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Wining and Dining Government Officials: What Drives Political Networking in Chinese Private Ventures?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2020

Jianjun Zhang ,
Pei Sun  and
Kunyuan Qiao Open the ORCID record for Kunyuan Qiao [Opens in a new window]
Jianjun Zhang*
Affiliation:
Peking University, China
Pei Sun
Affiliation:
University of Manchester, UK
Kunyuan Qiao
Affiliation:
Cornell University, USA
*
Corresponding author: Jianjun Zhang ([email protected])
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Abstract

Managerial networking with political actors has long been recognized as a crucial co-option strategy to navigate the challenging institutional environment in emerging economies. However, we know much less about what drives the variation of political networking investment by private ventures. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we unpack the dyadic business-government relations and identify the key organizational and environmental factors that shape the power dependence relationships between private ventures and the government. By examining power imbalance and mutual dependence in this dyadic relationship and considering both the necessity and the capability of political networking, we develop hypotheses regarding the ways in which size-, connection-, and location-based dependencies affect firms’ political networking intensity. These hypotheses are tested through a unique survey of Chinese private ventures. Our study finds that political networking intensity (1) has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm size, (2) is negatively associated with the presence of embedded political ties while positively associated with that of achieved political connections, and (3) is smaller when the focal firm is located in business development zones. This research bears rich implications for our understanding of corporate political activity in emerging economies from a resource dependence lens.

摘要

建立与维系密切的政商关系一直被认为是在新兴经济体中应对具有挑战性制度环境的重要战略。然而，既有研究并未深入探讨民营企业为何在投资政治联系的强度上会存在显著差异。基于资源依赖理论，我们把政商二元关系做了进一步分解，并从组织和环境两方面因素入手探究民营企业和政府的相互依存关系。具体而言，基于此二元关系中权力对比和相互依赖两个维度，考虑到企业建立、维系政治联系的必要性和能力，我们提出了基于企业规模、关系以及地区的资源依赖如何影响企业政治联系投资强度的研究假说。我们使用一个对中国民营企业调研的数据库对这些假说进行了检验，此调研数据中包含了企业针对政府官员和其他利益相关者的商业招待费比例的独特信息。我们的研究发现企业在政治联系上的投资强度（1）与企业规模呈现一个倒U型关系；（2）与企业的网络嵌入性政治联系负相关，但与企业后天获得的政治联系正相关；（3）在经济开发区中更低。本研究从资源依赖角度丰富了我们对于新兴经济体中企业政治战略的理解。

Аннотация

Управленческое взаимодействие с политическими деятелями уже давно признано важнейшей стратегией кооптации, которая позволяет ориентироваться в сложной институциональной среде в странах с развивающейся экономикой. Однако, гораздо меньше известно о том, что способствует разнообразию инвестиций в политические связи со стороны частных предприятий. Опираясь на теорию ресурсной зависимости, мы изучаем диадическую модель отношений между бизнесом и правительством, а также определяем ключевые организационные и внешние факторы, которые формируют отношения взаимосвязи между частными предприятиями и государством. Изучая дисбаланс сил и взаимозависимость в этих диадических отношениях, а также принимая во внимание как необходимость, так и возможности политических связей, мы разрабатываем гипотезы относительно того, каким образом факторы, основанные на размере, связях и местоположении, влияют на интенсивность развития политических отношений в компаниях. Эти гипотезы проверяются в уникальном исследовании китайских частных предприятий. Наше исследование показывает, что интенсивность политического взаимодействия (1) имеет перевернутую U-образную зависимость от размера компании, (2) обратно зависит от существующих политических связей, и при этом напрямую зависит от приобретенных политических связей, и (3) уменьшается в том случае, если компания расположена в зоне развития бизнеса. Это исследование имеет большое значение для понимания корпоративной политической активности в странах с развивающейся экономикой через призму теории ресурсной зависимости.

Resumen

El relacionamiento gerencial con actores políticos ha sido reconocido durante mucho tiempo como una estrategia de cooptación crucial para navegar en el ambiente institucional retados en economías emergentes. Sin embargo, sabemos mucho menos sobre qué impulsa la variación de las inversiones en relacionamiento político por parte de empresas privadas. Basándonos en la teoría de dependencia de recursos, desentrañamos las relaciones diádicas entre empresas y gobierno e identificamos factores organizacionales y ambientales clave que moldean las relaciones de dependencia al poder entre los factores ambientales privados y el gobierno. Al examinar el desequilibrio de poder y la dependencia mutua en esta relación diádica y considerando tanto la necesidad y la capacidad del relacionamiento político, desarrollamos hipótesis en relación a las maneras en las cuales el tamaño-, conexión-, y las dependencias basadas en ubicación afectan la intensidad del relacionamiento político de las empresas. Estas hipótesis son probadas mediante una encuesta única de empresas privadas chinas. Nuestro estudio encuentra que la intensidad del relacionamiento político (1) tiene una relación en forma de U invertida con el tamaño de la empresa, (2) está negativamente asociado con la presencia de lazos políticos arraigados, mientras que se asocia positivamente con las conexiones políticas logradas, y (3) es menor cuando la empresa focal está ubicada en zonas de desarrollo empresarial. Esta investigación trae repercusiones profundas para nuestro entendimiento de la actividad política corporativa en economías emergentes de una perspectiva de dependencia de recursos.

Keywords

Chinapolitical networkingprivate venturesresource dependence theory (RDT)企业政治联系资源依赖理论民营企业中国Китайполитические связичастные предприятиятеория ресурсной зависимости (RDT)Chinarelacionamiento políticoempresas privadasteoría de dependencia de recursos (RDT)
Type
Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 16 , Issue 5 , December 2020 , pp. 1084 - 1113
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

ACCEPTED BY Senior Editor Bilian Sullivan

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