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Social movements, reframing investment relations, and enhancing the application of human rights norms in international investment law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2020

Moshe Hirsch
Moshe Hirsch*
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem9190501, Israel, Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The recent moderate trend to increasingly apply human rights law in investment awards is accompanied by certain new investment treaties which include expressed human rights provisions. An analysis of recent investment awards indicates that though there are some ‘winds of change’ in this field, it is equally noticeable that human rights law is far from being mainstreamed in international investment law. Investment arbitration procedural law is also undergoing a process of change, and the new procedural rules tend to enhance public elements in the investment arbitral system. This study is aimed at explaining these recent legal changes, highlighting the role of social movements in reframing investment relations as well as increasing public pressure to apply human rights law. These framing changes concern broadening the frame of investment arbitration (beyond the foreign investor–host state dyad), reversing the perceived balance of power between investors and host states, and zooming-in on local individuals and communities residing in host states. The discussion on factors impeding legal change in this field emphasizes the role of the private legal culture prevalent in the investment arbitration system, which is reflected and reinforced by certain resilient socio-legal frames. Informed by this analysis, the study suggests some legal mechanisms which can mitigate the inter-partes frame, and increase the application of human rights law in investment arbitration; inter alia, rigorous transparency rules that are likely to facilitate increased public pressure on tribunals and increase the participation of social movements representing local actors in arbitral processes.

Keywords

framing analysishuman rightsinvestment arbitrationsocial movementssociology of law
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 127 - 154
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the European Society of International Law’s Annual Conference (University of Manchester, September 2018), the Workshop on ‘Sociological Perspectives on International Tribunals’ (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, November 2018), the Workshop on ‘The Paths of Change in International Law’ (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, June 2019), and the ‘Workshop on The Legitimate Role for Investment Law and Arbitration in Protecting Human Rights’ (PluriCourts, University of Oslo, September 2019) and I am grateful to the participants in those fora for their valuable comments. I am particularly grateful to Caroline Henckels (Monash University Law Faculty) for sending her insightful comments. I would also like to thank Dvir Ezra, Shani Friedman, Ohad Abrahami, and Jiries Elias (Hebrew University Law Faculty) for excellent research assistance.

References

1 See, e.g., C. Reiner and C. Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration’, in P. M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E. U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (2009), 82, at 90; M. Hirsch, ‘Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths’, in ibid., 97, at 106–7; B. Choudhury, ‘Democratic Implications arising from the Intersection of Investment Arbitration and Human Rights’, (2009) 46 Alberta Law Review 983, at 988–90. See also E. De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights Considerations in International Investment Arbitration’, in M. Fitzmaurice and P. Merkouris (eds.), The Interpretation and Application of the European Convention of Human Right (2013), 183, at 191, 208.

2 Urbaser S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award of 8 December 2016, at paras. 1193–221.

3 See, also, e.g., Tulip v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision on Annulment, 30 December 2015, paras. 86–98, and additional awards discussed below.

4 The survey examines decisions of investment tribunals published on the italaw.com website that were rendered from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2018. The survey includes investment awards published on this website by 13 October 2019. These decisions include jurisdictional awards, awards on the merit, final awards, reports of ICSID Annulment Committees, and similar decisions, Thus, for example, decisions regarding stay of enforcement, expedited procedure, and procedural orders are not included in the survey.

5 For example, references to ‘human rights’ are occasionally included in the citations of ICJ judgements that do not address human rights, or in the citations of certain Reports of the International Law Commission concerning general rules of international law.

6 For the list of all decisions, see Annex.

7 Annex, Cases No. 5, 14, 15, 16, 23, 25, 27, 28, 32, 50, 53, 64, 76, 77, 80, 87, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122.

8 See, e.g., Urbaser v. Argentina, supra note 2; Impregilo v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011; Tulip v. Turkey, supra note 3; EDF International v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012; Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 December 2014; Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016.

9 See, e.g., Total v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010; Burlington v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Reconsideration and Award, 7 February 2017; Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, 16 September 2015.

10 See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011; Grand River v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 12 January 2011.

11 Annex, Cases No. 9, 24, 30, 40, 43, 59, 59a, 59b, 69, 74, 107.

12 See, e.g., Bernhard von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, 28 July 2015; White Industries v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 November 2011; Renta 4. v. Russia, SCC Case no. 24/2007, Award, 20 July 2012; RosInvestCo v. Russia, SCC Arbitration V Case No. 079/2005, Award, 12 September 2010.

