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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2024
This article evaluates China’s influence on the making and unmaking of economic détente in the 1970s. Utilizing recently declassified documents in Japan, the United States, and China, this article demonstrates that Chinese officials used both diplomatic and commercial means to influence their Japanese and American counterparts to prevent them from developing economic relations with the Soviet Union. During this process, Japanese and American industrialists had to carefully weigh up their participation in governments’ geopolitical schemes when pursuing business opportunities in the two socialist countries. This cautious attitude led to shifting dynamics in economic détente and varying outcomes for development projects. Chinese activism also prompted changes in Japan and the United States when decision-makers sought to benefit from the Sino-Soviet confrontation and maximize their economic and geopolitical gains. This article, therefore, features economic détente as a dynamic, multilateral process and emphasizes that the volatile geopolitics in Northeast Asia played a crucial role in ending détente and redrew the global Cold War to carry stronger economic overtones.
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12 Industrialists who played roles in Sino-Japanese normalization include Saeki Isamu, the head of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Fujiyama Aiichiro, the former head of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) and foreign minister during the Kishi administration; and Nagano Shigeo, the head of New Nippon Steel, who also served as the president of the JCCI. For research regarding their involvement in Sino-Japanese normalization, see Bohao Wu, ‘Uneasy friends and convenient enemies: Sino-Japanese competition and coordination in Cold War Asia, 1950–1972’, PhD thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, 2023.
13 From the 1950s to the 1970s, Japanese traders maintained business relations with China through two channels: the ‘Friendship Trade’ (You hao mao yi; Yūkō bōeki) via small, left-wing trading companies, and the barter agreements involving large corporations. In the 1950s, the barter trade existed under four Private Agreements on Trade between China and Japan (Zhong Ri min jian mao yi xie ding, Nichū minkan bōeki kyōtei) signed between 1952 and 1958. In 1962, Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke (the former Minister of International Trade and Industries in the Kishi administration) came to another agreement. The Liao-Takasaki Trade Agreement (extended and renamed the Memorandum Trade Agreement in 1968) lasted until 1974, when the two governments drew up a formal trade agreement between the two countries. For studies on these agreements, see Itoh, Mayumi, Pioneers of Sino-Japanese relations: Liao and Takasaki (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; King, Amy, China-Japan relations after World War II: Empire, industry and war, 1949–1971 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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17 ‘Tokubetsu zadan-kai Nihon no katsuro o saguru’ [Special roundtable discussion: Exploring Japan’s path to revitalization], Bungei Shunjū, vol. 49, no. 14, November 1971, p. 101.
18 ‘Shiberia kaihatsu ni tsuite shū Onrai sōri no Nakasone daijin ni taisuru hatsugen (Yomiuri shinbun bō kisha no naiwa)’ [Premier Zhou Enlai’s Statement on Siberian Development with Minister Nakasone (informal conversation with Yomiuri correspondent)], 14 February 1973, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu purojekuto [Japanese-Soviet Siberian development projects], 2014-5913, DAMOFAJ.
19 Takashi Suzuki, ‘Chūgoku taishi naiwa (chū so kankei)’ [Informal conversation with Chinese Ambassador (regarding Sino-Soviet relations)], 24 January 1973, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu purojekuto [Japanese-Soviet Siberian development projects], 2014-5913, DAMOFAJ.
20 Ibid.
21 Li, Xin, ‘The evolution of petroleum import-export status of China since 1949’, Journal of Southwest Petroleum University (Social Science Edition), vol. 16, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1–6Google Scholar; also see Lu, Yingzhong, Fueling one billion: An insider’s story of Chinese energy policy development (Washington, DC: Washington Institute Press, 1993), p. .Google Scholar
22 Gaimushō Chūgoku-ka, ‘Chūgoku to no aida no shigen mondai’ [On the matter of resource between Japan and China], 8 August 1977, Nitchū kankei [Sino-Japanese Relations], 2016-1714, DAMOFAJ.
