Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2016
We employ a life-cycle model with income risk to analyze how tax-deferred individual accounts affect households' savings for retirement. We consider voluntary accounts as opposed to mandatory accounts with minimum contribution rates. We contrast add-on accounts with carve-out accounts that partly replace social security contributions. Quantitative results suggest that making add-on accounts mandatory has adverse welfare effects across income groups. Carve-out accounts generate positive welfare effects across all income groups, but gains are lower for low income earners. Default investment rules in individual accounts have a modest impact on welfare.
Previous versions of this paper were circulated under the titles “Pension Reform and Individual Accounts” and “Optimal Savings for Retirement: The Role of Individual Accounts and Disaster Expectations.” We thank two anonymous referees, Michael Haliassos, seminar participants at the Deutsche Bundesbank, and participants at the International Netspar Pension Workshop 2011, the Meeting of the Canadian Economic Association 2010, and the Meetings of the European Economic Association 2009 for very useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.