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EXPECTATIONS, CREDIBILITY, AND TIME-CONSISTENT MONETARY POLICY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2001

Peter N. Ireland
Peter N. Ireland
Affiliation:
Boston College and National Bureau of Economic Research
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Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of multiple equilibria in a model of time-consistent monetary policy. It suggests that this problem originates in the assumption that agents have rational expectations and proposes several alternative restrictions on expectations that allow the monetary authority to build credibility for a disinflationary policy by demonstrating that it will stick to that policy even if it imposes short-run costs on the economy. Starting with these restrictions, the paper derives conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the model's steady state; monetary policy in this unique steady state involves the constant deflation advocated by Milton Friedman.

Keywords

ExpectationsCredibilityTime ConsistencyMonetary Policy
Type
Research Article
Information
Macroeconomic Dynamics , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , December 2000 , pp. 448 - 466
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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