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Plausibility in the Provisional Measures Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2018

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Abstract

In 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.

Keywords

Article 41 ICJ StatuteInternational Court of Justiceplausibilityprima facie jurisdictionprovisional measures
Type
HAGUE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: International Court of Justice
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 641 - 668
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2018 

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Footnotes

*

Associate Legal Officer, International Court of Justice [[email protected]]. The author would like to thank Mike Becker, Rosalind Elphick, Asier Garrido-Muñoz, Vladyslav Lanovoy, Cameron Miles, Daniel Peat and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. All views expressed are entirely personal.

References

1 On provisional measures before the ICJ, see C. Miles, Provisional Measures before International Courts and Tribunals (2016); S. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law – The International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2005); P. Gaeta, La Giustizia Cautelare nel Diritto Internazionale (2000).

2 Inter alia, see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order on Provisional Measures of 13 July 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep. 113, at 128–9, paras. 57 and 61–2; Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Order on Provisional Measures of 17 June 2003, [2003] ICJ Rep. 102, at 106–7, paras. 20 and 22; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United States of America v. Mexico), Order on Provisional Measures of 5 February 2003, [2003] ICJ Rep. 77, at 87, para. 38, and at 89–90, paras. 49–50; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Order on Provisional Measures of 8 December 2000, [2000] ICJ Rep. 182, at 200–1, paras. 67, 69; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order on Provisional Measures of 15 March 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 13, at 21–2, paras. 30, 35; Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order on Provisional Measures of 29 July 1991, [1991] ICJ Rep. 12, at 15–7, paras. 14, 16, 23.

3 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order on Provisional Measures of 28 May 2009, [2009] ICJ Rep. 139, at 151, para. 57.

4 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Order on Provisional Measures of 22 June 1973, [1973] ICJ Rep. 99, at 103, para. 21; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Order on Provisional Measures of 22 June 1973, [1973] ICJ Rep. 135, at 139, para. 22.

5 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Order on Provisional Measures of 13 September 1993, [1993] ICJ Rep. 13, at 325, para. 39.

6 Passage through the Great Belt, supra note 2, at 28–31 (Separate Opinion Shahabuddeen).

7 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, [2011] ICJ Rep. 466, at 506, para. 109.

8 Section 2.1, infra.

9 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 2, at 140, para. 8 (Separate Opinion Abraham). Collins had expressed a view similar to that of Judge Abraham. See Collins, L., ‘Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation’, (1992) 234 Recueil des Cours 9, at 224–8Google Scholar.

10 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order on Provisional Measures of 8 March 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep. 6, at 18, para. 53; Request for Interpretation of the Judgement of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order on Provisional Measures of 18 July 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep. 537, at 545, para. 33; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Order on Provisional Measures of 22 November 2013, [2013] ICJ Rep. 354, at 360, para. 27; Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order on Provisional Measures of 13 December 2013, [2013] ICJ Rep. 398, at 403–4, paras. 17–19; Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Order on Provisional Measures of 3 March 2014, [2014] ICJ Rep. 147, at 152, para. 22; Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Order on Provisional Measures of 7 December 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep. 1148, at 1165–6, para. 71; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Order on Provisional Measures of 19 April 2017, [2017] ICJ Rep. 104, at 126, para. 63; Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan), Order on Provisional Measures of 18 May 2017, para. 35, available at www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170518-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.

11 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 31, para. 7 (Separate Opinion Koroma).

12 Ibid., at 37, para. 11 (Separate Opinion Sepúlveda-Amor). Tanaka took the same view as Judges Koroma and Sepúlveda-Amor. See Y. Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (2018), 194.

