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Political Parties, Factions, and Corruption in Thailand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

James Ockey
James Ockey
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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The first reason [for the coup] is the act of corruption. The national administrative party [i.e. the civilian government] has taken the opportunity to make use of its political posts and authority to vigorously and unprecedentedly seek benefit for itself and its companions. It has become normal practice for most of the cabinet ministers to seek money to build up their status and wealth in order to support their political power base. During the consideration of potential large-and medium-scale projects, politicians at the government level played a role in pushing for them to materialize by claiming that the public will benefit from each project. In fact, it is only a sophisticated way to seek benefits. Despite knowledge of extensive corruption among the politicians at the Cabinet level and among government officials and certain high-ranking state enterprise officials, the prime minister as head of the government has not seriously attempted to solve the problem. Moreover, the prime minister has even committed such inappropriate acts himself, by claiming various reasons to conceal corruption…. Corruption has escalated quickly and vigorously, beyond anyone's ability to stop its spread…

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Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , May 1994 , pp. 251 - 277
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5, 23 Feb. 1991. Quoted in FBIS-APA 25 Feb. 1991, p. 42.Google Scholar

2 I use the word corruption to describe these activities because the word most commonly used in Thailand is the English word ‘corruption’. It is unclear when the English word ‘corruption’ entered the Thai vocabulary. Haas', MaryThai-English Student's Dictionary (Standord: Stanford University, 1964)Google Scholar, which was compiled between 1951 and 1963, lists the word, but McFarland, George B., Thai-English Dictionary (Stanford: Stanford University, 1944), first published in Bangkok in 1941 and based largely on the government Siamese Dictionary of 1927, does not.Google Scholar

3 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5, 23 Feb. 1991. Quoted in FBIS-APA 25 Feb. 1991, p. 42.Google Scholar

4 Burnham, Walter D., ‘Party Systems and the Political Process’, in Chambers, William N. and Burnham, Walter D. (eds), The American Party System: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 286, explains that the machine provided ‘primitive welfare functions’ to the urban poor–in many cases recent immigrants. The break-up of machine politics occurred as the federal government increasingly took on responsibility for social welfare.Google ScholarScott, James C., Comparative Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 112, writes: ‘The control of a city machine was often undercut by federal, state, or even county patronage which was not within its jurisdiction.’Google ScholarShefter, Martin also makes this point in ‘Party, Bureaucracy, and Political Change in the United States’, in Maisel, Louis and Cooper, Joseph (eds), Political Parties: Development and Decay (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 239–43. Shefter argues that in the US, at least, the Democrat party deliberately employed this strategy to break up Republican machines.Google Scholar

5 The ‘machine politics’ period discussed by Burnham and many others represents the era of the most systematic corruption in the history of US political parties. As for England, see Ostrogorski, M., Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, translated by Clarke, Frederick (New York: Haskell House, 1970; originally published 1902), vol. 1, pp. 138–40.Google Scholar Ostrogorski also writes of machine politics in the US in volume 2. In Asia, corruption in the political parties in the Philippines, in particular, has been discussed in great detail. See, for example, Lande, Carl, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965). For an attempt at comparative corruption, with special reference to Stuart England, the US, Thailand, Ghana, and India, see Scott, Comparative Corruption.Google Scholar

6 Parties were allowed from 1945–1951, 1955–1958, 1968–1971 and 1974–1976. Civilian governments were ostensibly in power from 1945–1951; however, following the coup of 1947, the government served at the pleasure of the military.Google Scholar

7 See Skinner, G. William, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1958)Google Scholar, and Riggs, Fred W., Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East—West Center Press, 1966).Google Scholar

8 See Benedict, R., Anderson, O'G., ‘Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9 (no. 3, 1977), pp. 13–30.Google Scholar

9 International pressure was particularly evident during the brief Thanin regime (1976–1977), which coincided with the presidency of Jimmy Carter and his attempts to emphasize the promotion of human rights in foreign policy.Google Scholar

10 During the administration of Prime Minister Chatchai, the first elected prime minister under the 1978 constitution, the government voted to hold only one parliamentary session a year with only 12 days of meetings—in spite of a large backlog of pending legislation. While the session was extended under pressure from the opposition and the public, this was clearly an attempt to centralize decision-making within the cabinet (i.e. the faction leaders) and prevent the parliament from overturning the government. See Bangkok Post 19 Aug. 1988, p. 1.Google Scholar

