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Armed Incidents and Unpaid Bills: Anglo—Dutch Rivalry in the Banda Islands in the Seventeenth Century

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Vincent C. Loth
Vincent C. Loth
Affiliation:
University of Nijmegen, Netherlands
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Extract

The purpose of this study is to shed light on an aspect of seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch relations that has hitherto been virtually neglected: the rivalry over the Banda Islands. I will point out how economic antagonism between England and the Dutch Republic, a topic that as a rule is mainly regarded in a European context, also erupted in the East-Indian sphere of expansion, even in remote areas such as Banda. Unlike in Europe, in Asia conflicting economic interests immediately and repeatedly resulted in open violence. This was stopped in 1619 by a treaty of cooperation that paradoxically enabled the Dutch to establish themselves even more firmly in these islands, and in the Indonesian Archipelago as a whole, in a way detrimental to the English.

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Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , October 1995 , pp. 705 - 740
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Only Elias included the happenings in Banda in his analysis of the origins of the First Anglo-Dutch War. See Eiias, J. E., Het voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog (2 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1920), notably II, chapter V, pp. 1–46.Google Scholar

2 Situated in the Moluccas, Indonesia.Google Scholar

3 Elias states: ‘nowhere the commercial animosity between the English and the Dutch stands out sharper than in the Indian “shippings”. See Elias, Voorspel, II, p. 10.Google Scholar

4 What we have at this moment is either obsolescent, too general, too specific, or treating these relations as an explanatory factor in the background of some other political phenomenon. See e.g. Edmundson, G., Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century, being the Ford Lectures delivered at Oxford in 1910 (Oxford, 1911)Google Scholar; Haley, K. H. D., The British and the Dutch: Political and Cultural Relations through the Ages (London, 1988)Google Scholar; Hatton, R., Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic 1714–1721 (London, 1950)Google Scholar; Israel, J. I. (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney, 1991).Google Scholar

5 For a clear, provocative and recent description of economic development during this period, specifically the position of the Dutch, see Israel, J. I., Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford, 1987).Google Scholar

6 A description of both East India Companies' organizations, and their histories during the first years can be found in Masselman, G., The Cradle of Colonialism (New Haven, London, 1963)Google Scholar; Meilink-Roelofsz, M. A. P., ‘Een vergelijkend onderzoek van bestuur en handel der Nederlandse en Engelse handelscompagnieën op Azië in de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw’, in: Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 91 (1976), pp. 196–217Google Scholar; Bassett, D. K., ‘Early English Trade and Settlement in Asia, 1602–1690’, in: Bromley, J. S., Kossmann, E. H. (eds), Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia. Papers delivered to the Third Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference (London, Melbourne, Toronto, New York, 1968)Google Scholar; and Gaastra, F. S., De geschiedenis van de VOC (Leiden, Zutphen, 1992 (2)).Google Scholar

7 See Chaudhuri, K. N., The English East India Company. The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600–1640 (London, 1965).Google Scholar Unlike the suggestion made in the title, Chaudhuri emphasizes the inclination of the EIC merchants towards a ‘regulated company’ form during the formative years of the early seventeenth century.

8 It has sometimes been called the first limited liability company, or even the first multinational. For more particulars on Dutch entrepreneurial tradition, and the modernity of the VOC, see Mansvelt, W. M. F., Rechtsvorm en geldelijk behter bij de Oost-Indische Compagnie (Amsterdam, 1922).Google Scholar

9 The policy of monopolization was first officially put to paper in 1609; see Rietbergen, P. J. A. N., De eerste landvoogd Pieter Both (1568–1615) gouverneur-generaal van Nederlands-Indië (1609–1614) (2 vols, Zutphen, 1987), II, pp. 212–27: Instruction for Pieter Both by the directors, d.d. 11 29, 1609; specifically article 22 (p. 219).Google Scholar