13 Miles, C., ‘Provisional Measures and the New “Plausibility” in the International Court of Justice’, (2018) 88 BYIL (forthcoming)Google Scholar; Miles, supra note 1, at 194–201; Saab, Y., ‘The Requirement of “Plausibility of Rights” in Provisional Measures: The Burgeoning Practice in International Jurisprudence’, in Borgo, J.C. Sainz et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum in Honour of a Modern Renaissance Man – His Excellency Gudmundur Eiríksson (2017), 195Google Scholar; Marotti, L., ‘«Plausibilità» dei Diritti ed Autonomia del Regime di Responsabilità nella recente Giurisprudenza della Corte Internazionale di Giustizia in tema di Misure Cautelari’, (2014) 97 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 761, at 763–76Google Scholar; Uchkunova, I., ‘Provisional Measures before the International Court of Justice’, (2013) 12 Law & Practice of Int'l Courts & Tribunals 391, at 407–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lee-Iwamoto, Y., ‘Repercussions of the LaGrand Judgment: Recent ICJ Jurisprudence on Provisional Measures’, (2012) 55 Japanese YBIL 237, at 246–51Google Scholar. In the latest edition of his classic work on international dispute settlement, Merrills did not elaborate on plausibility. See J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (6th ed., 2017), 132–6. Similarly, in the fifth edition of Rosenne's authoritative work on the ICJ, only half a page is devoted to plausibility. See M. Shaw, Rosenne's Law and Practice of the International Court 1920–2015 (2016), vol. III, at 1459–60.

14 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), Order on Provisional Measures of 25 April 2015, [2015] ITLOS Rep. 134, at 158, para. 58.

15 1833 UNTS 3. ITLOS confirmed the Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire finding in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), Order on Provisional Measures of 25 August 2015, [2015] ITLOS Rep. 182, at 197, para. 85.

16 419 UNTS 126.

17 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) (2011) 150 ILR 311, at 351, para. 135.

18 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No. 2 of 28 October 1999, para. 13; Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Provisional Measures of 17 August 2007, paras. 64–5.

19 Art. 26(3)(b) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include a provision similar to Art. 26(3)(b) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

20 1295 UNTS 339.

21 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 2, at 118, para. 20.

22 Ibid., at 134, para. 87.

23 This article only discusses the separate opinion of Judge Abraham, as it directly concerns the issue of the plausibility standard. In his separate opinion, Judge Bennouna wrote on the circumstances in which the Court would be called upon to assess whether the rights asserted by the applicant state prima facie exist, which this article does not discuss.

24 Ibid., at 138, para. 4 (Separate Opinion Abraham).

25 Ibid., at 140, para. 9 (Separate Opinion Abraham).

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., at 140–1, para. 10 (Separate Opinion Abraham).

28 Ibid.

29 Paragraph 160 of the 2016 Report of the Third Commission on Provisional Measures of the Institut de Droit International, written by Lawrence Collins, similarly stated that Judge Abraham discussed plausibility ‘[w]ithout coming to a firm conclusion on the content of the plausibility criterion’ (the Report is available at www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/3eme_com.pdf). The Institut approved its Final Resolution on provisional measures on 8 September 2017, which is available at www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/08/3-RES-FINAL-EN-COR.pdf.

30 This section does not discuss provisional measures in interpretation proceedings. See Section 3.4, infra.

31 1465 UNTS 112.

32 Belgium claimed that Senegal breached its obligations under Art. 7(1) of the Torture Convention, under which ‘[t]he State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution’.

33 Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 3, at 152, para. 58.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., at 152, para. 59.

36 Ibid., at 152, para. 60.

37 Ibid.

38 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19, para. 55.

39 118 CTS 439.

40 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19, para. 55. On the character of Costa Rica's invoked rights as rights under customary international law, see Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment of 16 December 2015, [2015] ICJ Rep. 665, at 708, para. 108.

41 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19–20, para. 59. See also Award in regard to the Validity of the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua of 15 July 1858 (Costa Rica/Nicaragua) (1888) XXVIII RIAA 189, 210.

42 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19, para. 58.

43 By order of 17 April 2013, the Court joined the proceedings in the cases Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order of 17 April 2013, [2013] ICJ Rep. 166; Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Order of 17 April 2013, [2013] ICJ Rep. 184.

44 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area; Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, supra note 10, at 360, para. 28.

45 Ibid.

46 Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 403, para. 17.

47 Ibid., at 403, para. 19.

48 Ibid., at 403–4, para. 19. See also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, [2010] ICJ Rep. 14, at 83, para. 204.

49 2258 UNTS 3.