11 The party does continue to play several important roles. First, it aggregates factions into a larger unit, facilitating the formation of coalition governments. In general, larger parties are better situated to join coalitions. Second, it serves as a coordinator of factions solving most internal problems, and leaving the coalition government free to deal with inter-party conflict. And it is a means of attracting MPs loyal to no faction to the larger group, thus strengthening the bargaining power of all faction leaders in the party.Google Scholar

12 See ‘Khom khao sapha: chom na so. so. chak pa’, in Lak thai 13 Oct. 1988, p. 21. One former leader of a left-oriented party suggested to me in an interview that the left had scattered among a number of larger parties for safety reasons. He also mentioned that many on the left had chosen to seek to influence politics through non-parliamentary means, for example from within the bureaucracy, the press, or academia.Google Scholar

13 The best example of this type of activity is the group of MPs identified only as ‘young and idealistic’ founded by some of the leaders of the Oct. 14 uprising. The group is reported to have a membership of about 40, from both government and opposition parties. ‘In forming and joining the group, these young MPs hope to keep their political idealism alive and cooperate with one another in sponsoring and legislating bills that they believe will serve the public interest.’ One member comments, ‘We will not distinguish our members as either government MPs or opposition MPs. We can talk and exchange our views. Even if we may not be able to vote on the same side on some of the bills, we can show our sympathy for our friends by leaving the House before a vote.’ Another adds that, ‘Although I'm in a government party, I still fight in my party for what I think is right.’ See The Nation 5 Sept. 1988, p. 8.Google Scholar

14 In the South, regional ties are strengthened by ethnic and religious ties. Ethnic ties may also play a role in the northeast.Google Scholar

15 See Keyes, Charles, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1967), esp. ch. V.Google Scholar

16 See Bangkok Post 1 Aug. 1988, p. 31.Google Scholar

17 The Nation 20 July 1988, p. 31.Google ScholarSee also Khao Phiset 13 July 1988, pp. 53–4.Google Scholar

18 This type of faction is based on phon prayot or profit. As one example of how a financier may benefit by developing ties to politicians, factions and political parties, see The Nation 30 Dec. 1990, p. 3, which is quoted later in this paper.Google Scholar

19 I have chosen to outline the SAP here because of the relative abundance of sources dealing with the party. SAP is fairly typical of Thai political parties in respect to political factions, as the following list of individuals identified by the Thai press as faction leaders in some other political parties demonstrates. Given the fluid nature of the factions, this list can only be indicative, not precise and is admittedly incomplete. Chat Thai: Praman Adireksan, Chatchai Chunhawan, Banhan Silapaacha, Chuchip Hansawat, Han Lilanon, Udomsak Thangthong, Thawit Klinprathum, Sa-ad Piyawan, Piya Angkinan. Solidarity: Uthai Phimchaichon, Bunchu Rochanasathien, Chaloemphan Siwikon, Narong Wongwan, Bunthaeng Thongsawat, Sawat Khamprakop. Democrat: Phichai Rattakun, Chuan Likphai, Marut Bunnak, Sanan Khachonprasat, Prachuap Chaiyasan, Banyat Banthatthan, Niphon Phromphan/ Phonthep Thechaphaibun. Rasadon: Thienchai Sirisamphan, Mana Rattanakoset, Charoen Phattanadamrongchit (non-MP), Bunthung Phonphanit.Google Scholar

20 Thawisak, p. 57. In addition to these two groups, there were several politicians who defected from the Democrat party, probably Out of loyalty to Khukrit, who was a founding member of the Democrat party. These prominent politicians, like Bunthaeng Thongsawat, had smaller followings of their own, creating factions within the Khukrit faction.Google Scholar

21 Election results for the SAP are as follows:

* The 1983 election was the last held under the temporary provisions of the constitution allowing independent candidates and small parties to contest the election. Following this election, independents and some small parties joined larger parties such as Chat Thai and SAP. Nine MPs joined the SAP after the election, giving the party a total of 101 seats in the parliament.

