Weld, encl. in Colonial Office Despatch 209, 9.8.1884.

32 War Office Despatch dated 3.10.1900 ordered that senior ranks were meant for British regular officers only.

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41 Arthur Young to War Office, 24.12.1913, WO32/4817. See also Remarks by the Army Council, 27.2.1914, WO32/4817.

42 With the withdrawal of the British battalion, the establishment which normally consisted of 2,480 of all ranks was reduced by 1,060 men. Telegram No. 170, GOC, Maj-Gen. R. Reade to War Office, 15.12.1914, CO273/416.

43 War Office to Lewis Harcourt, 20.12.1914, CO273/416.

44 The Party was based in California and was said to be partly financed by German agents. The objective was the subversion of British rule in India. According to the plan agents were to foment troubles in the colonies. If disturbances occurred the energies of the British would be engaged in that direction. Simultaneously, a revolt in India was to be raised. Report of Inquiry presided over by Sir Evelyn Ellis, 26.8.1915; and Testimony of Sukumar Chatterji on his role in the Gadr Party movement after his arrest in 1914, CO273/435.

45 Young to Harcourt, 22.11.1914 and 19.1.1915, CO273/408 and CO273/420.

46 War Office to Harcourt, 7.1.1915, CO273/1435.

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49 Earlier, personnel of the MSG volunteered for active service in South Africa (1899), China (1900) and Somaliland (1903), but the War Office declined their on each occasion. MSG Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, 5.6.1905, CO273/303.Google Scholar

50 Maj-General Ridout to Governor Young, Arthur, 21.6.1916, CO273/450; Letter from men of the Guides to Maj-General Reade (n.d.), December 1914, CO273/435.Google Scholar

51 British troops of the 4th Battalion Shropshire Light Infantry arrived from Rangoon five days later when the situation was already brought to normal. For full report of the Singapore Mutiny, see report by the GOC, 25.2.1915, CO273/435.

52 Report by GOC Ridout to War Office, 27.5.1915; Report by Lt.-Colonel Brown Low, RGA Commander (n.d.), CO273/435.

53 Under-Secretary of State War Office to Colonial Office, 7.1.1915, CO273/435.

54 Straits Settlements War Diary (098/3282) for July 1918, CO273/477.

55 The Shropshire Light Infantry was despatched to Kelantan to suppress the uprising but was found to be ineffective due to lack of adequate training and having no previous experience of work in the tropics. Report by the GOC Dudley Ridout to the War Office, 27.5.1915, CO273/435. This regiment was soon relieved by the 25th Battalion Middlesex Regiment. A year later, in July 1918, the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment took over garrison duty. Straits Settlement War Diary (298/3283), July 1918, CO273/477.Google Scholar

56 Towards the end of the War, compliants were voiced to the effect that the manpower of the Singapore force had increased by only 233 men since 1898. Young to Long, 24.7.1918, CO273/469.

57 Straits Settlements, Report on the State of Crime, 1915, CO275/96.Google Scholar

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59 The decision to form Asiatic companies in the Malay States was partly an act of acknowledging the concern of natives over the large sum of money spent on the European volunteers and the Guides. Arthur Young to War Office, 27.2.1914, CO32/4817.

60 GOC Ridout to Young, Arthur, 21.6.1916, CO273/450.Google Scholar

61 Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider the Question of Organisation Against Civil Disturbances, CO Circular, 11.11.1918, CO537/796.

62 Ibid.

63 The War Office rejected the proposal for enlistment of Chinese as auxiliary forces in Hong Kong, and also the proposal for converting a portion of the Chinese police units to an armed force. The reason for objection was not only because of the homogeneous population but also on account of its close proximity to the mainland of China. However, the War Office gave its approval for the formation of a volunteer force of Portuguese. Despatch, Governor Thomas Wade to Colonial Office, No. 20, 13.2.1878; Secretary of State War Office to Colonial Office, 19.4.1879, CO537/210.

64 Arthur Young to Viscount Milner, 17.5.1919, CO273/487.

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67 Grey to Harcourt, 10.10.1913. CO273/402.

68 A writer who claimed to have consulted Admiralty records and War Cabinet papers, notes that the Japanese were involved in a secret German organization for the promotion of revolution in the East. See Digman, D. K., ‘Australian and British Relations with Japan, 1914–1921’, Australian Outlook: Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, XXI (08 1967), p. 136.Google Scholar

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70 Remarks by the Army Council on the Defence of Malaya, 31.12.1912, WO32/4816.