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Between Legitimacy and Socioemotional Wealth: Family Ownership and the Party Branches Building of Chinese Private Enterprises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2022

Xiaobin He
Affiliation:
Tsinghua University, China
Jiankun Liu*
Affiliation:
Harbin Engineering University, China
*
Corresponding author: Jiankun Liu ([email protected])

Abstract

Since 2012, a large-scale Party branches building campaign intending to regain political influence in the private sector has been sweepingly promoted. Drawing on the Chinese Private Enterprise Survey conducted in 2008, 2012, and 2018, this study investigates private enterprises’ strategies in response to the intensified political pressure by integrating socioemotional wealth theory and neo-institutional theory. It is found that (1) private enterprises with high family ownership tend not to establish Party branches until political pressure is very high; (2) enterprises with high family ownership are more likely to adopt a decoupling strategy of evading the Party's political and social goals; and (3) the owners’ perceptions of a better market and legal environment weaken the negative effect of family ownership on the establishment of Party branches. These results reveal the key logic of preserving the socioemotional wealth and ‘embedded agency’ of Chinese private enterprises when they confront institutional legitimacy mandates. This study also sheds new light on the causes of the decoupling phenomenon and the dynamic interactions between institutional environment and organizational behaviors.

摘要

2012年以来,中国共产党为了获得在私营部门的政治影响,开展了大规模的私营企业党建运动。在这一背景下,我们整合了社会情感财富理论和新制度主义理论,探讨了私营企业在应对加剧的政治压力时所采取的策略。对2008、2012和2018年中国私营企业调查数据(CPES)进行分析之后,我们发现:家族所有权程度与其党建活动密切相关,表现在(1)所有权越高,建立党支部需要越大的政治压力;(2)所有权越高,越可能采取脱耦策略来逃避政治目标。但是,结果也表明,企业家对市场和法律环境的正面感知可以减弱家族所有权对党建的负面影响。本研究的结果对于理解组织脱耦现象的成因,以及组织行为与制度环境的动态互动关系有新的启示。

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

ACCEPTED BY Senior Editor Dali Ma

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