22 Buntham, , p. 119, identifies the following as examples of ‘economic and regional leaders’: Thanong Siriprichaphong, Phairot Chayaphon, and Chia Kokphong, and the following as former politicians with many supporters: Narong Wongwan, Sawat Khamprakop, and Surat Osathanukhroh. He continually emphasizes that these new members were joining for phon prayot (profit) rather than for ideological reasons.Google Scholar

23 See Buntham, , p. 119 and p. 161.Google Scholar

24 These are adapted from Buntham, pp. 120–2.Google Scholar

25 See Buntham, , pp. 159–60.Google Scholar

26 It is not clear why Khukrit chose to resign at this time. One SAP member suggested that it was because Khukrit could no longer finance the party and thus could not control it. It is also possible that Khukrit, seeing that the political parties and the military were not likely to agree on a party leader as prime minister during this period, chose to resign so that he, like Prem, would be ‘neutral’. Reported meetings between Khukrit and then army commander-in-chief Athit Kamlang-ek during this period hint at this possibility.Google Scholar

27 For details of the reasons behind the break-up and the factions that rebelled— leading to a dissolution of parliament—see Buntham who identifies the rebellious factions as those of Bunthaeng, Koson, Bunchu and Thanong and lists all individuals by name. It is possible that some of the individuals on the lists all individuals by name. It is possible that some of the individuals on the list did belong to these factions but when forced to choose by the polarization of the party, went along with these factions. It has often been noted that the Democrat party (114 seats in 1976), the Chat Thai party (108 seats in 1983), the SAP (101 seats in 1983) and the Democrat party again (100 seats in 1986) all broke up shortly after reaching the 100 seat plateau. Buntham describes the events leading to the first three of these breakups and attempts to make comparisons. William Riker's work on minimum winning coalitions may provide a clue to the reasons for this barrier to creating larger parties.Google Scholar See Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University, 1962).Google Scholar

28 That the party was able to do as well as it did is partly a result of the concurrent split within the Chat Thai party which went from 108 seats to 63. The biggest winner was the Democrat party which went from 56 seats to 100.Google Scholar

29 The information on factions during this era comes from an interview with a member of the SAP and from an article in Matichon sudsabda 29 July 1990, pp. 22–3, which, in identifying the sources of financial support within the party, confirms much of the information from the interview and describes the financial resources of each faction leader. The article leaves out Mai, who controls a small provincial faction; Thawi, whose faction, though small, demonstrated its power through a concerted campaign against SAP cabinet minister Santi Chaiwiratana; and, surprisingly, Thongyot. More will be said concerning Santi below.Google Scholar

30 This scandal will be discussed in more detail below.Google Scholar

31 See Sathanakan 24 Dec. 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar

32 Sathanakan mentions that the faction belonging to Santi Chaiwiratana may have successfully drawn members from the Thawi faction. When Thawi failed to gain a cabinet seat in the first Chatchai government while Santi became Deputy Minister of the Interior—perhaps reflecting the switch in factional support—the two became sworn enemies with Thawi determined to undermine Santi's position. He was ultimately successful through events that will be described below.Google Scholar

33 Sathanakan makes this point.Google Scholar

34 Charges of buying votes in parliament are almost as rife as charges of buying votes in elections and equally convincing. For some recent references see Bangkok Post 2 Sept. 1989, p. 3, where two Democrat party MPs claim that some government MPs asked for bribes in exchange for a vote of confidence for Democrat minister Sanan Khachonprasat. In Aug. 1989, a cabinet minister admitted in an interview that in the previous vote of no confidence, a group of 20 MPs in his party demanded money from the cabinet in exchange for their votes. He specified that deputy ministers were asked to contribute 1 million baht each, a figure later reduced to 300,000 which, he admitted, he had contributed.Google Scholar See Matichon 1 Aug. 1990, p. 2.Google Scholar Among the most convincing evidence is the admission of former Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot who said he bribed MPs while he was prime minister and claimed that ministers pay MPs for votes of confidence on a regular basis. See Bangkok Post 1 April 1990, p. 3.Google Scholar For an earlier report, see Bangkok Post 2 May 1986, p. 1, where several MPs admit to widespread money dumping. One party secretary-general is so widely reputed to buy votes in parliament that he has earned the nickname of ‘ATM’ (automated teller machine).Google Scholar