23 Sternheimer, Stephen, East-West technology transfer: Japan and the communist bloc (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), p. .Google Scholar
24 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Shiberia kaihatsu ni tsuite’ [Regarding Siberian development], 19 February 1973, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu purojekuto [Japanese-Soviet Siberian development projects], 2014-5913, DAMOFAJ.
25 ‘11:30–13:40 Zainichi Soren taishikan’ [11:30 to 13:40, at Soviet Embassy in Japan], 19 February 1973, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu purojekuto [Japanese-Soviet Siberian Development Projects], 2014-5913, DAMOFAJ.
26 Ibid.
27 For the various elements of the economic détente negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, see ‘President’s visit to the USSR June—July 1974, Volume III—Possible cooperative agreements’, Box 77, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Office Files: Country Files—Europe-U.S.S.R.; Yorba Linda, CA: Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (hereafter cited as RNPLM).
28 Peter G. Peterson, ‘Economic announcement at the Moscow summit—How important and desirable is it to make specific economic agreements (and, if necessary, concessions)?’, 19 May 1972, MOSCOW TRIP ECONOMIC TALKS Henry A. Kissinger [1 of 4], Box 74, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Office Files: Country Files—Europe-U.S.S.R., RNPLM.
29 ‘Transcript of telephone conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Commerce Percy’, 13 October 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 60, pp. 213–215. Another conversation of a similar nature took place on the same day when Kissinger told Peterson not to ‘settle for what we’ve got’ and not to further test Soviet patience. See National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 16, Chronological File.
30 For examples of conversations between Huang Hua and Kissinger that touched on Siberian development, see ‘Top Secret, Memorandum of Conversation’ [Discussion of Vietnamese conflict and Cambodia with Huang Hua], Kissinger’s Transcripts, 1968–1977, Digital National Security Archives (hereafter cited as DNSA), published online on 16 April 1973, available at https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/discussion-vietnamese-conflict-cambodia-with/docview/1679137737/se-2, [last accessed 28 November 2023]; ‘Top Secret, Memorandum of Conversation’ [Discussion with Huang Hua; Includes talking points], Kissinger’s Transcripts, 1968–1977, DNSA, published online on 26 July 1972, available at https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/discussion-with-huang-hua-includes-talking-points/docview/1679125242/se-2, [last accessed 11 November 2023].
31 ‘SOVIET UNION: I. November 1973 talks, Chinese position in November 1973’, ‘PRC Summaries of Previous Talks [1973] [2 of 2]’, Box 99, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Office Files: Country Files—Far East, RNPLM.
32 Ibid.
33 ‘US position in November 1973’, ‘PRC Summaries of Previous Talks [1973] [1 of 2]’, Box 99, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Office Files: Country Files—Far East, RNPLM.
34 According to MOFA’s internal records, Tanaka instructed Ambassador Yasukawa to seek and ‘demand U.S cooperation’ (kyoryoku o seshimeta) from Kissinger on Siberian development. See Gaimushō Tōō Daiikka, ‘Shiberia kaihatsu o meguru nichibeikan no ugoki (jijitsu kankei)’ [Actions between Japan and United States regarding the Siberian Development (Factual Sheet)], 23 May 1974, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu gōben jigyō [Japan-Soviet co-development projects], 2017-1084, DAMOFAJ.
35 Takeshi Yasukawa, ‘Kisshinjā chōkan to no kaidan’ [Conversation with Secretary Kissinger], 23 April 1974, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu gōben jigyō [Japan-Soviet co-development projects], 2017-1084, DAMOFAJ.
36 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Shiberia kaihatsu o meguru nichibeikan no ugoki (jijitsu kankei)’.
37 ‘Nixon, Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira’, Box 4, Memoranda of Conversations—Nixon Administration, Ann Arbor, MI: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum (hereafter cited as GRPLM), published online on 21 May 1974, available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552704.pdf, [accessed 15 July 2024].
38 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Nishi Shiberia sekiyu kaihatsu no gunji-teki sokumen’ [Military aspects of oil development projects in West Siberia], 22 February 1972, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu purojekuto [Japanese-Soviet Siberian development projects], 2014-5913, DAMOFAJ.