50 Certain Documents and Data, supra note 10, at 152, para. 24.

51 Ibid., at 153, para. 27.

52 500 UNTS 95. Art. 22 states that ‘[t]he premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission’.

53 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 10, at 1167, para. 79.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 A recent commentator wrote, in respect of the Court's order in Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, that ‘la Cour exerce un contrôle minimal de la plausibilité’, and that ‘il ne s'agit pas, au stade des mesures conservatoires, de vérifier avec certitude, au terme d'un examen approfondi, que le droit existe bien’. In this commentator's view, in Immunities and Criminal Proceedings the Court limited its plausibility assessment to verifying the plausible existence of Equatorial Guinea's claimed rights, seemingly without considering its claims on the merits. However, the same author focused much of her commentary on plausibility on the facts underlying Equatorial Guinea's request for provisional measures, admitting that ‘[l]a plausibilité du droit revendiqué par la Guinée équatoriale ne peut etre appréciée que si les faits suivants sont rappelés dans leur intégralité’. See H. de Pooter, ‘La Cour international de Justice face à la question des biens mal acquis: l'ordonnance du 7 décembre 2016 rendue dans l'affaire des Immunités et Procédures Pénales (Guinée equatoriale c. France)’, (2016) 62 Annuaire Français de Droit International 55, at 62–6.

57 2178 UNTS 197.

58 660 UNTS 195.

59 CR 2017/1, at 38, para. 15 (Koh).

60 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 130, para. 73.

61 Ibid., at 131–2, para. 75.

62 CR 2017/1, at 59, para. 14 (Gimblett).

63 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 135, para. 83.

64 Ibid.

65 596 UNTS 261. Art. 36(1)(a) VCCR provides that ‘consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State’.

66 Jadhav Case, supra note 10, para. 43.

67 Ibid., para 44.

68 Ibid., para 45.

69 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 32, para. 12 (Separate Opinion Koroma). Oellers-Frahm argued that plausibility concerns ‘exclusively whether the claim of the applicant is one being susceptible of a legal decision’. See Oellers-Frahm, K., ‘Article 41’, in Zimmermann, A. et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2nd ed., 2012), 1029, at 1044Google Scholar.

70 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 169–70, para. 38 (Separate Opinion Cançado Trindade).

71 Section 3.3, infra. This correspondence appears to apply only in cases in which the applicant state's asserted rights stem from a treaty.

72 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 47, para. 4 (Declaration Greenwood).

73 Section 2.2.1, supra. Writing in 2016, Thirlway suggested that plausibility only concerns whether the rights asserted by the applicant state exist. See H. Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (2016), 161. Similarly, see L. Daniele, Le Misure Cautelari nel Processo dinanzi alla Corte Internazionle di Giustizia (1993), 78.

74 Section 2.2.2, supra.

75 This was the case in the Jadhav Case. See Section 2.2.2, supra.

76 This was the case in Certain Documents and Data. See Section 2.2.1, supra.

77 The Court's consideration of the available evidence was clear in Ukraine v. Russian Federation. See Section 2.2.2, supra.

78 A purely legal assessment of whether a respondent state's conduct is of such a kind that it might violate an applicant state's rights would correspond to assessing prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae. See Section 3.3, infra.

79 Section 2.1, supra.

80 Ibid.

81 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 47, para. 4 (Declaration Greenwood).

82 Section 3.2, infra. Although the Court never distinguished ‘legal plausibility’ and ‘factual plausibility’, the remarks below endeavour to identify which component of the test the Court assessed in its reasoning on plausibility in the various orders on provisional measures.

83 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 2, at 140, para. 8 (Separate Opinion Abraham).

84 Section 2.2.1, supra.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 CR 2014/2, at 27, para. 27 (Campbell).

89 Certain Documents and Data, supra note 10, at 153, para. 27.

90 Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 3, at 152, para. 60.

91 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19, para. 58.