10 For a good account of Portuguese presence on Banda, and of the specific governmental organization see Villiers, J., ‘Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century’, in: Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), pp. 723–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For more particulars about local economy and the structure of government see also ibid., ‘The Cashcrop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries’, in: Kathirithamby-Wells, J., Villiers, J. (eds), The Southeast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise (Singapore, 1990), pp. 83–106.Google Scholar

11 For a description of Dutch appearance and presence in the Banda Islands up to the occupation, see the work of van der Chijs, J. A., De vestiging van het Nederlandsche gezag over de Banda-eilanden (1599–1621) (Batavia, 's-Gravenhage, 1886). The following account of Dutch and English activities is based mainly on this, and on Elias, Voorspel, II, chapter V.Google Scholar

12 The shift of the VOC policy makers towards violent action is best exemplified by the secret instructions for governor-general Pieter Both, written in May 1612 by Hendrik Brouwer. He brutally advises to cut off the Bandanese trade to and from Java; to destroy part of the nutmeg trees in Banda, their only source of income (a means of pressure considered much ‘cheaper’ than an attack on their strongholds); to build a fort on Lonthor; and to kill any Bandanese who dares to resist. See Tiele, P. A., Heeres, J. E. (eds), Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleische Archipel (3 vols, 's-Gravenhage, 1886–1895), I, pp. 1–11.Google Scholar

13 One reaal (rial) at that time valued 51 stuivers in Asia. One bahar weighed about 550 metric pounds. When the Dutch arrived in 1599, they paid 6 realen per bahar.Google Scholar

14 For the doings of Verhoeven and his death see Van der Chijs, Vestiging, pp. 36 ff., and van Opstall, M. E., De reis van de vloot van Pieter Willemsz Verhoeff naar Azië 1607–1612, met inleiding, journaal en bijlagen ('s-Gravenhage, 1972).Google Scholar

15 See Van der Chijs, Vestiging, pp. 51 ff.Google Scholar

16 A punitive expedition in 1610 failed miserably.Google Scholar

17 After Middleton they did not touch at Banda for years. An attempt in 1613 to open a lodge on Ay failed. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 22Google Scholar

18 According to Van der Chijs, this was not true; the shots were delivered by two Dutchmen who had defected to the defenders of Ay. See Van der Chijs, Vestiging, p. 72.Google Scholar

19 See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 25; also Villiers in MAS 15, p. 730.Google Scholar

20 In 1614 they wrote that, now their military strength elsewhere (in the Moluccas) was more secure, it had to be considered to overrun the Bandanese, kill the principal inhabitants, chase the others and populate the islands with imported ‘heathens’, in order to gain total and definite control, to be able to exploit them at their will. See Van der Chijs, Vestiging, p. 75Google Scholar

21 Free burghers of mixed Asian and European (Portuguese) descent.Google Scholar

22 These figures are from a letter of Coen to the directors, d.d. October 10, 1616, in: de Jonge, J. K. J., De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië. Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het oud-koloniaal archief(13 vols, 's-Gravenhage, 1862–1909), IV, pp. 42–54.Google Scholar

23 For a full report on what happened on Ay see Tiele/Heeres, Bouwstoffen, I, pp. 132–63: letter of Adriaen van der Dussen to the directors, d.d. July 25, 1616. Van der Dussen says that the Dutch decided to take possession of Ay because the English had cast their eye on it (p. 142).Google Scholar

24 Arrival December 23, 1616. In fact Jourdain had sent them to help defend Ay in reply to the invitation expressed by the Ay embassy that came to Banten. Being too late, Nathaniel Courthope disembarked on Run instead, to accept sovereignty, and to occupy it before the Dutch would. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 27.Google Scholar

25 January 3, 1617.Google Scholar

26 This hostile act was later brought forward by the Dutch as being the ‘first shot’, a factual decaration of war that demanded an apt reply. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 27Google Scholar

27 Appointed as president of the factory in Banten in 1614, later as director-general of the trade in India, the most important commercial VOC command in Asia. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 30.Google Scholar

28 See Van der Chijs, Vestiging, pp. 76–7, and Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 32Google Scholar. As the original plakkaat is lost, we do not know the exact date of its public proclamation. Coen mentions the contents in his letter to the directors of December 18, 1617; he says he had his orders posted up on all gates in Banten and Jacatra.