39 Ibid.
40 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Otō 49-5: Soren ni kansuru Nichibei hikōshiki kyōgi daisankai kaigi (Shōwa 49-nen 1 gatsu 16-nichi oyobi 17-nichi)’ [East Europe file no. 49-5: The third meeting of informal consulting committee regarding the Soviet Union between Japan and the United States (16–17 January 1974)], January 1974, Soren ni kansuru Nichibei kyōgi [U.S-Japan consultation regarding the Soviet Union], 2019-1554, DAMOFAJ, pp. 26–27.
41 ‘Dai ni Shiberia tetsudō ni kansuru Chūgoku no kangaekata’ [Chinese consideration for the second trans-Siberian railroad], 29 May 1974, ‘Nisso Chumeni sekiyu kaihatsu yunyū purojekuto’ [Soviet-Japanese oil development and import project in Tyumen], 2019-1815, DAMOFAJ.
42 ‘9 July 1974—Nixon, Ambassador James Hodgson (Japan)’, Box 4, Memoranda of Conversations—Nixon Administration, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, GFPLM, pp. 2–3.
43 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Chumeni sekiyu purojekuto ni tsuite taiso kaitō ni kansuru ōkura tsūsan kankei kyokuchō to no kyōgi’ [Consultation with related bureau directors of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry regarding response to Soviet side on the Tyumen oil project], 23 May 1974, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu gōben jigyō [Japan-Soviet co-development projects], 2017-1084, DAMOFAJ.
44 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Dai ni Shiberia ōdan tetsudō kensetsu Soren teian ni taishite seifu no torubeki kihon hōshin’ [Basic policy lines the Government should take regarding Soviet proposal for the construction of the second trans-Siberian railroad], 12 April 1974, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu gōben jigyō [Japan-Soviet co-development projects], 2017-1084, DAMOFAJ.
45 On 28 May 1974, Nagano, Imasato, and Uemura met with officials from the three ministries and received the government directive to inform the Soviets of Japan’s decision to shelve the Tyumen oil project, with or without railroad construction. During the meeting, Nagano enquired whether this decision was related to China’s concern for the project, while Imasato resentfully left the meeting early and refused to inform the Soviet side of the government’s position. Eventually, Nagano and Uemura accepted the government’s position. See Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Chumeni sekiyu taisaku (Keidanren to no kyōgi kekka)’ [Countermeasures for the Tyumen oil (as a result of consultation with Keidanren)], 28 May 1974, Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu gōben jigyō [Japan-Soviet co-development projects], 2017-1084, DAMOFAJ.
46 ‘16 November 1974—Ford, Kissinger’, Box 7, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, GRFPLM, pp. 4–5.
47 ‘VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT, Memcons, 23–24 November 1974’, Box 1, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, GRFPLM, p. 17.
48 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
49 ‘Summaries of Kissinger/Teng Discussions, November 1974 (Prepared for HK Trip October 1975 and Ford Trip December 1975)’, 25–29 November 1974, Box 2, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, GRFPLM, p. 1.
50 ‘Memorandum of conversation: President’s first meeting with Prime Minister Miki’, 5 August 1975, Box 14, Memoranda of Conversations—Ford Administration, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, GRFPLM, p. 7.
51 Ibid., p. 8.
52 United States National Security Council Staff, ‘Approaches to dealing with the Soviet Union’ [President Ford’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping], Kissinger Transcripts, 1968–1977, DNSA, published online on 2 December 1975, available at https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/approaches-dealing-with-soviet-union-president/docview/1679068802/se-2, [last accessed 27 November 2023].
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 ‘Chūso kankei no dōkō to wagakuni no taichu taiso seisaku’ [Developments in Sino-Soviet relations and our country’s policies with China and Soviet Union], 19 March 1975, Chūgoku Soren kankei [Sino-Soviet relations], 2017-0039, DAMOFAJ.
56 ‘Patorichefu Soren gaikoku bōeki daijin to no kaidan no sai no sankō shiryō’ [Reference materials for the meeting with Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union], 23 May 1977, Patorichefuso ren gaikoku bōeki daijin hōnichi (1977-nen) [The visit of Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union Patolichev to Japan (in 1977)], 2016-1739, DAMOFAJ.
