This article lays the groundwork for a Marxist theory of the international law of land-grabbing. It argues that any comprehensive politico-economic analysis of land-grabbing must also be a politico-economic analysis of the law of land-grabbing. It argues further that Marx’s account of ‘primitive accumulation’ in Capital – an account it presents as an historical explanation of the transition to capitalism as well as a general theory of ‘extra-economic’ force deployed through state power, including, crucially, the power of law – is helpful for developing an analytical framework for understanding the legal facets of land-grabbing. Political economists, rural sociologists, and social and political theorists have argued for and against the applicability of Marx’s theory of ‘primitive accumulation’ to the contemporary wave of global land grabbing. Intriguingly, though, no international lawyers have grappled with the question of whether a specifically Marxist approach to the phenomenon can or should be developed. This article does so, contending that contemporary land-grabbing is unintelligible absent a theory of capitalism, and that the processes whereby capitalism transforms land and labour are unintelligible absent a theory of the periodic waves of legally mediated ‘primitive accumulation’ that propel it forward. The article pays particular attention to the work produced by Olivier De Schutter during his tenure as United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.

Since 2008, a global ‘land rush’ has been unfolding and so have efforts by international, national and regional actors to position themselves as the principal authorities in the determination of appropriate usages of land. This article examines three of the most influential ‘soft law’ instruments: the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment; the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems and; the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. Despite their substantive differences, all three documents share a specific form of state-centrism. They imagine the host state of such large-scale investments as internally unitary and externally independent and entrust it with the bulk of responsibilities regarding the management of land investments. However, I argue that this particular form of state-centrism obscures the legal and administrative realities of the post-colonial state that is often legally bifurcated and subject to pervasive forms of international authority. Rather, an appreciation of the multitude of actors who claim jurisdiction over the lands of the South enables a better understanding of the legal mechanics of land-grabbing. Sierra Leone, which has been positioned as a ‘poster child’ for the implementation of such ‘soft law’ instruments, serves as the focal point of this jurisdictional approach to land-grabbing. In this context, the promise of ‘soft law’ instruments to make the post-colonial state the guarantor of universally beneficial large-scale land acquisitions is shown to be a false one.

This article explores how Luxembourg and Nauru put their sovereignty to use in order to become global players in what can be considered extraterritorial landgrabs – the turning of the deep seabed and outer space into realms of commercial exploitation. It shows how the international legal framework puts states, however small, into a position to facilitate private enterprises’ endeavours to obtain extraterritorial exploitation rights. The article further enquires into the public interest justifications put forward by governments to legitimate their support for the expansion of private resource extraction into the deep sea and outer space. It finds that these justifications are very tenuous; that governments refer to vague notions of economic growth and benefits that may accrue from extraction to an undefined humanity while it remains unclear whether their own populations will obtain any concrete gains. Both case studies illustrate how states, on the basis of international law, facilitate the expansion of private value extraction, thus perverting the redistributive ambitions that may once have motivated the negotiations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Outer Space Treaty.

On 27 June 2017, in the Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica case, The Hague Court of Appeal applied the effective control test in determining attribution and found that the Netherlands was responsible for the failure of the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) acting as a part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect civilians from the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. This judgment is of considerable significance because the court renounced the preventive approach to the effective control test, to which the Dutch courts had repeatedly declared their adherence, and reverted to the traditional (presumptive) approach. The preventive interpretation was originally proposed with a view to justifying much broader attribution to troop-contributing nations (TCNs). However, quite interestingly, the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that the Dutchbat’s conduct was attributable to the Netherlands without recourse to the preventive approach. The present study argues that the legal framework for the attribution of UN peacekeepers’ conduct has developed in such a manner that the fair allocation of responsibility and the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations are in equilibrium. In that sense, the effective control test should be located at the interface between the law of international responsibility and the law of international organizations. It is illustrated that not only does the preventive interpretation fail to strike a fair balance between the institutional considerations and the need to provide remedies for victims of peacekeepers’ misconduct, but also the presumptive approach may lead to effective remedies while having due regard for the institutional considerations.

Additional opinions (AOs) – dissenting opinions, separate opinions and declarations, whether authored individually or jointly – are a distinctive characteristic of the ICJ’s jurisprudence. Few decisions of the International Court of Justice (the Court, ICJ) are delivered without any additional opinion attached to it. Yet, despite their ubiquity, there is still significant disagreement as to their relationship to the authority of the Court and its decisions. Although this disagreement is commonly attributed to the different approaches and attitudes traditionally associated with the ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’ traditions, few ask specifically why those traditions take the approach they do, and even fewer consider the appropriateness of the extension of those attitudes to the ICJ, which of course is neither ‘civil law’ nor ‘common law’. In this article, using the work of Mirjan Damaška, I offer a contextually coherent and contextually contingent understand of the theory and practice of additional opinions at the ICJ upon which engagement with this practice – by judges, scholars and practitioners – can be premised. This effort to understand the relationship between additional opinions and institutional authority will, by its very nature, lead to a broader enquiry into the very nature of institutional authority at the ICJ. Having explained the importance of AOs to the structural integrity of the Court’s authority, I will close this article by highlighting the role of various stakeholders when engaging with that practice to ensure that their institutional function is discharged.

Tu quoque, meaning in Latin ‘you too’, is a fallacy of relevance which targets the hypocrisy of the arguer rather than the truth of the advanced argument.

In international criminal tribunals, defendants who advance the defence choose not to argue for their innocence, but rather seek to shift the spotlight on the crimes committed by the prosecuting authority or by the opposing side to the conflict, so as to delegitimize the entire prosecution as a form of ‘victor’s justice’. According to legal doxa, the argument has never been accepted in court. As a consequence, it has also been completely neglected within academia. Yet, the tu quoque defence is extremely powerful, as not only proven by its recurrent use over time, but also by its ability to turn trials into ‘show-trials’. This delegitimization of international prosecutions not only does impact the memory and reconciliation of war-torn communities, but also weakens the edifice of international criminal law.

‘The Tu Quoque Argument as a Defence to International Crimes, Prosecution or Punishment,’ written by Sienho Yee in 2004 is the only existing in-depth treatment of the defence. Departing from a critique of Yee’s theorization, this article attempts to fill the scholarly lacuna that exists around tu quoque. It departs from a critique of Yee’s theorization and questions whether the defence can be legally legitimate. The article concludes that the defence is legally void, but international criminal tribunals and academia must not disregard its underlying argument because of its political pertinence.