13 See, e.g., The Rompetrol v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013; Yukos v. Russia, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, 18 July 2014.

14 Annex, Cases No. 1, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 73, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 115, 119, 123.

15 See, e.g., Balkan Energy v. Ghana, PCA Case No. 2010-7, Interim Award, 22 December 2010; Pacific Rim v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Award, 14 October 2016; Ioan-Micula, v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013.

16 See, e.g., Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 2 November 2015; Bear Creek v. Perú, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 30 November 2017.

17 See, e.g., Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Annulment, 5 May 2017.

18 Mondev. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, of 11 October 2002, at paras. 143–4.

19 Phoenix. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, at para. 78.

20 Urbaser v. Argentina, supra note 2, paras. 1193–1221.

21 Tulip v. Turkey, supra note 3, paras. 86–98.

22 S. Steininger, ‘What’s Human Rights Got to Do with It? An Empirical Analysis of Human Rights References in Investment Arbitration’, (2018) LJIL 31, at 35, 45. See also V. Kube and E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights Law in International Investment Arbitration’, (2016) 11 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy 65, at 71 (see also 68–9).

23 See, e.g., E. De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Law’, in M. Krajewski and R. T. Hoffmann (eds.), Research Handbook on Foreign Direct Investment (2019), 619, at 9. See also Steininger, ibid., at 34–5.

24 See, e.g., De Brabandere, ibid., at 625–6; N. Nicolas, ‘Recent Clauses Pertaining to Environmental, Labor and Human Rights in Investment Agreements’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 23 July 2019, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/07/23/recent-clauses-pertaining-to-environmental-labor-and-human-rights-in-investment-agreements-laudable-success-or-disappointing-failure, accessed 6 December 2019.

25 2017, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, OJ L 11/23, at the preamble; Annex 8-E Joint Declaration on Arts. 8.16, 9.8, 28.6, available at trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.

26 2015, Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and … for the Promotion of and Protection of Investments, Arts. 6, 8(2), 11, 12, 31, available at www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-model-agreement-english.pdf.

27 2016, Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria, Art. 18(2), available at pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/01/Morrocco-Nigeria-BIT-2016.pdf.

28 2012, SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, Art. 15, available at iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf.

29 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. 12.1(v), available at www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.

30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Ecuador), ‘Ecuador proposes new investment agreements that protect the country and defend human rights’ (2018), available at www.cancilleria.gob.ec/en/ecuador-proposes-new-investment-agreements-that-protect-the-country-and-defend-human-rights/.

31 2019, Netherlands Model of Investment Treaties, Arts. 5(3), 6(6), 7, 23, available at www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse-zaken/documenten/publicaties/2019/03/22/nieuwe-modeltekst-investeringsakkoorden.

32 OHCHR, ‘Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ – Zero Draft, 16 July 2018, Arts. 3(1) and 13(7), available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf.

33 OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, 2011, Arts. 11–15, available at www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf.

34 See, e.g., Council of Europe – Committee of Ministers, ‘Human rights and business’, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3, 2 March 2016, Arts. 22–23, available at edoc.coe.int/en/fundamental-freedoms/7302-human-rights-and-business-recommendation-cmrec20163-of-the-committee-of-ministers-to-member-states.html.

35 See, e.g., OECD, ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, 2011, Arts. A(2), (9)–(12), available at www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.

36 See Sections 2.2 and 3.1.4 below.

37 On new procedural rules included in investment treaties concluded in 2018 see UNCTAD, ‘Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: A Stocktaking’, (2019) 1 International Investment Agreements Issues Note 1; on new rules concerning transparency see paras. 8–10, and on arbitrators’ conflict of interest see paras. 7–9, 20, available at www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d3_en.pdf.

38 ICSID, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules’, (2020) 1 ICSID Working Paper No. 4, at Ch. X p. 331, available at icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf.

39 UNCITRAL, ‘Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration’, 2014, [hereinafter UNCITRAL Transparency Rules].

40 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, UN Doc. A/Res/69/116 (2014).

41 See, e.g., Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-fifth session, UN Doc. A/CN.9/935 (New York, 23–27 April 2018), para. 76; Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-seventh session, UN Doc. A/CN.9/970 (New York, 1–5 April 2019), para. 71.

42 European Commission, ‘Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)’, SWD(2015)3 final, 13 January 2015 [hereinafter EU 2015 Report on Consultation], at 88, available at www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf.