29 Van der Chijs, Vestiging, p. 78.Google Scholar

30 Arrival March 24, 1617.Google Scholar

31 It seems they were only incidentally provisioned by Portuguese and Javanese that passed by. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 29Google Scholar

32 Ibid., p. 28.

33 For a brief description of his problems in Java, ibid., pp. 34–6.

34 Since January 1619, the Dutch had fought the English in Jacatra, killed president John Jourdain in the bay of Patani (July), and taken seven English ships on different occasions.Google Scholar

35 Before the Bull reached Java, a few days earlier in the Straits of Sunda she had met the English squadron preparing for battle under admiral Pring, and notified him of the treaty as well. See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 36Google Scholar

36 A detailed description of the diplomatic proceedings resulting in the treaty of 1619 is to be found in Clark, G. N., The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615 (2 vols, Lugduni Batavorum, 1940–1951), II.Google Scholar This work is especially useful for the legal side of the matter, though (with the exception of chapter II) less for the historical contents. The resume I give of the legal disputes is based mainly on this work.Google Scholar For a general background see Elias,Voorspel, I, pp. 134–77.Google Scholar

37 Published anonymously in 1609; later it appeared to be part of De Jure Praedae, completed in 1606 by Hugo Grotius. See Clark: Colonial Conferences, II, pp. 33–4.Google Scholar

38 Given the pretensions of the Spanish to Asian and American waters, this matter remained unsolved at that moment; as a result, the Dutch build-up in Asia at the expense of Spain and Portugal continued even during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621).Google Scholar

39 As early as 1604, during negotiations prior to an alliance with Spain, this had been emphasized on an international level. It is noteworthy, by the way, that already at that time the English expressed their fears to the Spanish delegates that only the Dutch would profit from their rigid policy in this matter.Google Scholar

40 To be distinguished from, for instance, former Portuguese prescriptive claims that forbade access to specified geographical areas, thereby totally excluding all other trade in any product from a certain area.Google Scholar

41 For a comparison between the strength of the English and the Dutch from 1613 on, see Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 30–1.Google Scholar

42 Most notably the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain in 1621.

43 For the contents see Aitzema, L. van, Saken van stael en oorlogh, in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden, beginnende met het jaer 1621, ende eindigende met het jaer 1669 (6 vols., 's-Gravenhage, 1669–1672), I, pp. 206–8.Google Scholar Also a paraphrase in Jonge, De, Opkomst, IV, pp. cxxiv–cxxvi,Google Scholar and Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 38Google Scholar

44 It is clear that his own sympathies were with the latter option. In 1616 he wrote: ‘through our previous (letter, V. L.) your gentlemen will have understood ( … ) that the English better be evaded from the Moluccas by the use of violence ( … ), because in those quarters they did not refrain from action against the interest of your honourables, did harm to our allies, assisted our enemies or secretly communicated with them’, letter to the directors, dated October 10, 1616; see De Jonge, Opkomst, lV, pp. 42–54. A year later, after the attack on the Dutch lodge in Banten, he wrote: ‘I am sorry to shed so much paper on the matter of the English ( … ), but as it will come to the state that we will have to leave this place (i.e. Banten, V. L.) or, if we want to live here, have to establish a garrison, I could not refrain from notifying your honourable gentlemen, pray do provide in this matter in as much as it is possible, or even more accidents will happen, for it can not be otherwise, can we not be friends, let us publicise war and let us make war (my emphasis, V. L.), for it is disgraceful and murderous that one shall kill the other and have him killed, be it under any pretext, without any justice being done’, letter to the directors, dated December 18, 1617; see De Jonge, Opkomst, IV, pp. 67–72.

