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Towards a Principled Justification for the Mixed Composition of Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2016

HARRY HOBBS
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Abstract

The justification for a majority of international judges sitting on hybrid international criminal tribunals is tremendously undertheorized. At present, policymakers must rely on base pragmatic considerations that allege that local judges are either too incapable or too corrupt. This may or may not be true. It is, however, certainly unattractive and inadequate as an argument. In this article, I sketch out a principled theoretical argument defending internationalization of hybrid tribunals. Drawing on debates in municipal jurisdictions on the principle of fair reflection, my principled justification centres on institutional and sociological legitimacy. As international crimes strike at two societies – the local and the global – hybrid tribunals should be composed of both international and local judges. In principle, the severity of international crimes dictates that international judges should predominate. However, peculiar contextual factors may suggest moderating the principle of fair reflection in appropriate circumstances.

Keywords

composition of courtshybrid tribunalsinternational criminal lawprinciple of fair reflectionsociological legitimacy
Type
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 177 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2016 

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114 Although my focus is limited to the position of hybrid courts, in principle, this argument could be carried to purely international tribunals, such as the ICC. Of course, as I have stressed, the principle of fair reflection is but one element in the design of criminal courts – it may not be feasible for each and every case before the ICC.

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