The Spring Conference of the British Branch of the International Law Association exemplified to the authors some of the ways in which the ‘old’ encounters the ‘new’ in contemporary international law. Followed by a selective Bibliography of new-stream international legal writing, this Editorial tries to unravel the ‘interested distance’ maintained by the mainstream towards new trends in international legal scholarship.

The adoption of the Convention in hand is regarded as a significant step in the law-making process in the field, irrespective of its entry into force. In order to assess the extent of such significance, the text under consideration is interpreted in the light of the most advanced relevant international instruments, including the International Law Association private codification process. The provisions on the general principles of equitable utilisation and no-harm are read in conjunction with Part IV on ‘protection, preservation and management’, on account of a systematic interpretative approach, and on the assumption of the interdependence between water quantity and quality issues. The general character of the wording in which the substantive principles are spelled out, will prompt their further specification, rather than change, through subsequent diplomatic, treaty, and judicial practice.

The United Nations Claims Commission (UNCC) was set up by the UN Security Council to process claims submitted by victims of the war between Iraq and the Coalition Forces (1990–1991). From an institutional point of view, the UNCC is a curious creation, assuming the form of a hybrid between an administrative claims procedure and an international tribunal. This article will highlight some of the difficulties with the institutional model chosen and focus on the institutional, as well as the normative legitimacy of the UNCC, whereby particular attention is devoted to Iraq's participation in the procedure.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for arbitration over the boundary line in the Brćko area of Bosnia. Arbitration took place between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. Both party appointed arbitrators refused to sign the Award. The Award of 14 February 1997 did not draw a boundary line but established an international interim supervisory regime. The Tribunal decided on the basis of international law and equity, but it refused to apply the principle of non-recognition of territorial gains obtained in violation of international law. On 15 March 1998 the Arbitral Tribunal handed down a Supplemental Award. This holds out the prospect of a further decision by the Tribunal in early 1999.

The effects of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are felt strongly up to the present day. On numerous occasions, the inspection teams of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) have encountered serious problems and opposition by the Iraqi government when verifying the non-production of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Among the many legal questions raised by the Iraqi-Kuwait war's aftermath, a fundamental issue is whether – in the absence of an explicit Security Council decision – compliance by Iraq with its obligations may be enforced by military means. In this article, this question is addressed by examining whether military enforcement action can be based on Security Council resolutions adopted earlier in the course of the conflict, especially Resolutions 678 (1990), in which the Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’, and 1154 (1998), in which the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the UN and Iraq was endorsed. It is argued that without a further mandate from the Security Council, military enforcement of arms control in Iraq under the present circumstances is prohibited by international law.

The Energy Charter Treaty came into force on 16 April 1998. The Treaty contains far-reaching provisions on trade and investment liberalisation within the energy sectors of 49 signatory states. The Treaty arguably offers a basis for multilateral agreement on micro-economic reform of the energy sectors. Some of the most significant initiatives contained in the treaty are the provisions for resolution of disputes. This article examines in detail the provisions dealing with arbitration of disputes between investors and states. These mechanisms build on models developed in other recent multilateral investment treaties. The limitations and potential offered by these provisions are discussed and some conclusions drawn.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one of the “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” provided for in Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal is established by Annex VI to the Convention which is its Statute. Within the Tribunal is established the Seabed Disputes Chamber which has jurisdiction to deal with respect to deep-sea mining activities covered by Part XI of the Convention.

The Tribunal performs three different but closely related functions. The first is to offer a forum of choice for states parties to the Convention to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The second function is to provide a special, and largely mandatory, procedure for dealing with disputes in connection with the interpretation and application of the provisions of Part XI of the Convention. This is the function of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber also has competence to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly and Council of the International Seabed Authority. Thirdly, the Tribunal serves as a residual and compulsory mechanism for the settlement of certain disputes identified by the Convention as requiring expeditious decision, such as applications for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crew or requests for the prescription of provisional measures pending final decisions in cases. The Tribunal may also deal with disputes arising under other maritime agreements, if the agreements so provide.

The Tribunal commenced operations in October 1996. It has completed organizational work for its administrative judicial functions. It has adopted its Rules, the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Procedure and Guidelines to assist parties appearing before it. It has also established special Chambers. The Tribunal has already dealt with one application for the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested in a foreign port and one request for provisional measures. Proceedings are in progress on the merits of the first case submitted to it.