92 Costa Rica argued that its sovereignty over Isla Portillos was plausible because it had been recognized by the 1888 Cleveland Award and the 1897 First Alexander Award, it was reflected in the official maps of both parties, and a number of principles of international law prevented a state from occupying part of the territory of another state. See CR 2011/1, at 39–47, paras. 9–32 (Kohen); CR 2011/3, at 20, para. 36 (Kohen). Nicaragua built its counter-argument on the assertion that both the 1858 Treaty of Limits, and the Alexander Award of 30 September 1897, conferred upon Nicaragua full and exclusive sovereignty over the entire San Juan River and established the right bank of said River as the land boundary between the parties, from which it followed that Costa Rica's asserted rights were devoid of legal basis, and thus not plausible. CR 2011/2, at 53–7, paras. 8–15 (Pellet).

93 Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 403, para. 19.

94 Section 2.2.2, supra.

95 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 10, at 1167, para. 79.

96 Section 2.2.2, supra.

97 Jadhav Case, supra note 10, para. 44.

98 Ibid., para. 45.

99 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 128–31, paras. 72–4.

100 Ibid., at 135, para. 83.

101 The assessment of factual plausibility necessarily entails that the Court has previously satisfied itself that the applicant state's rights are legally plausible. See Section 3.1, supra.

102 CR 2016/16, at 22, para. 3 (Kamto).

103 Ibid., at 29–30, para. 21 (Kamto).

104 CR 2016/15, at 26, para. 19 (Pellet).

105 Ibid., at 40, para. 32 (Pellet).

106 CR 2017/2, at 72–3, paras. 31–2 (Forteau).

107 Ibid., at 31, para. 28, and at 33, para. 33 (Wordsworth).

108 Jadhav Case, supra note 10, para. 44.

109 CR 2011/2, at 54, para. 9 (Pellet).

110 Ibid., at 54, para. 10 (Pellet).

111 For example, the rule codified under Article 22 VCDR, which was the basis of Equatorial Guinea's claim against France in Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, had already been declared to be part of customary international law. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, [1980] ICJ Rep. 3, at 30–1, para. 62.

112 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 148, para. 23 (Separate Opinion Owada).

113 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Order on Provisional Measures of 5 July 1951, [1951] ICJ Rep. 89, at 97 (Dissenting Opinion Winiarski and Badawi Pasha).

114 Ibid., at 93.

115 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Judgment of 22 July 1952, [1952] ICJ Rep. 93, at 114.

116 Section 3.3, infra.

117 See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 38, para. 15 (Separate Opinion Sepúlveda-Amor); Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 219–20, paras. 8–9 (Separate Opinion Pocar).

118 Practice Direction XI states that ‘[i]n the oral pleadings on requests for the indication of provisional measures parties should limit themselves to what is relevant to the criteria for the indication of provisional measures as stipulated in the Statute, Rules and jurisprudence of the Court. They should not enter into the merits of the case beyond what is strictly necessary for that purpose’.

119 On the possible link between prima facie jurisdiction and plausibility see Saccucci, A., ‘Fond du Litige et Indication de Mesures Conservatoires – Reflexions en Marge des Ordonnances de la CIJ dans l’Affaire des Usines de Pâte à Papier’, (2008) 112 RGDIP 795, at 821Google Scholar.

120 The issue of the scope ratione materiae of the Court's jurisdiction could also arise in connection with the scope either of a special agreement, or of the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36(2) of the Statute. However, in provisional measures proceedings this issue has so far arisen in cases in which jurisdiction was based on a compromissory clause contained in a treaty.

121 For example, Art. I of the Optional Protocol to the VCCR states that ‘[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol’.

122 Art. 22 CERD states, in relevant part, that ‘[a]ny dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention . . . shall . . . be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision . . .’.

123 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Order on Provisional Measures of 15 October 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep. 353, at 378, para. 87.

124 Ibid., at 378–9, para. 89.

125 Ibid., at 381, para. 95.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., at 387, para. 112.

128 Ibid. The Court made similar decisions in Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Order on Provisional Measures of 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 124, at 137, para. 38; LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Order on Provisional Measures of 3 March 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 9, at 13–14, paras. 13–18; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, supra note 2, at 87, paras. 38–42.