57 Soviet Embassy Information Department, ‘Leonid Brezhnev’s speech at the plenary meeting of the CPSU central committee (Excerpts relating to some aspects of the party’s international activities)’, March 1976, Office of Staff Secretary, 1976 Campaign Transition File, Confidential File, 11/76-1/77, Container 1, Atlanta, GA: Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum (hereafter cited as JCPLM), p. 7.
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60 Guromuiko no Miki sōri hyōkei [Courtesy visit by Gromyko to Prime Minister Miki], 16 January 1976, Guromuiko sōri gaimu daijin hōnichi (1976-nen) [Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Japan (in 1976)], 2019-1605, DAMOFAJ.
61 ‘Ri ben ren min jue bu xiang Su lian ya li qu fu’ [Japanese people shall never bend to Soviet pressure], People’s Daily, 7 January 1976, p. 6.
62 Guromuiko gaishō hōnichi (Chūgoku no mikata) [Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Japan (China’s perspective)], 15 January 1976, Guromuiko sōri gaimu daijin hōnichi (1976-nen) [Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Japan (in 1976)], 2019-1605, DAMOFAJ.
63 Soviet Embassy Information Department, ‘Leonid Brezhnev’s Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee (Excerpts relating to some aspects of the party’s international activities)’, March 1976, Office of Staff Secretary, 1976 Campaign Transition File, Confidential File, 11/76-1/77, Container 1, JCPLM, pp. 7–8.
64 According to Vance’s memoir, one of the main differences between Brzezinski and Vance on the implications of détente in Asia was the former’s interest in using Sino-American relations as a deterrence to the Soviet Union, while Vance emphasized the repercussions it would have on American relations with the Soviet Union and its Asian allies, namely, South Korea and Japan. See Vance, Cyrus, Hard choices: Critical years in American foreign policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 78–79.Google Scholar
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66 ‘Hōgen sōsai to yo Jin gaikō-bu fuku buchō to no kaidan kiroku’ [Record of Conversation between President Hogen and Vice Minister Yu Zhan of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 12 May 1977, Nitchū kankei, 2016-1714, DAMOFAJ, p. 11.
Sternheimer, East-West technology transfer, p. 59.
67 ‘Hōgen sōsai to ri sen’nen fuku sōri to no kaidan’ [Conversation between President Hogen and Vice Premier Li Xianian], 11 May 1977, Nitchū kankei, 2016-1714, DAMOFAJ, p. 11.
68 ‘Hōgen sōsai to yo Jin gaikō-bu fuku buchō to no kaidan kiroku’, p. 26.
69 Heishirō Ogawa, ‘Kakokuhō shuseki no Dokō Keidanren kaichō ikkō to no kaidan kiroku’ [Record of conversation between Chairman Hua Guofeng and Keidanren President Doko’s group], 2 April 1978, Nitchū kankei, 2016-1714, DAMOFAJ, p. 11.
70 Inayama, Yasuhiro, ‘Nichū chōki bōeki torikime o musunde kaetta inayama yoshihiro no Chūgoku zakkubaran’ [Real impression of China from Inayama Yasuhiro, who came back after successfully securing the long-term trade agreement with China], Zaikai, vol. 26, no. 5, March 1978, p. .Google Scholar
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72 Inayama, ‘Nichū chōki bōeki torikime o musunde kaetta inayama yoshihiro no Chūgoku zakkubaran’, pp. 35, 37.
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76 ‘Minami yākuto genryō tan purojekuto kankei Nisso tōjisha-kan (daisankai teiki) kyōgi kaisai mondai’ [Issues of holding (the third periodic) consultations with the Soviet side regarding the South Yakut coking coal project’, 16 August 1978, Tai Soren shakkan kyōyo/minami yakūto tan kaihatsu kyōryoku purojekuto [Loan Provision to the Soviet Union/South Yakut coal development cooperation project], 2015-0730, DAMOFAJ.
