Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 June 2017
Two essential imperfections determine the degree of the financial sector development in an economy: lending frictions, which constrain the ability to extend loans to borrowers; and, trading frictions, which constrain the trading of these loans in secondary markets. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where long-term investment is the engine of growth to study macroeconomic consequences of financial development. In the model, long-term loans are extended to entrepreneurs in a primary market and then traded in a secondary market among financiers. In competitive equilibria, reductions in either lending or trading frictions enlarge the financial sector. Although financial deepening through low-cost lending is always welfare improving, financial deepening stimulated by low-cost trading could be detrimental to the society. I illustrate that a model qualitatively consistent with the U.S. financial development episode of the last 30 years should exhibit disproportionately large reductions in trading frictions relative to lending frictions.
For their suggestions and comments I would like to thank Thorsten Beck, Ata Can Bertay, Harry Huizinga, Manuel Oechslin, Gonzague Vannoorenberghe, Wolf Wagner, and Ping Wang; conference participants at 2012 Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, 2013 Society for Advanced Economic Theory Conference, 2013 Tilburg Development Economics Workshop; and seminar participants at Goethe University and Tilburg University.