43 M. Bauer, ‘Campaign-triggered mass collaboration in the EU’s online consultations: the ISDS-in-TTIP case’, (2015) 14 European View 121, at 124.

44 L. J. Eliasson and P. G. D. Huet, ‘TTIP negotiations: Interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns and public opinion’, (2018) 16 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 101, at 102–3.

45 On the results of this consultation see Section 4 below.

46 EU Commission, ‘Creating more investment opportunities in the EU and the US – Factsheet on Investment in the context of the TTIP’, 23 November 2015, available at trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.pdf; EU Commission, ‘TTIP textual proposal on investment protection and investment court system’, 12 November 2015, ch. II – Investment [hereinafter ‘TTIP textual proposal’], available at www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf.

47 TTIP textual proposal, ibid., Art. 2(1).

48 On the interactions between the ICS bilateral system and the multilateral MIC initiative see, e.g., European Commission, ‘Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes’, COM/2017/0493 final, 13 September 2017, at 1–3, 6, available at eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:df96826b-985e-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

49 But the European Commission noted in the above Recommendation to the Council that ‘[a]ction by the Union at multilateral level cannot compromise the level of protection of fundamental rights in the Union’, ibid., at 6.

50 For an analysis of the ‘double hatting’ in investment arbitration see M. Langford, D. Behn and R. H. Lie, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’, (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 301.

51 See, e.g., M. Hirsch, Invitation to the Sociology of International Law (2015), 9 et seq.

52 See, e.g., R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law (1992), 44–65.

53 G. Ritzer, Introduction to Sociology (2015) 593–4; J. A. Weinstein, Social Change (2010), 1, at 9–10; J. Macionis, Sociology (2012), 565–6.

54 Weinstein, ibid., at 55–6; Macionis, ibid.

55 Additional sociological perspectives may also shed light on recent developments in this field, including the social conflict perspective and Bourdieusian approaches (emphasizing power relations, symbolic capital, and social hierarchies in investment arbitration). On power relations in international adjudication see M. Hirsch, ‘Introduction: Sociological Perspectives on International Tribunals’, Temple Journal of International and Comparative Law (forthcoming).

56 The term ‘social movement’ refers to a sustained and intentional collective effort, usually operating outside of established institutional channels, either to bring about or to resist social change: Ritzer, supra note 53, at 594. See also D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H. Kriesi, ‘Mapping the Terrain’, in D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (2006), 3, at 11.

57 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 53, at 133–93; Ritzer, supra note 53, at 592–608; A. Giddens and P. Sutton, Sociology (2013), 994.

58 On ‘legal mobilization’ (legal strategies employed by social movements to promote social change) see M. McCann, ‘Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives’, (2006) 2 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17; E. Lehoucq and W. Taylor, ‘Conceptualizing Legal Mobilization: How Should We Understand the Deployment of Legal Strategies?’, (2020) 45 Law & Social Inquiry 166.

59 Ritzer, supra note 53, at 594–604; Macionis, supra note 53, at 548; D. A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields’, in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 56 [hereinafter Snow, ‘Framing Processes’], at 380.

60 N. Pedriana, ‘From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s’, (2006) 111 American Journal of Sociology 1718, at 1720–1; D. A. Snow, R. Vliegenthart and P. Ketelaars, ‘The Framing Perspective on Social Movements: Its Conceptual Roots and Architecture’, in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 56, at 392–3; Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, ibid., at 384; J. H. Turner, Contemporary Sociological Theory (2013), 429.

61 Turner, ibid., at 427–9.

62 E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974), 21.

63 Ibid., at 21.

64 Goffman, supra note 62, at 10, 21. See also Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, supra note 59, at 385. Goffman adds that, ‘frames’ refer to ‘definitions of a situation [that are] built up in accordance with principles of organizations which govern events – at least social ones …’: Goffman, supra note 62, at 10–11.

65 E. Goffman, ‘A reply to Denzin and Keller’, (1981) 10(1) Contemporary Sociology 60, at 63. See also Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, supra note 59, at 385.

66 See Goffman, supra note 62, at 201, 210.

67 G. Ritzer and J. Stepnisky, Sociological Theory (2013), 363.

68 Snow et al., in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 60, at 394; Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, supra note 59, at 384.

69 Snow et al., in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 60, at 393; Snow, ‘Frame’, in G. Ritzer and J. M. Ryan (eds.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Sociology (2011), 235 at 235; Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, supra note 59, at 384–5.