77 ‘Afugan jiken-go no Nisso keizai kankei’ [Soviet-Japanese economic relations after the Afghanistan incident], 17 September 1980, Afuganisutan mondai/tai Soren seisai sochi [Afghanistan issue/sanctions against the Soviet Union], 2017-0530, DAMOFAJ.
78 Hammer, Armand and Lyndon, Neil, Hammer: Witness to history (London and New York: Simon Schuster, 1987), pp. 456–458Google Scholar. Hammer’s recollection is partially supported by a memorandum dated 13 May 1980 from Judy Powell to Carter, which noted that the White House had denied Hammer’s request to meet with the president since August 1978, which was surprising, considering Hammer’s role in Carter’s campaign. Another document dated 20 October 1979 from Tom Beard to David Aaron also noted that Hammer’s request for an audience with the president was at the discretion of the NSC (under Brzezinski). See Tom Beard, ‘Memorandum for David Aaron’, 20 October 1979, Presidential Papers of Jimmy Carter, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Name File, Hammer, Armand, 10/79-6/80 through Lukasik, Andrei, 4/79, Collection No. 9, Box 2, JCPLM; and Judy Powell, ‘Memorandum for the president: Armand Hammer meeting’, 13 May 1980, Presidential Papers of Jimmy Carter, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Name File, Hammer, Armand, 10/79-6/80 through Lukasik, Andrei, 4/79, Collection No. 9, Box 2, JCPLM.
79 Hammer and Lyndon, Hammer: Witness to history, p. 458. Hammer’s recollection was supported by Chinese records, which also noted Deng’s warm welcome for Hammer. See Wang, Xuan, ‘Pingshuo Pingshuo (Yi)’ [A review of Pingshuo Project, (Part 1)], Shenzhou, vol. 7, 2015, pp. 102–106.Google Scholar
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81 According to Chen Rixin, president of the An Tai Bao Coal Mine Committee, the report from the Ministry of Coal to the Central Planning Committee held that the original choices were more prepared than the Island Creek Company, while Island Creek had a better ‘political foundation’. Chen also mentioned that the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Chai Zemin, also intervened and favoured Occidental Petroleum over other candidates. See Wang, ‘Pingshuo Pingshuo (Yi)’, p. 106; regarding the Ministry of Coal’s report in 1983 on the final decision to cooperate with the Island Creek, see Wang, Zhijie (ed.), Shuozhou mei tan zhi [A chronicle of coal industry in Shuozhou] (Beijing: Fang zhi chu ban she, 2009), p. .Google Scholar
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83 According to the report from China’s National Energy Commission to the Party Central in April 1981, the eventual contract ‘had some flaws and disadvantages due to the lack of experience, which should be amended if possible’. See Zhongyang cai jing ling dao xiao zu ban gong shi, ‘Zhong yang cai jing ling dao xiao zu hui yi ji yao di jiu qi ting qu bo hai shi you kan tan lun zheng hui de hui bao’ [Minutes of the meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Leading Group, Issue 9: Hearing the report regarding the feasibility of Bohai Oil Exploration and Development], 10 April 1981, cited in Bohai you tian zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui, Bohai you tian zhi [The chronicle of Bohai oil field] (Tianjin: Tianjin ren min chu ban she, 1993), pp. 402–403.
84 Akira Matsuzawa, ‘Bokkai no sekiyu Kaihatsu’ [Oil development in Bohai Area], in ‘Wagakuni kaigai sekiyu kaihatsu no genjō to shōrai’ [Current status and future of Japan’s overseas oil development], (ed.) Tomoya Takei, Sekiyu Gakkai Zasshi, vol. 5, no. 8, August 1982, pp. 66–72.
85 For New Nippon Steel’s involvement, see ‘Biao 2-3, hai shang shi you gong cheng she shi yi lan biao’ [Chart 2.3, A list of constructions for offshore oil engineering], Bohai you tian zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui, Bohai you tian zhi, 1993, pp. 32–36.
86 ‘Soren no iyoku to genkai mo hakkiri shita Nisso keizai iinkai’ [The Japan-Soviet Economic Commission made clear the aspirations and limitations of the Soviet Union], Keizai tenbō, vol. 51, no. 6, April 1979, p. 17.
