On games with almost complete information
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Extract
1. It is well known that a game with perfect information has an equilibrium-point of pure strategies; this was first proved for two-person games by Zermelo (9), and later extended to n-person games by Kuhn(3). More recently, Dalkey(1) and Otter and Dunne (8) have published the stronger result (Theorem 6 below): If in the complete inflation of a game Γ every player has complete information about every other player, then Γ has an equilibrium-point of pure strategies.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , April 1955 , pp. 275 - 287
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge Philosophical Society 1955
References
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