70 Snow et al., in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 60, at 393.

71 Snow et al., ibid., at 395; R. D. Benford and D. A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, (2000) 26 Annual Review of Sociology 611, at 614.

72 Benford and Snow, ibid., at 614; Snow, ‘Framing Processes’, supra note 59, at 385.

73 Snow, ibid., at 380, 383–4; Snow et al., in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, supra note 60, at 396. On the selective nature of interpretative frames see D. Della Porta and M. Diani, Social Movements (2006), 76.

74 On Corporate Europe Observatory, its aims and activities, see Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), ‘About CEO’, available at corporateeurope.org/about-ceo.

75 On the vision, mission and values of the Transnational Institute, see The Transnational Institute (TNI), ‘Mission’, available at www.tni.org/en/page/mission.

76 On this alliance of organizations see Stop ISDS, ‘Alliance’, available at stopisds.org/alliance/. On the Council of Canadians and their activities against Investment Arbitration see The Council of Canadians, ‘Investment Arbitration’, available at canadians.org/tags/investment-arbitration.

77 On European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration see European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), ‘About EFILA’, available at www.efila.org/about-efia/.

78 Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 105.

79 Ibid., at 105, 109. See also Bauer, supra note 43, at 125.

80 Bauer, ibid., at 24–5. See also G. Monbiot, ‘This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy’, Guardian, 4 November 2013; S. Donnan and S. Wagstyl, ‘Transatlantic trade talks hit German snag’, Financial Times, 14 March 2014; M. Vaudano, ‘Le traité Tafta va-t-il délocaliser notre justice à Washington?’, Le Monde, 15 April 2014.

81 Bauer, supra note 43, at 124. On the role of online and social media publications see also, L. J. Eliasson and P. G. D. Huet, Civil Society, Rhetoric of Resistance, and Transatlantic Trade (2019), 3–6.

82 See, e.g., Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), ‘Press’, available at corporateeurope.org/en/press.

83 See, e.g., regarding street protests in Germany, Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 107. On various protest activities lodged by the ‘Stop TTIP’, see P. Graziano and M. Caiani, ‘Europeanization and Social Movements: The Case of the Stop-TTIP campaign’, Paper presented at the SGEU ECOR Conference, Trento, 15–18 June 2016, available at ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/693a6f26-d799-4870-b257-36e7bafabd53.pdf; L. Buonanno, ‘The new trade deals and the mobilisation of civil society organizations: comparing EU and US responses’, (2017) 39 Journal of European Integration 795, at 796.

84 Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 102–3, 106.

85 Ibid., at 107. See also Bauer, supra note 43, at 124; Donnan and Wagstyl, supra note 80.

86 See, e.g., Eliasson and Huet, ibid., at 107–8; Bauer, ibid., at 124. See also A. Reinisch, ‘The European Union and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From Investor-State Arbitration to a Permanent Investment Court’, CIGI Investor-State Arbitration Series Paper No. 2, March 2016, at 8, available at www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/isa_paper_series_no.2.pdf.

87 Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 107.

88 P. G. Duran and L. J. Eliasson, ‘The Public Debate over TTIP and Its Underlying Assumptions’, (2017) 51 Journal of World Trade 23, at 23–5. See also Eliasson and Huet, ibid., 101–2.

89 On social movements’ pathways of influence see Section 3.1.4 below.

90 See Section 2.2 above.

91 Bauer, supra note 43, at 124.

92 Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 102–3.

93 On the influence of the European Parliament and Civil Society groups on the European Commission’s position in this sphere see L. Puccio and R. Harte, ‘From arbitration to the investment court system (ICS): The evolution of CETA rules’, European Parliamentary Research Service In-Depth Analysis PE 607.251, June 2017, at 1, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf; N. Lavranos, ‘2019: the Year of the Big Harvest!’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30 December 2018, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/12/30/2019-the-year-of-the-big-harvest/; B. Lange, ‘TTIP Negotiations Investment Protection: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’, European Parliament Legislative Train 11.2019, 20 November 2018, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-international-trade-inta/file-ttip-investment-protection-investor-state-dispute-settlement-(isds).

94 ‘EU 2015 Report on Consultation’, supra note 42, at 10.

95 Ibid., at 3.

96 Ibid., at 10. See also CEO’s call to people to appeal to the EU Commission, CEO, ‘Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors’ super-rights in EU trade deals’, 16 April 2014, available at corporateeurope.org/en/international-trade/2014/04/still-not-loving-isds-10-reasons-oppose-investors-super-rights-eu-trade

97 ‘EU 2015 Report on Consultation’, supra note 42, at 3.