45 See Colenbrander, H. T., Coolhaas, W. Ph. (eds), Jan Pieterszoon Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn verblijf in Indië (7 vols, 's-Gravenhage, 1914–1943), I, p. 544: ‘ They (i.e. the English, V. L.) owe you gratitude, for they had rightly helped themselves out of India, and now your gentlemen have put them straight back in again’. He admitted that good relations with the English were quite important. ‘But your honorable gentlemen ( … ) have been too hasty. And why the English have been allowed to have one third of the cloves, nutmeg and mace I cannot fully understand. They could not pretend to lay claim to a single grain of sand of the beaches in the Moluccas, Amboyna or Banda’. (My translation; for a more liberal one see G. Masselman, Cradle of Colonialism, p. 408).Google Scholar

46 At least not on the highest levels; the sailors and soldiers in Banten and Jacatra seem to have fraternized in the taverns.Google Scholar

47 An indigenous type of ship to the size of a large, seaworthy sloop.Google Scholar

48 See Elias,Voorspel, II, p. 39; Van der Chijs, Vestiging, p. 113.Google Scholar

49 They made a detour along the east coast of Java to purchase rice.Google Scholar

50 VOC 1073, fol. 7/14.Google Scholar

51 And rightly so; during the fighting that followed the Dutch indeed suffered casualties from shots fired by the guns that the English had brought in; see VOC 1073, fol. 7/14.Google Scholar

52 Three English ‘advisors’ on Lonthor were returned to Run, as well as 150 sokkels (rotan packs of about 20–25 cati) of mace and 20 bahar of nuts; see VOC 1073, fol. 7/14.Google Scholar

53 This episode, and the sad fate of the Bandanese population, is well described in Van der Chijs, Vestiging, pp. 120–68. For a significant contribution to the discussion about the nature of the conquest and its background, see Kiers, L., Coen op Banda. De conqueste getoetst aan het regt van den tijd (Utrecht, 1943).726Google Scholar

54 ‘Even so they are not ashamed to state that this is the only fort the King of England has in India’, Coen sneered. See VOC 1073, fol. 7/14.Google Scholar

55 Which, by the way, lasted only until about a year later; in 1621, the English dismantled their defenses and left the rock.Google Scholar

56 See e.g. VOC 1076, fol. 171/180. In May 1622, the English occupied Run again, and let the people sign a contract in which they handed over the sovereignty over their island. This did not benefit them very much, though. Trade on Run had been stopped by the Dutch when they had found out that rice and cloth which had been handed out by the VOC for the convenience of EIC officials under the obligations of the treaty, was sold to free merchants and to Bandanese, to solve the cash problem. Henceforth, all inhabitants of Run were forced to rely on Ay for the purchase of food and provisions.Google Scholar

57 For lack of transport, he had to hire a small private Dutch yacht to get there Until the very end of his stay in Banda, his relations with the Dutch authorities remained disturbed: much to his indignation, president De Bruijne did not allow him to hoist the English flag on this craft. See VOC 1080, letter of May 16, 1623.Google Scholar

58 See Elias, Voorspel, II, p. 44.Google Scholar

59 In so far as this could be accomplished; seedlings kept coming up, and regular control remained necessary. The Dutch also peeled off the bark of full-grown trees to suppress the flowering, a measure less radical than cutting them down.Google Scholar

60 See VOC 1121, pp. 848–82 and pp. 883–911.Google Scholar

61 See VOC 1121, pp. 848–82.Google Scholar

62 Among them several Macassarese, one Bandanese, two Chinese with five or six women, and four English; they had brought provisions to hold out for at least one year.Google Scholar

63 And not without reason, for this implied that English and Spanish ships in Asia were forthwith allowed to visit each other's settlements and ports. The possibility of a Spanish ship anchoring in the roadsted of Run was of course unacceptable to the Dutch.Google Scholar

