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ON RANDOM MATCHING, MONETARY EQUILIBRIA, AND SUNSPOTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 March 2001

Huberto M. Ennis
Huberto M. Ennis
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
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Abstract

We study comparative statics results for the steady-state monetary equilibria of a simple random matching model of money with endogenous prices and no extrinsic uncertainty. Some of the results appear counterintuitive (both when take-it-or-leave-it offer or when Nash–Rubinstein bargaining is used in the model). Consistency of the equilibrium expectations causes the partial equilibrium intuitions to be reversed. We then proceed to apply the new insights to the analysis of sunspot equilibria in these type of models of bilateral trade with money.

Keywords

Random MatchingMonetary EquilibriaMultiplicityComparative StaticsSunspot Equilibrium
Type
Note
Information
Macroeconomic Dynamics , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , February 2001 , pp. 132 - 142
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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