98 Ibid., at 14.

99 Ibid.

100 Bauer, supra note 43, at 127.

101 European Commission, ‘Report presented today: Consultation on investment protection in EU-US trade talks’, 2015, available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3201_en.htm.

102 On the EU permanent investment court initiative see Section 2.2 above.

103 Prior to the above civil society groups’ operations, public awareness to investment arbitration was low, and the investment arbitration community’s frame largely prevailed in the public’s previously held perception. See, e.g., Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 105; Duran and Eliasson, supra note 88, at 33. See also A. Depalma, ‘Mexico Is Ordered to Pay a U.S. Company $16.7 Million’, New York Times, 31 August 2000.

104 See, e.g., R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2012), 249; J. W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2010), 205.

105 See, e.g., C. Olivet and P. Eberhardt, Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom (2012). On the ‘investment arbitration industry’ see at 7–9, 15–16.

106 See e.g., ibid., at 11; P. Eberhardt, C. Olivet and L. Steinfort, One Treaty To Rule Them All: The ever-expanding Energy Charter Treaty and the power it gives corporations to halt the energy transition (2018), 47.

107 Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 11. See also Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 47.

108 On ‘elite of law firms and lawyers’ see Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 7, 15; Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 8, 47, 95.

109 See, e.g. Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 95, 47, 49–51; Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 7–8, 22, 38–41.

110 Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 22, 72.

111 See, e.g., Olivet and Eberhardt, supra note 105, at 7–8; Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 47.

112 Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 8.

113 See, e.g., Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, at para. 122; see also Azurix Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, at para. 311.

114 See, e.g., Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, supra note 106, at 95. See also ‘Rights for People, Rules for Corporations – Stop ISDS’, available at stopisds.org/.

115 Olivet and Eberhardt, supra note 105, at 7, 9.

116 Ibid., at 23.

117 Ibid., at 27. See also CEO, ‘Still not loving ISDS’, supra note 96.

118 Ibid., at 71.

119 Ibid., at 7. On concerns about arbitrators’ commitment to deliver fair and independent judgements see also Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, supra note 106, at 47.

120 Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 9, 11, 48; Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, ibid., at 53, 95.

121 See, e.g., the cover page of Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid. See also the cover page for CEO, ‘Still not Loving ISDS’, supra note 96. See also ‘ISDS in numbers’, 8 October 2019, available at www.bilaterals.org/?isds-in-numbers.

122 See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Letter from President of Tribunal Responding to Petition by NGOs to Participate as amici curiae, 29 January 2003.

123 On these invisible local communities in investment disputes see N. Perrone. ‘The “Invisible” Local Communities: Foreign Investor Obligations, Inclusiveness, and the International Investment Regime’, (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 16.

124 See, e.g., Olivet and Eberhardt, supra note 105, at 7–8, 11, 13, 35; Eberhardt, Olivet and Steinfort, supra note 106, at 8, 19, 24, 68; P. Eberhardt, B. Redlin and C. Toubeau, Trading Away Democracy (2014), 2, 4, 11–12.

125 Olivet and Eberhardt, ibid., at 35.

126 See, e.g., C. N. Brower and S. Blanchard, ‘From “Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute Settlement’, (2013) 55 HILJ 45. See also K. Hober, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Future – If Any’, (2015) 7 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation 58.

127 See, e.g., EFILA, ‘A response to the criticism against ISDS’, 7 May 2015, available at efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf; N. Lavranos, ‘Countering Anti-ISDS Propaganda with Facts: An Uphill Battle’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 8 June 2015, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/06/08/countering-anti-isds-propaganda-with-facts-an-uphill-battle/. For additional publications of the EFILA see Publications, available at efila.org/publications/.

128 These responses will not be presented here due to space limitations and the objectives of this study.

129 On the diverse means employed by social movements, see Section 3.1.2 above.

130 On the significant influence of civil society groups on public opinion against ISDS and TTIP see L. J. Eliasson, ‘Transatlantic Trade Negotiations, Civil Society Campaigns and Public Opinion’, in D. Dialer and M. Richter (eds.), Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, dynamics and trends (2019), 375, at 380–4; K. Hübner, A.-S. Deman and T. Balik, ‘EU and trade policymaking: the contentious case of CETA’, (2017) 39 Journal of European Integration 843, at 853; Buonanno, supra note 83, at 801–3; Duran and Eliasson, supra note 88, at 23–5. See also Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 102; P. G. Duran and L. J. Eliasson, ‘The Public Debate over TTIP and Its Underlying Assumptions’, (2017) 51 Journal of World Trade 23, at 23–5.