64 H e was taken on a guided tour, including lunch, around Run by Van Diemen himself; in the following days, he was received on Ay, Neira, and Lonthor, where he was rowed around the islands by boat, and shown the plantations and forts during walks. The Dutch apparently made certain that he got a good impression of the wealth of the islands and of the solidity of the impressive naval and military defences. Everywhere he was presented with dinners and drinks to the health of the King of England; barrels of powder must have been used for the salutes demonstratively fired by all the guns of the ships and forts.Google Scholar

65 Van Diemen received a small silver-trimmed sabre and a modest amount of tea; in return, he presented Hunter with 60 kannen French and Spanish wine (some 90 litres), a pot of butter, and (rather arrogantly) with 15 cati mace and a small rotan pack of nuts.Google Scholar

66 See VOC 1257, p. 358 and 359/362.Google Scholar

67 Actually, the Dutch considered it a good bargain that they managed to acquire Run, and a coastal strip in Guyana which is now called Surinam, in exchange for a Dutch settlement called Nieuw Amsterdam, now better known as New York.Google Scholar

68 There is evidence of significant differences in the weight of nutmeg and mace taken aboard in Banda, and the figures that are registered on arrival of those ships in Batavia. Even as VOC authorities in the capital complained about this, the differences were as a rule attributed to leckagie (leakage), or the fact that mace was packed after it had been sprinkled with salted water (to prevent affection by worms or insects), and had dried out on the way to Batavia, thus reducing in weight.Google Scholar

69 For a clear presentation of his policy towards the English, see VOC 1077, fol. 41/54, dated January 31, 1623, notably under 62. These instructions that Coen left behind when he returned to the Republic mirror an attitude of mistrust and aversion. At the same time he emphasizes a correct attitude with regard to the obligations of the treaty. The English shall have their share, but only if they fulfill their obligations: ‘and besides that, they have nothing to pretend than to pay this toll; grant them one third of this trade, or so much less as they pay toll, to avoid these disputes’.Google Scholar

70 VOC 1077, s.f. (4 fols.): ‘Extract’.Google Scholar

71 VOC 1094, fol. 423–427.Google Scholar

72 Each Bandanese cati weighed 51/2 Hollandsche ponden (Dutch pounds); a Hollandsche pond was a little less than the present metric pound.Google Scholar

73 See VOC 1074, letter of July 3, 1621.Google Scholar

74 VOC 1077, s.f. (5 fols.): ‘Beclagh’, January 9, 1622.Google Scholar

75 VOC 1077, s.f. (5 fols.): ‘Project van antwoort’, February 3, 1622.Google Scholar

76 Could it be that the difference between the amount demanded in the bill, and the actual sum the English paid was due to the recalculation the Dutch agreed to?Google Scholar

77 See VOC 1076, fol. 171/180.Google Scholar

78 Mace incidentally yielded a price on the Amsterdam market some two- or three-hundred times the purchasing price.Google Scholar

79 There is ample evidence of the English being unable to pay. See e.g. VOC 1074, letter of August 30, 1621; VOC 1076, fol. 152/154; fol. 169/170; in fol. 171/180, Sonck reports that when he presented the English with the account over March and April 1622, Welding openly admitted that he had no money whatsoever.Google Scholar

80 A comparison of t he value of nutmeg and mace on the one hand and cloves on the other in my opinion emphasizes the importance of the Bandanese produce: this amounted to 27,084 guilders on a total of 45,073.Google Scholar

81 See, for an explanation of the problems involved, as well as an overview of latest research results, F. S. Gaastra, Geschiedenis VOC, pp. 130–133.Google Scholar

82 See e.g. Korte, J.P. de, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de VOC (Leiden,1983)Google Scholar

83 The most obvious proof of an attempt to present the figures in a way favourable to the Dutch is in VOC 1076, fol. 171/180: Sonck to Coen, d.d. May, 14, 1622: ‘your honourable need to know that we have put the expenses as high, and the fruits as little as in any way has been possible’.Google Scholar