35 On the first two examples, see Buntham. On the third, see below.Google Scholar

36 See Bangkok Post 21 Oct. 1990, p. 7 for a list of these appointees. Of the 121, 100 were MPs. Of particular importance is the position of executive secretary to a cabinet minister. The executive secretary controls access to the minister and gains the status of minister-in-training.Google Scholar

37 See Bangkok Post 2 Nov. 1988, p. 2. This article describes the appointment of the latest group of 27 advisors, calling the advisor a ‘growing army’ and pointing Out that one of them was on trial for attempting to smuggle some 10 million baht worth of ivory out of the country. The next day the order to appoint this particular group of advisors was cancelled without explanation.Google Scholar See Bangkok Post 3 Nov. 1988, p. 1.Google Scholar

38 Sayamrat 30 April 1989, pp. 4–5 (excerpted in Bangkok Post 30 April 1989, p. 7);Google ScholarThe Nation 23 April 1989, pp. 6–7;Google Scholar and Bangkok Post 23 April 1989, p. 2.Google Scholar

39 For a good summary of the most controversial transfers up until October, see Bangkok Post 8 Oct. 1988, p. 5.Google Scholar

40 There are also frequent rumors that high level civil servants must buy important or lucrative positions. In a recent censure debate in parliament, one MP claimed that for a policeman to be appointed an inspector, he must pay 3 million baht; for a superintendent, 5 million baht; for a commander, 7 million baht; and for a police director-general, 50 million baht. See Bangkok Post 19 July 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar On the following day, Wasit Dechakhunthon, a recently retired police general, admitted that positions had been bought ‘as recently as two years ago.’ See Bangkok Post 20 July 1990, p. 6.Google Scholar

41 The Nation 30 Dec. 1990, p. 3.Google Scholar

42 See the example presented in note 51 where a deputy cabinet minister complains of the demands of the party for donations from ministers. More details of this interview and the background behind these revelations will be presented below.Google Scholar

43 Rampant corruption was the first reason given for the recent military coup. In addition to the charges outlined below, here is a partial list of areas where allegations of corruption have been leveled over the past few years: logging (several times), construction (several times), car prices, whiskey taxes, the trust company bailout scheme, land in forest preserves, the site for a new airport, a radar system for the Phukhet airport, the purchase of planes for Thai International, mobile telephones, advertising time on government television stations, fertilizer sales, tapioca and rice quotas, government rice stocks, the crane system at the Port Authority of Thailand, a pineapple cannery owned by a minister, and government concessions and contracts of all sorts. Party secretary-generals are said to be the thung phak or chief financiers of each party and are usually blamed for most of the corruption. Prior to the coup, the military leveled such charges against the secretary-generals of the Chat Thai party and the Social Action party and demanded they be replaced. (See Bangkok Post 8 Nov. 1990, p. 1 for the military allegations.) Of Banhan Silapa-acha, the Chat Thai party secretary-general, Kanjana Spindler of the Bangkok Post writes, ‘No one seems to have a definite idea as to how he made his “billions”, except that he's been in “construction, land development and import–export” businesses, and that his company “Saha Srichai”, monopolizes the supply of water pipes uncountry.’Google Scholar See Bangkok Post 30 March 1990, p. 5. Inquiries into the wealth of Montri Phongphanit, SAP secretary-general who made headlines when he donated some 30 million baht to Buddhist monks to celebrate the Kathin festival, generally lead to vague comments about his family business, a rice mill operation in Ayutthya province. Montri is also the secretary-general accused of ‘teaching Santi to cheat.’Google Scholar See The Nation 15 Aug. 1990, p. 1 and the text below.Google Scholar

44 Bangkok Post 15 Oct. 1988, p. 4. In fact, Santi, Thawi and another MP, had formed a group following the 1979 election called ‘Mr Thawi's group’ which was later transformed into the Prachathai party with Thawi as party leader and Santi as secretary-general. This party was disbanded and the members joined the Chat Thai party prior to switching to the SAP in 1986. Santi was first appointed to the cabinet during this period. In the 1988 election, Santi succeeded in bringing MPs into the parliament and was rewarded with the same cabinet seat.Google Scholar See Matichon 15 Aug. 1990, p. 3.Google Scholar

45 Thawi also accused Santi of corruption in a provincial water works project in Nakhon Ratchasima and in the appointment of civil servants in the party meeting. These events are covered in detail in the Thai language press from 12 to 15 Oct. 1988. A summary of the controversy from start to finish can be found in Matichon 9 Aug. 1990, p. 3.Google Scholar