87 Nagano, Shigeo, ‘Shiberia kaihatsu kyōryoku no hatten o mezashite dai 4-kai Nisso gōdō iinkai kanbu kaigi’ [Aiming to further the Siberian development cooperation: On the fourth Japan-Soviet Joint Committee Executive Meeting], Keidanren geppō, vol. 27, no. 4, April 1979, p. .Google Scholar
88 ‘Nitchūkankei (Ka sōri no hōnichi, dainikai shunō kaidan, sono san) (A)’ [Japan-China relations (Prime Minister Hua’s visit to Japan, second government-head meeting, Part 3) (A)], 28 May 1980, Kakokuhō Chūgoku kokumuinsōri hōnichi [Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng’s visit to Japan], 2016-1196, DAMOFAJ.
89 ‘Ōkita gaishō Kokuboku fuku sōri kondan naiyō (5 gatsu 28-nichi oide Īkura kōkan)’ [Contents of the meeting between Foreign Minister Okita and Vice Premier Gu Mu (May 28th at Iikura Building)], 28 May 1980, Ka Kokuhō Chūgoku kokumuinsōri hōnichi, 2016-1196, DAMOFAJ.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 ‘Taiso keizai bōeki kankei (tōmen no taisho hōshin)’ [Economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union (current policies)], 3 June 1980, Afuganisutan mondai/tai Soren seisai sochi, 2017-0348, DAMOFAJ.
93 ‘1 Oku-doru ika no shinki anken de kinkyū ni kōteki sapuraiyāzu kurejitto o kyōyo suru hitsuyō no aru anken (ni-ken)’ [New projects worth less than $100 million that require urgent provision of public supplier credits (2 projects)], 12 September 1980, Afuganisutan mondai/tai Soren seisai sochi, 2017-0530, DAMOFAJ.
94 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration’s sanctions included freezing loans and suppliers’ credit to Soviet Union by the Western bloc and suspending licensing for industrial equipment and strategic goods sales.
95 Gaimushō Tōō daiikka, ‘Chūgoku gaikō-bu Soren Tōō Tsukasa fuku Tsukasa-chō to dōnowaki ōa-kyoku shingi-kan to no kaidan’ [Meeting between the Deputy Director-General of the Soviet Union’s Eastern Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, and Deputy Director-General of the European and Asia Bureau Donoguri], 3 September 1980, Nisso yōjin kaidan, 2018-0033, DAMOFAJ.
96 ‘Taiso keizai bōeki kankei (tōmen no taisho hōshin)’. For the list of projects that were exempted from the sanctions, see ‘Afugan jiken-go no Nisso keizai kankei’ [Soviet-Japanese economic relations after the Afghanistan incident], 17 September 1980, Afuganisutan mondai/tai Soren seisai sochi, 2017-0530, DAMOFAJ.
97 Ibid.
98 These negotiations include Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro’s meeting with Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Pavlov in December 1982, during which the former made it clear that Japan ‘will not separate economy from politics’ in pursuing economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. This cast a long shadow on the SJECC delegation Nagano led to Moscow in 1983. The ninth meeting of the SJECC in 1983 was the final meeting between the two sides, which only resumed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See ‘Abe daijin pafurofu chū Nitsu Soren taishi kaidan-yō shiryō’ [Materials for the meeting between Minister Abe and Soviet Ambassador to Japan Pavlov], 4 December 1982, Nisso yōjin kaidan, 2016-0734, DAMOFAJ.
99 Takeo Kumagai, ‘Russia approves Japan’s SODECO participation in new Sakhalin 1 oil, gas project operator’, S&P Global Commodity Insights, published online on 15 November 2022, available at https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/111522-russia-approves-japans-sodeco-participation-in-new-sakhalin-1-oil-gas-project-operator, [accessed 15 July 2024].
100 ‘Russia: Sakhalin 1 Project’, Oil and Gas E&P, JAPEX, available at https://www.japex.co.jp/en/business/oilgas/sakhalin1/, [accessed 15 July 2024].