Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 June 2019
This paper deals with the optimal management of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We specifically focus on a contrasting tax evasion-based strategy for controlling the debt-to-GDP ratio. Two devices can be employed by the policymaker: by the one side, the tax rate is to be applied to the tax payers; by the other side, the monitoring activity is to be performed in order to detect the evaded taxes. To pursue our scopes, a stochastic control problem is developed and solved. Some numerical experiments validate the theoretical proposal and lead to an intuitive discussion of the obtained findings.
We are grateful to Angelo Antoci, Luca Gori, Mauro Sodini, two anonymous Referees, and the participants to the NED-CICSE 2017 Workshop held in Pisa in September 2017 for the very useful comments. Of course, we are the solely responsible of any errors.