Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
No one even with only a casual interest in Chinese history can be unaware that China's capacity for war in the last few centuries has proved truly awesome. In the middle of the eighteenth century Qing armies numbering some 150,000 troops marched into central Asia. After many campaigns some of which continued for nearly two years, they rid China finally of the menace from the desert that had caused so much havoc in the past. In the process they exterminated the Zunghars as a people. In the nineteenth century, China fought wars with nearly all the major powers: England in the Opium War of 1839–42 and several times thereafter; France in the 1880s; and Japan in the 1890s. In 1900 it took on all of them at the same time. Civil war too was a frequent occurrence. The Taiping Rebellion of 1852–64 exacted casualties that should be counted in the tens of millions, and this was merely the most devastating of a series of rebellions. The scale of war in the twentieth century has proved even more spectacular. Warlord wars, fighting between the nationalists and communists, and the War of Resistance against Japan ravaged China until the communist victory in 1949.
2 For a critical discussion of the contents of the term that places the new scholarship in the history of scholarship on war, see Paret, Peter, ‘The history of war and the new military history,’ in Paret, , Understanding War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 209–26.Google Scholar
3 Stephen MacKinnon organized the first conference in Tempe, Arizona in 1992. Realizing that researchers in various places were beginning to undertake research on China's military history, he brought many of them together to discuss sources, approaches, and topics. Future workshops and seminars are planned to discuss the history of strategic thought, war and memory, the impact of war on the statebuilding, and battles in modern Chinese history.
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8 Qichao, Liang, Xin min shuo (On the renewal of the people) in Yinbinshi congzhu (Collected writings from the Ice Drinker's Studio) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, no date), vol. 1, p. 8.Google Scholar
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19 A sophisticated discussion of the modernization of warfare especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that provides a lucid synthesis with many fresh insights is McNeill, , Pursuit of Power, pp. 117–306. Valuable for its concise overviews of technological developments and the actual wars in Europe and the United States isGoogle ScholarAddington, Larry, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, 2nd edition).Google Scholar An old and still very useful classic, first published in 1920, is Delbrück, Hans, The Dawn of Modern Warfare: History of the Art of War, vol. 4 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).Google Scholar
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27 On German influence, see Ratenhof, Udo, Die China Politik des Deutschen Reiches, 1871–1945 (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1987);Google ScholarQingdai dang'an ziliao congbian, vol. 10, pp. 221–90;Google ScholarRugui, Guo et al. (eds), Zhongguo junshishi: Disi juan: bingfa, vol. 4, pp. 412–25;Google ScholarKirby, William, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983) notes that Wang Tao wrote a book on the Franco-Prussian War that shocked the Self-Strengthening establishment and led to the use of German advisors both by Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong as well as the purchase of new equipment including from the Krupp factories.Google Scholar
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33 Ibid., pp. 315–20.
34 Some examples of the new genre are Huaidan, Ran and Haiyan, Zhu, Beifang you zhanhuo (The smoke of war in the north) (Peking: PLA Press, 1993);Google ScholarQingping, Guo and Yuanshang, Xu, Baituan Dazhan (The hundred regiments offensive) (Peking: PLA Press, 1993);Google ScholarDikang, Wang et al. , Disi yezhanjun nanzheng jishi (The southern campaign of the Fourth Field Army) (Peking: PLA Press, 1993);Google ScholarYubin, Wang and Suhong, Wang, Dashi zhongyuan (Battles on the central plains) (Peking: PLA Press 1993).Google Scholar
35 Weili, Wang, ‘Kang-Ri zhanzheng zhong de Guo-Gong guanxi yu Zhongguo zhengzhi qiantu’ (The relationship between the CCP and the KMT during the Period of the Anti-Japanese war and subsequent Chinese politics). Third international symposium on the history of Republican China, Nanjing, December 1994.Google Scholar
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41 Ibid., pp. 98–9. For the technological, industrial, and managerial developments that were basic to the rise of the Muscovite empire, see Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914, pp. 23–5, 56–84.
42 Paret, ‘The new military history,’ in Understanding War, p. 222.Google Scholar
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