46 Bangkok Post 20 Oct. 1988, p. 4.Google Scholar

47 Unless otherwise specified, the information attributed to Santi below comes from the interview with Matichon 14 Aug. 1990, p. 2.Google Scholar The text is also printed in Khao phiset 20 Aug. 1990, pp. 17–20.Google Scholar

48 During this period, there was an ongoing struggle for leadership in the party between party leader Sitthi Sawetsinla, backed by Phong Sarasin, and party secretary-general Montri Phongphanit. While Santi had earlier been acceptable to both sides, by Aug. of 1990, he had chosen the Sitthi side. (In the interview he is quoted as saying ‘Phom yu sai than huana phak, mai dai yu sai khun Montri,’ that is, I am on the side of the party leader not on the side of Mr Montri. Later he says that Montri called him and asked, ‘Hey … yu khang khrai kan nae?’ Which side are you really on? He answered that he was on the side of the party leader.Google Scholar See Matichon 14 Aug. 1990, p. 2.) The conflict was resolved when former party leader Khukrit Pramot agreed to return to the party and take up the leadership. Sitthi retired from the party the parliament, Phong lost his position as Deputy Prime Minister—but remained the party and the parliament—and Montri stayed on as party secretary-general. One of the first actions of Khukrit was to end the attempts to expel Santi from the party.Google Scholar

49 Literally a ‘large’ person (in prestige).Google Scholar

50 It is important to note that all the demands for contributions from ministers/faction leaders were for specific purposes. The party has no discretionary budget of its own but is at the mercy of the faction leaders for funding.Google Scholar

51 ‘Ruang thi koed khun man pen khabuankan thamlai phom phroh phom mai samat ha ngoen hai phak dai duan la 3–5 lan baht.’ (The events that took place were a group effort to destroy me because I was unable to contribute 3–5 million baht a month to the party.) Matichon 14 Aug. 1990, p. 22.Google Scholar

52 Matichon deleted the name and identified the person only as an important SAP party member but see The Nation 15 Aug. 1990, p. 1, which carries the headline ‘Montree [sic] taught me to cheat’ and quotes Santi as saying, ‘Montree taught me the techniques to make money for the party. I am not as good as Montree and I am more outgoing. I don't need the techniques that he used.’Google Scholar

53 The Nation 15 Aug. 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar

54 Matichon 15 Aug. 1990, p. 3. Santi's revelations are especially interesting in light of the reaction they provoked. While those who were directly accused threatened to sue for defamation of character, comment was muted. Prime Minister Chatchai's policy advisors, a group of young liberal intellectuals, exemplify that reaction. ‘Pansak Vinyaratn questioned why allegations of corruption were being directed purely at the politicians when corruption “is an on-going societal debate.” ’ ‘Kraisak Choonhavan portrayed corruption as a “form of lobbying” which exists because the country lacks an “inbuilt system of lobbying” as say, in the United States.’Google Scholar See Bangkok Post 15 Aug. 1990, p. 4. For most, these revelations were hardly startling as such activities had long been rumored and often exposed, though no ‘receipts’ had been discovered. Former Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot, who returned to the SAP to take over the leadership following the debacle, has been quoted as saying that there is corruption ‘in all governments.’ He added: ‘Remember in politics, even if a person is hia, you have to sleep with him if necessary. You have to sleep with him no matter how distasteful it may be. You don't really have any choice. What can you do when the hia helps enable the government to survive?’Google Scholar See Bangkok Post 15 Aug. 1990, p. 4. One of Khukrit's first actions on resuming the leadership of the party was to stop the move to oust Santi from the party, effectively ending such revelations.Google Scholar

55 Later splits when the party joined the government destroyed the party's support in Bangkok (1976) and weakened support in the South (1988).Google Scholar

56 While the Democrat party has 133 branches (as of Dec. 1990), these branches were established as a means of enhancing power within the party rather than as effective local organizations.Google Scholar See Samutawanit, Chai-anan, Kanluagtang, phakkanmuang, ratasapha, lae khana thahan (Bangkok: Bannakit, 1981), pp. 174–85.Google Scholar

