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Toleration, Synthesis or Replacement? The ‘Empirical Turn’ and its Consequences for the Science of International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2016

JAKOB V.H. HOLTERMANN  and
MIKAEL RASK MADSEN
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Abstract

One of the most striking trends in contemporary international law (IL) scholarship is the turn to empirical research methods. Some see this as sign of progress, whereas others call for caution or even show hostility. With a view to the future of IL scholarship, however, all sides in this at times heated debate seem to have considerable problems keeping a clear focus on the key question: What are the implications of this empirical turn in terms of philosophy of legal science, of the social understanding of IL, and, not least, of the place of doctrinal scholarship after the alleged Wende? What is needed, we argue, in order to answer this question is not yet another partisan suggestion, but rather an attempt at making intelligible both the oppositions and the possibilities of synthesis between normative and empirical approaches to law.

Based on our assessment and rational reconstruction of current arguments and positions we outline a taxonomy consisting of the following three basic, ideal-types in terms of the epistemological understanding of the interface of law and empirical studies: toleration, synthesis and replacement. This tripartite model proves useful with a view to teasing out and better articulating implications of and interrelations between positions. As such the model: i) provides a framework to better situate arguments about the role of empirical studies in IL; ii) helps identify real epistemological stakes in order to overcome ‘trench wars’ – or worse: absence of dialogue and genuine argument; and iii) thus ultimately contributes to the development of a genuine basic science-of-law.

Keywords

empirical studies of lawepistemology of lawinternational legal theorysociology of lawThe Empirical Turn
Type
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: Symposium on the Changing Role of Scholarship in International Law
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 1001 - 1019
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2016 

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References

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50 This is also the main reason why we do not generally use the term naturalism to denote this third position – to avoid the unfortunate identification of empirical science with natural science.

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53 Most outspokenly by J. Klabbers, ‘The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity’, (2005) 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 35. But see also, e.g., Byers, supra note 12.

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63 On this, cf., e.g., Šadl, U., ‘The Role of Effet Utile in Preserving the Continuity and Authority of European Union Law : Evidence from the Citation Web of the Pre-Accession Case Law of the Court of Justice of the EU’, (2015) 8 European Journal of Legal Studies 19 Google Scholar.

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66 See M. Huber, ‘Beiträge zur Kenntnis der soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts und der Staatengesellschaft’, (1910) Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart.

67 Koskenniemi, supra note 37, Chapter 4.