131 On the influence of civil society groups on some EU member states see, e.g., Hübner et al., ibid., at 847, 852; Eliasson, ibid., at 375, 379; J. Greenwood, ‘Interest Representation in the EU: An Open and Structured Dialogue’, in D. Dialer and M. Richter (eds.), Lobbying in the European Union: strategies, dynamics and trends (2019), 21, at 27; Eliasson and Huet, ibid., at 108.

132 On the influence of social movements’ operation on the EU Commission see e.g., Eliasson, supra note 130, at 383–4; N. Gheyle and F. De Ville, ‘Outside Lobbying and the Politicization of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, in D. Dialer and M. Richter (eds.), Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, dynamics and trends (2019), 339, at 348; Greenwood, ibid., at 27.

133 See Section 3.1.2 above. See also K. Yiannibas, ‘Democratizing International Trade and Investment Agreements in the European Union’, in B. Pérez De Las Heras (ed.), Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union and Global Governance: Building (2017), 353, at 354; Gheyle and De Ville, ibid., at 339; Greenwood, ibid., at 27.

134 See Section 3.1.3 above.

135 On the opposition of civil society groups to the EU investment court initiative see, e.g., Corporate Europe Observatory, ‘The zombie ISDS’, 17 February 2016, available at corporateeurope.org/en/international-trade/2016/02/zombie-isds.

136 On the ICS initiative see Section 2.2 above.

137 The explanation for the limited influence of social movements’ framing operations on investment arbitrators is discussed in Section 4 below.

138 See, e.g., Macionis, supra note 53, at 63, 194.

139 See, e.g., Olivet and Eberhardt, supra note 105, at 7.

140 Ibid., at 48–9.

141 See, e.g., ibid., at 72; European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) State of play and prospects for reform’, Briefing PE 545.736, (January 2015), at 7, available at europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/545736/EPRS_BRI(2015)545736_EN.pdf.

142 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment No. 24 on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (2017), at 13.

143 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, ‘Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’, available at ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx.

144 See, e.g., Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, UN Doc. A/70/285 (2015).

145 OHCHR, Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, OL ARM 1/2019, 7 March 2019, available at ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/IEDebt/OL_ARM_07.03.19_1.2019.pdf.

146 See, e.g., A. Angelini et al., ‘An Open Letter to the Chair of UNCITRAL Working Group III Concerning the Reform of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Addressing the Asymmetry of ISDS’, 13 February 2019, available at www.eur.nl/en/news/erasmus-institute-public-knowledge.

147 As discussed in Section 4 below, this pressure was less influential within the investment arbitration community.

148 See Section 3.1.4 above.

149 On European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), see Section 3.12 above.

150 N, Lavranos, ‘Profiting from Anti-ISDS Propaganda’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 11 October 2016, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/10/11/profiting-anti-isds-propaganda/. See also Duran and Eliasson, supra note 88, at 23–5; Eliasson and Huet, supra note 44, at 101–2. On the influence of anti-ISDS NGOs on the EU Commission’s initiative (discussed in Section 2.2 above, see, Lavranos, ‘2019: The Year of the Big Harvest!’, supra note 93. On the influence of NGOs’ pressure on the Netherlands (regarding the new Dutch Model BIT discussed in Section 2.1 above) see N. Lavranos, ‘A Rollercoaster: The First Half Of The Year 2018 For Bits And ISDS’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 9 July 2019, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/09/rollercoaster-first-half-year-2018-bits-isds/.

151 On the exceptional employment of human rights law to protect ‘third party interests’ by investment tribunals see Steininger, supra note 22, at 52–3, 55 (see also 48–9). See also Kube and Petersmann, supra note 22, at 93–4.

152 For a discussion of investment awards included in Group 1 see Section 2 above.

153 El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, paras. 369, 401, 649; EDF v. Argentina, supra note 8, paras. 1059, 1172; Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 8, paras. 302, 304, 395; Suez v. Argentina, supra note 17, paras. 28, 71, 255; Urbaser v. Argentina, supra note 2, paras. 726, 1097, 1206; Grand River v. USA, supra note 10, paras, 186, 211–12, 220; Total v. Argentina, supra note 9, paras. 64, 79, 163; Quiborax v. Bolivia, supra note 9, paras. 13, 26, 249; Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Final Award, 18 September 2018, para. 420; South American Silver v. Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award, 22 November 2018, paras. 561, 640. It is noteworthy that while the tribunals in these cases took into the account the positions and rights of local groups and individuals, they did not necessarily find that these rights or positions justified the particular governmental measures vis-à-vis foreign investors.

