Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2018
This paper studies the effect of different types of child subsidies on the economic allocation and the cross-sectional fertility pattern. I construct a rich but tractable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of heterogeneous individuals, two sectors of production and a government. I derive analytically how fertility choices are affected by changes in household resources and child subsidies and show the numerical results of two policy experiments. A subsidy on childcare favors the birth rates of educated, high-wage individuals. Parents work more so that the subsidy program is partly financed by a rise in labor earnings. In contrast, a lump-sum child allowance stimulates fertility of uneducated, low-wage parents the most. This policy has a larger effect on the average birth rate, but as parents perform most of the care themselves it comes at the expense of a lower supply of labor and a greater tax burden.
For valuable comments and suggestions, I thank the Associate Editor and two anonymous referees, as well as Hippolyte d'Albis, David de la Croix, Paula Gobbi, and the participants of the workshop on “Fertility decisions and endogenous mortality in macroeconomics” (February 2014, Paris) and the Demographic Economics Conference (May 2014, Iowa City).
*Financial support from The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged (grant number 453-14-012).