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Kleptoparasitic Interactions under Asymmetric ResourceValuation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 May 2014
Abstract
We introduce a game theoretical model of stealing interactions. We model the situation asan extensive form game when one individual may attempt to steal a valuable item fromanother who may in turn defend it. The population is not homogeneous, but rather eachindividual has a different Resource Holding Potential (RHP). We assume that RHP not onlyinfluences the outcome of the potential aggressive contest (the individual with the largerRHP is more likely to win), but that it also influences how an individual values aparticular resource. We investigate several valuation scenarios and study the prevalenceof aggressive behaviour. We conclude that the relationship between RHP and resource valueis crucial, where some cases lead to fights predominantly between pairs of strongindividuals, and some between pairs of weak individuals. Other cases lead to no fightswith one individual conceding, and the order of strategy selection is crucial, where theindividual which picks its strategy first often has an advantage.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena , Volume 9 , Issue 3: Biological evolution , 2014 , pp. 138 - 147
- Copyright
- © EDP Sciences, 2014
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