Three intertwined threads run through many recent editorials of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL). They tie together many debates within and beyond the board of editors. The threads are those of the Journal's plural identity, the conversation about methods, and the spicy theme of interdisciplinarity. They are related for obvious reasons. Methodology forms one – not the only and perhaps not the foremost – factor in assessing submissions. We need to have an idea of good methodology for such an assessment to be possible. At the same time such an idea must not go against the plurality of perspectives or the Journal's aspiration to provide a forum to new and possibly unsettling voices. Research that cuts across disciplines seems especially valuable in this regard. But it comes with its own methodological challenges and tests the Journal's identity which is – albeit plural– that of a Journal of international law. It is against the background of these intertwined threads that I wish to offer a discussion of a central question that mirrors these recent debates: What makes for a valid legal argument?

Traditional rules of international law do not recognize a positive right of revolution, nor a prohibition thereof as the relevant rules merely place the legality of revolutions in their effectiveness. However, the recent upsurge in democratically inspired revolutions has provided high currency to proposals that seek to re-evaluate the position of international law towards revolutions. Proponents of the theory of democratic revolution have sought to establish the legality of revolutions on an elevated normative ground using the lofty ideals of human rights and democratic governance and ultimately suggesting the existence of a positive right of democratic revolution under international law. Focusing on the Arab spring and the normative framework of the African Union, this article argues that the existing (emerging) human rights and democratic norms do not necessarily provide any distinct normative justifications for democratic revolutions beyond the legality that could be possibly established on the basis of traditional norms of international law. While the study recognizes emerging norms that represent a shift away from the effectiveness doctrine, it is observed that the pro-revolutionary implications of the norms are not as obvious as their importance as an (anti-revolutionary) injunction against the forcible ouster of democratically elected governments. The article concludes with the observation that the premium placed on democratic elections in the various normative instruments underscores the centrality of elections – and, alas, not revolutions – as the primary means through which the people's constitutive power (pouvoir constituant) is to be expressed.

In 2013 the Netherlands lost its standard bearer in international law. After a short period of illness, Pieter Hendrik Kooijmans died at the age of 79 on 13 February 2013. Some time before his illness the author had an extensive and frank interview with Judge Kooijmans who reflected on his life and work, especially on his intellectual formation, his understanding of the essence and core functions of law, his experiences as UN special rapporteur on torture, his ideas on reform of the International Court of Justice, and the great changes that have taken place in international law. This portrait shows a fine man with a strong sense of justice who was fully dedicated to the substance of public international law without turning a blind eye to its shortcomings and relative influence in international and domestic affairs. The interview is preceded by an introduction and concludes with some observations on his long and productive life in the service of peace, justice, and respect for human rights through the law.

International law is an amalgam of the past, present, and future. The past is important in itself not only because the vast majority of rules and principles of international law have come into being through decades, if not centuries, of deviation, crystallization and consolidation, but also because the past, and one's perspectives of the past, underlie, inform and explain a state's perspectives of a particular order or particular norms or values, and its approaches to the perspectives and actions of other states. The importance of understanding China's historical approaches to international law cannot be understated. China's interactions with international law began to take place in the context of its interactions with Western powers that culminated in the Opium War. This article then examines China's approaches to international law during its republican, communist, and contemporary socialist-market eras.

The principle of sovereign rights under UNCLOS countenances competition among littoral states for ownership of a common oil deposit through the unilateral exploitation of their continental shelf. This leads to conflict, wastage, and resource sterilization. However, rather than apply the principle of sovereign rights, states seem to turn to natural law principles as a more reasonable regulation of their activities on the continental shelf. Two sources of natural law principles are relevant. One source consists of a priori principles of sociableness and necessity which prescribe that, for their own preservation, states ought to act pursuant to the common good. These principles underlie energy security policies which espouse interdependence. Another source of natural law principles are international agreements and national laws in which states temper their sovereign rights and interests and recognize the co-existence of the rights and interests of other states in a common deposit. These practices constitute a posteriori intervenient or secondary law of nations, which appears similar to customary law. Adherence is not dictated by conviction that these principles are obligatory. Rather, adherence seems to be based on discernment that, while permissible under the principle of sovereign rights, unilateral appropriation is impermissible under natural law.

Recent cases before the ICC raise the question of on behalf of which entities crimes against humanity can be committed. Interpreting the ‘organizational policy’ requirement in its context, this article argues that in principle crimes against humanity can be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy of any organization that has the capacity to orchestrate a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. It is shown that this does not broaden the scope of the crime indefinitely but that concrete requirements defining such entities are found in the contextual elements of crimes against humanity.

What a difference a good textbook would have made twenty years ago, when the first judges embarked upon the adventure of creating a new international criminal procedure. Of course, back then there was little to draw upon other than domestic criminal systems. Fast forward twenty years, and a series of international(ized) criminal tribunals and courts have created a rich and sprawling body of international criminal procedural law. So rich, in fact, that it threatens to overwhelm the practitioner or scholar struggling to make sure that he or she has not overlooked anything important. So the recent series of books devoted to the topic of international criminal procedure is welcome indeed. The present book review surveys and compares four of these volumes.