Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 June 2019
This paper examines how the degree of gender-egalitarianism embedded in inheritance rules impacts state capacity at its early stages during medieval times. We present a theoretical model in which building state capacity enables nobles to raise taxes and overcome rivals. The model addresses the use of inheritance to consolidate landholding dynasties, also accommodating interstate marriages between landed heirs. On the one hand, dynastic continuity—of utmost importance to medieval lords—directly encourages state-building. Male-biased inheritance rules historically maximize the likelihood of dynastic continuity. We weigh this effect against the indirect impact of the more frequent land-merging marriages under gender-egalitarian rules. Contrary to the literature, our results suggest that gender-egalitarian norms—offering a low probability of dynastic continuity—promote state capacity in the short run more than gender-biased norms. In the long run, results are reversed, providing a rationale for the pervasive European tradition of preference for men as heirs.
I thank the participants of the “2015 Warwick Growth Economic Workshop” and the “8th Louvain Symposium in Economic Dynamics,” and seminars at Brown University, Université catholique de Louvain, and Université de Luxembourg for their useful comments. I am indebted to Jacob Weisdorf, David de la Croix, Luca Pensieroso, and Fabio Mariani for their support, critiques, and encouragement. Helpful suggestions and discussion with Thierry Verdier, Mathias Thoenig, Marc Goñi, David Weil, and Mark Putterman have improved this paper. I thank the two anonymous referees for their comments on this paper. This research project was supported by an FSR grant on “Family, Marriage and Economic Development” and the “ARC project 15/19-063” on “Family Transformations: Incentives and Norms”, both financed by the French-speaking community of Belgium. This work was also supported by French National Research Agency Grant ANR-17-EURE-0020.