154 On the ‘lethargic’ response of investment arbitration to reform attempts see M. Langford and D. Behn, ‘Can Investment Arbitration Fix Itself?’, EJIL:Talk!, 31 October 2018, available at ejiltalk.org/can-investment-arbitration-fix-itself/. On the ‘less-responsive’ reaction of investment arbitrators to public opinion see M. Langford and D. Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The Evolving Investment Treaty Arbitrator?’, (2018) 29 EJIL 551, at 579 (see also 576–7).

155 It is noteworthy that the members of the investment arbitration community are somewhat indirectly influenced by social movements and public pressure. As discussed in Section 3.1.4 above, civil society groups criticizing ISDS influenced public opinion, which, in turn, influenced the position of EU member states and EU institutions concerning investment arbitration. The EU institutions and EU member states influenced investment arbitrators; e.g., through new treaty provisions (discussed in Section 2.1 above). In addition, arbitrators are also somewhat influenced by public opinion (see Section 3.2 above regarding civil society groups taking part in social control processes).

156 See Section 2.1 above.

157 See Section 4.1 above.

158 On the private legal culture prevalent in the investment arbitration community see Hirsch, Invitation to the Sociology of International Law, supra note 51, at 148–52.

159 See, e.g., T. Wälde, ‘The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research’, (2007) Hague Academy Report on International Investment Law 63, at 75–6; See also Glamis v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 2009, para. 3; Romak v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No AA280, Award, 26 November 2009, para. 171.

160 On the concept of ‘frame’ see Section 2.1.1; Schema constitutes generalized knowledge structure and abstract guidelines; assisting people in perceiving, interpreting and remembering items in the social world. See M. Hirsch, ‘Cognitive Sociology, Social Cognition and Coping with Racial Discrimination in International Law’, (2019) 30 EJIL 1319, at 1327 et seq., and see the references therein.

161 See Section 3.1.1.

162 P. DiMaggio, ‘Culture and Cognition’, (1997) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 263, at 269.

163 See, e.g., ibid., at 269.

164 K. Cerulo, ‘Mining the Intersections of cognitive sociology and neuroscience’, (2010) 38 Poetics 115, at 125–6.

165 With regard to professional groups see, e.g., E. Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes; An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (1997), at 33; E. Zerubavel, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Social Structure of Irrelevance (2015), at 66.

166 See, e.g., Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes, ibid., at 14–15; Zerubavel, Hidden in Plain Sight, ibid., at 62–6.

167 See, Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 104, at 154 et. seq.

168 See Section 2.1 above.

169 M. Hirsch, ‘The Sociological Dimension of International Arbitration: The Investment Arbitration Culture’, in T. Schultz and F. Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (forthcoming), at Section III.

170 See, e.g., S. Nappert, ‘Defining (And Defending) Values in International Arbitration’, (2019) The 2019 International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Symposium, at 4.

171 See Section 3.1.3 above.

172 On these invisible local communities see Perrone, supra note 123.

173 On the historical evolution of transparency rules in international law see T. Neumann and A. Peters, ‘Transparency’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law (2019), at 9–25.

174 See, e.g., Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 104, at 286.

175 E. De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of International Procedural Law (2019), at 13.

176 See, e.g., Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 104, at 287; F. El-Hosseny, Civil Society in Investment Treaty Arbitration (2018), 90. See also J. A. Maupin, ‘Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad and the Murky’, in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (2013) 142, at 161–2, 171.

177 On amicus submissions see Section 5.2 below. Only a small minority of modern investment treaties expressly provide for the right of third parties to make a submission on a question of interpretation or application of a treaty. L. E. Peterson, ‘An In-Depth Look At ICSID’S Proposed Transparency Changes (Including Non-Disputing Party Participation)’, Investment Arbitration Report, 6 August 2018, available at www.iareporter.com/articles/an-in-depth-look-at-icsids-proposed-transparency-changes-including-non-disputing-party-participation/.

178 Prominently, Art. 6(1) regarding the hearing and Art. 3(1) regarding access to documents, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, supra note 39.