57 This is apparent in the struggle for the post of Agriculture minister following the last election when Northeast MPs sought to gain the post for faction leader Prachuap Chaiyasan. See Bangkok Post 8 Aug. 1988, p. 1. The post went to northern faction leader Sanan Khachonprasat. Southern MPs voted to nominate Suphatra Masadit and Trairong Suwwanakiri, while northeastern MPs settled on Niphon Phromphan and Phonthep Thechaphaibun as deputy ministers. While the final selections were as yet incomplete at the time this article was written, the method of dividing the party cabinet seats by region is clear.Google Scholar

58 In an interview with Bangkok Post reporter Kanjana Spindler, Suphatra Masadit, a southern MP and then cabinet minister is quoted as saying: ‘The split in the party really came in 1983. There was one side that shared the same ideals as I do, and the other side, who believed only in getting the most seats. Because of this attitude, anyone regardless of principles was welcome. I joined because I was moved by the party's nine-point platform; now some don't even know what those points are.’ Bangkok Post 7 July 1989, p. 5.Google Scholar

56 Following the 1986 election, a number of MPs were upset when Phichit Rattakun, the son of party leader Phichai, was named Deputy Minister of Science and Technology while Bangkok MP and important financier Chaloemphan Siwikon and a number of other long serving MPs were left out of the cabinet. Furthermore, Wira Musikaphong, party secretary-general, was named as a deputy minister while his former opponent for the post of secretary-general was named a full minister. Some members of the party began to call for an accounting of party election finances in an attempt to determine who should be named to the cabinet, under the premise that those spending the most deserved to be rewarded with cabinet posts. The party responded with a list of those who contributed to the election fund—a list that was questioned as to both accuracy and completeness by the faction that failed to gain seats. (The list: Phichai Rattakun 14,027,000 baht; Chaloemphan Siwikon, 3,000,000; Chaliao Yuwithaya, 2,900,000; Wira Musikaphong, 2,000,000; Marut Bunnak, 1,000,000; Lek Nana, 1,000,000; Sanong Tuchinda, 1,000,000; Sanan Khachonprasat, 1,000,000; Chan Manutham, 1,000,000; Prachuap Chaiyasan, 1,000,000; Prasit Kanchonawat, 1,000,000. Note that these figures are for money donated to the party and do not include money spent on factions or on individual campaigns.) On January 10, 1987, elections for the post of party leader were held. Phichai Rattakun defeated Chaloemphan Siwikon in the race for party leader and Sanan Khachonprasat became the new secretary-general. Wira Musikaphong, facing charges of lèse-majesté, did not run. The new party executive committee was composed almost entirely of Phichai supporters. Some 42 supporters of Wira, of Chaloemphan, and of other factions left out of the cabinet and party leadership formed a faction called the January10 group that, in effect, created a second party within the Democrat party. All efforts to resolve the conflict over the next two years failed and ultimately the split helped lead to an early dissolution of parliament in 1988. For the new elections, the January10 group formed a new party called the Prachachon party, making the split complete. The Prachachon party, which has since merged with other parties to form the Solidarity party, won 19 seats in the election, while the Democrat party went from 100 seats in 1986 to 48 seats in 1988.Google Scholar See Setthabut, Noranit, Phak Prachathipat (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1987), pp. 135–9.Google Scholar The list of contributors first appeared in Matichon 22 Aug. 1986, p. 29, and is cited in Noranit, p. 40, with an extended list of other contributors on p. 41.Google Scholar

60 On this conflict, see the interview with Suphatra Masadit in Bangkok Post 7 July 1989, p. 5, and the article in Bangkok Post Oct. 1989, which tells of a rally in Songkhla where MP Samphan Thongsamak told the crowd ‘there had been calls from within the party to withdraw from the coalition since General Chatchai was only concerned about the middle class and financiers.’ The Democrat party did pull out of the coalition in Dec. of 1990, partly because those factions that had managed to keep the party in the coalition had become convinced that early elections were inevitable and the hiatus from power would be brief.Google Scholar

61 The Phalang Tham party won ten seats in Bangkok—expanded to eleven in a by-election, three in the central region—one each in Singburi, Uthaithani, and Kanchanaburi—and one in the South, in Suratthani. The party leader, Chamlong Simuang, is mayor of Bangkok.Google Scholar