The article surveys the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga cases which inaugurated jurisprudence of the 21 Member International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany, with delivery of two important decisions on prompt release of the vessel and its crew (1997, Case No. 1) and on provisional measures of protection (1998, Case No. 2). The decisions provided precedential instances of application by the Tribunal of Articles 292 and 290 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea respectively, and of the relevant provisions of the ITLOS Rules. The prescription of provisional measures of protection formed the incidental proceedings of the pending M/V Saiga (Merits) case which is to be settled by ITLOS in mid-1999 (Case No. 2) and is to be the subject of a separate article. In view of the ITLOS Statute and the Rules being closely modelled in the Statute and the Rules of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), careful attention is given to comparison of the inaugural practice of ITLOS with the longstanding practice of the ICJ, and preservation of judicial consistency by ITLOS is particularly commended. A history of the M/V Saiga dispute, intertwined with domestic proceedings before Guinean courts, is for the reader's convenience outlined in a Chronological Table annexed to this article.

The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, adopted in October 1997 (together with the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice and the Guidelines Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases Before the Tribunal) follows the model of the Rules of the International Court of Justice with rather relevant differences. Some of these differences depend on the need of more expeditious and less expensive proceedings: in particular, the provisions introducing time limits and those in the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice which eliminate in most cases the requirement of Notes by each judge. Others depend on the specific characteristics of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These include the provisions on intervention, on preliminary objections and proceedings, on provisional measures, on prompt release of vessels and crews, and on activities in the international seabed Area. In this category can also be included the provisions on the participation in proceedings by international organizations and natural and juridical persons.

On 2 November 1992, Iran filed an application instituting proceedings against the United States in respect of a dispute arising out of the attack on and the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes. In it, Iran contended that these acts constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in 1955.

This commentary will give an analysis of the purpose of the first site visit by the International Court of Justice, viewed in the context of the Court's specific judicial functions under its Statute and Rules; the factors bearing upon the success of the site visit; and the circumstances, in reality somewhat limited, in which the exercise might usefully be repeated in future cases.

In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros proceedings, the parties, viz. Hungary and Slovakia, defended their conduct, amongst others, with arguments derived from the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility, and from the law of state responsibility itself. In its judgment, the International Court of Justice disentangled the mixture of arguments derived from the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility advanced by Hungary, and drew a clear line between these two branches of international law. Second, it rejected several circumstances that were advanced by the parties to preclude the wrongfulness of their conduct. On both these accounts, the author opines that the declaratory dicta of the Court have contributed to the development of the law of state responsibility. Third, the Court decided on the legal consequences of the intersecting internationally wrongful acts committed by Hungary and Slovakia. According to the author, the Court erred in its reasoning on this account by confusing the award of cessation of the internationally wrongful acts with the award of reparation for these acts.

Indictment of 10 November 1995.

On 10 July 1998, the Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded the review of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Six new rules were adopted and 25 others amended. Changes include the assignment by the Trial Chamber of one of its members as pre-trial Judge after the initial appearance of an accused and the streamlining of the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In addition, in the future Chambers will render one combined judgment determining whether the accused is guilty, and if found guilty, imposing sentence.

In a world of sovereign states, gathering evidence is one of the major challenges for the new international criminal tribunals. The decision in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, shows some of the difficulties. The Tribunal finds it has the power to issue compulsory orders to sovereign states for the production of evidence, although not to issue a subpoena as such. The Tribunal also assumes the power to review a state's national security privilege, a holding that may challenge the more protective provisions of the new Rome treaty for a permanent International Criminal Court. However, the Appeals Chamber's declaration that there is no power to summon particular government officials, even for eyewitness testimony, that document production must be limited, and that its orders cannot be directly enforced, may hobble the Tribunal's capacity to muster the necessary proof at trial.

With a number of sentencing judgments expected in cases pending before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the enforcement of sentences has become an important concern. The author discusses theoretical and practical issues raised in this regard, including the juridical basis for enforcement as well as the Model Agreement regarding modalities of enforcement. On the basis of this Model Agreement, a number of agreements has been concluded with individual states. The author concludes that the nature of the Tribunal has necessitated the development of novel and sometimes artificial measures for the enforcement of sentences.