179 See, e.g., 2008 Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, Art. 830(2) regarding open hearing and Art. 830(1) regarding access to documents, available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie/fta-ale/08.aspx?lang=eng. See also 2009 Canada-Romania BIT Annex C, Arts. A(1) and A(3) regarding public access to hearings and documents (respectively), available at treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105170&lang=eng. For an application of Art. 830(2) of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Area see, e.g., Eco Oro v. Colombia, Procedural Order No. 6 – Decision on Non-Disputing Parties’ ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41, Application, 18 February 2019, paras. 38–40.

180 See 1965, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [ICSID Convention] 575 UNTS 159 Arts. 31(1)–(2). For the proposed amendment of the ICSID Arbitration rules in this sphere see Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, ICSID Working Paper No. 3, 2 August 2018, at rules 61–65, available at icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/WP_3_VOLUME_1_ENGLISH.pdf. See also Maupin, supra note 176, at 153–4.

181 On additional justifications for transparency in international adjudication see A. Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’, in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (2013), 534, at 558–70; Neumann and Peters, supra note 173, at 30–44.

182 Peters, ibid., at 596–7.

183 See, e.g., Arts. 6(2) and 7, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, supra note 39.

184 For the use of delayed broadcasting of arbitral hearing see, e.g., Gabriel Resources v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31, Procedural Order No. 19, 7 December 2018, paras. 73–4.

185 See N. Butler, ‘Non-Disputing Party Participation in ICSID Disputes: Faux Amici?’, (2019) 66 Netherlands International Law Review 143, at 172–3.

186 De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, supra note 175, at 3; E. De Brabandere, ‘NGOs and the Public Interest: The Legality and Rationale of Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes’, (2011) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law, 85, at 94–5.

187 On the evolution of rules in this sphere see El-Hosseny, supra note 176, at 97 et seq.; De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, supra note 175, at 5–11; De Brabandere, ‘NGOs and the Public Interest’, ibid., at 101.

188 See Art. 44, ICSID Convention, supra note 180.

189 1976 Arbitration Rules (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) [UNCITRAL Rules], UN Doc. A/31/98, Art. 17(1).

190 Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, 15 January 2001, paras. 52–3.

191 See, e.g., 2006 ICSID Convention Regulations and Rules, rule 37(2); Art. 4(1), UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, supra note 39 and Art. 2, 2014 UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 40.

192 See, e.g., 2019, European Union-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, Art. 3.51(2), available at investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5868/download; 2006, Canada–Peru Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 39, available at investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/626/download. On recently concluded investment treaties’ provisions regarding amicus curiae submissions see El-Hosseny, supra note 176, at 114–19; De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, supra note 175, paras. 26–8.

193 See, e.g., Art. 20(13), The Netherlands model Investment Agreement 2019, supra note 31; 2004, US Model BIT Art. 28(3) (as well as Art. 28(3) of the 2012 US Model BIT); available at ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.

194 For an examination of investment tribunals’ decisions regarding amicus curiae petitions see Butler, supra note 185, at 152–71; El-Hosseny, supra note 176, at 119–33. See also E. Levine, ‘Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration’, (2011) 29 Berkeley Journal of International Law 200, at 208–12.

195 De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, supra note 175, paras. 29–44. See also, e.g., Gabriel Resources v. Romania, supra note 184, para. 51.

196 In addition, the amicus curiae should not disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral proceedings, and the disputing parties should be given reasonable opportunity to present their observations on the submission; De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, ibid., para. 30.

197 Such approach is discernible in Art. 20(13), The 2019 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, supra note 31.

198 Compare Aguas de Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Letter to NGO regarding petition to participate as amici curiae, 29 January 2003.

199 I. Uchkunova, ‘Not Arbitrary – Part II: Special Case of Application Of Arbitral Discretion. Functions Exercisable Proprio Motu In ICSID Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 4 February 2013, available at arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2013/02/04/arbitral-not-arbitrary-part-ii-special-case-of-application-of-arbitral-discretion-functions-exercisable-proprio-motu-in-icsid-arbitration/.

200 On ‘arbitrability’ of public policy issues see, e.g., I. Bantekas, ‘The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration’, (2008) 27 Austrian YBK of International Law 193, at 195.

201 On the fundamental link between the public interest and amicus curiae submissions in investment proceedings see, e.g., Methanex v. United States, supra note 190, para. 49; De Brabandere, ‘Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration) 2018’, supra note 175, para. 15; El-Hosseny, supra note 176, at 37–45; K. F. Gomez, ‘Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration’, (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 510, at 543–5.