129 The Court also examined whether it had prima facie jurisdiction under the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2225 UNTS 209) and concluded that it did not since the ‘alleged dispute . . ., appears to concern . . . whether the Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea enjoys immunity ratione personae under customary international law and, if so, whether France has violated that immunity by instituting proceedings against him’. See Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 10, at 1160, para. 49.

130 Ibid., at 1167, para. 79.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., at 1167, para. 77.

133 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 118, para. 30.

134 Ibid., at 131, para. 74.

135 Ibid., at 120, para. 38.

136 Ibid., at 135, para. 82.

137 Jadhav Case, supra note 10, para. 30.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid., para. 44.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., para. 45.

142 Commentators have discussed this issue in less recent years. Commenting on Passage through the Great Belt in 1995, Merrills wrote that ‘it seems reasonable to ask whether a test [that of the possible existence of the rights asserted on the merits] which is so easily met is really necessary, given that governments rarely bring cases which are obviously hopeless’. He implicitly seemed to express his understanding of plausibility as a low standard, presumably similar to prima facie jurisdiction, as he would envisage that such a standard would not be met in ‘cases which are obviously hopeless’. See Merrills, J.G., ‘Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’, (1995) 44 ICLQ 90, at 115CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By contrast, in 1994 Thirlway wrote that ‘the degree of probability required for jurisdiction should be somewhat higher than that needed for the other elements of a prima facie case on the merits’. See Thirlway, H., ‘The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of Justice’, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts (1994), 1 at 25Google Scholar.

143 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 33, para. 13 (Separate Opinion Koroma).

144 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment of 1 April 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep. 70, at 323, para. 2 (Separate Opinion Greenwood).

145 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 47, para. 4 (Declaration Greenwood).

146 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 146, para. 15 (Separate Opinion Owada).

147 Ibid., at 146, para. 16 (Separate Opinion Owada).

148 Ibid., at 147, para. 18 (Separate Opinion Owada).

149 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, supra note 10, at 19, para. 58.

150 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 147, para. 19 (Separate Opinion Owada).

151 Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Order on Provisional Measures of 24 October 1957, [1957] ICJ Rep. 105, at 118–19 (Separate Opinion Lauterpacht).

152 By way of example, see Legality of Use of Force, supra note 128, at 132–8, paras. 20–41. For a comment on the jurisdictional aspects of the Legality of Use of Force cases, see Rosenne, supra note 1, at 112–17.

153 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Order on Provisional Measures of 10 July 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 219, at 249, para. 89.

154 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 10, at 1160, para. 50. This finding was limited to Equatorial Guinea's request under the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

155 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 146, para. 15 (Separate Opinion Owada).

156 Section 2.2, supra.

157 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, supra note 10, at 219, para. 5 (Separate Opinion Pocar).

158 Certain Documents and Data, supra note 10, at 206, para. 28 (Dissenting Opinion Greenwood).

159 Ibid.

160 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order on Provisional Measures of 2 March 1990, [1990] ICJ Rep. 64, at 79, para. 53 (Dissenting Opinion Thierry). Judge Greenwood did not refer to Judge ad hoc Thierry's dissenting opinion.

161 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, supra note 15, at 203, para. 125. On provisional measures before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see Tomka, P. and Hernández, G.I., ‘Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’, in Hestermeyer, H. et al. (eds.), Co-Existence, Cooperation and Solidarity – Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (2004), vol. II, at 1243Google Scholar; Treves, T., ‘Provisional Measures granted by an International Tribunal pending the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal’, in Studi di Diritto Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (2004), vol. II, at 1243Google Scholar; Wolfrum, R., ‘Provisional Measures of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’, in Chandrasekhara Rao, P. and Khan, R. (eds.), The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – Law and Practice (2001), 173Google Scholar; Mensah, T., ‘Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)’, (2002) 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 43Google Scholar.

162 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962, [1962] ICJ Rep. 6. On this order see Yee, S., ‘Some Comments on the Temple (Interpretation) Judgment and the Impact of Possible Mistakes on the Temple Saga’, in Crawford, J. et al. (eds.), The International Legal Order: Current Needs and Possible Responses – Essays in Honour of Djamchid Momtaz (2017), 174Google Scholar; Oellers-Frahm, K., ‘Provisional Measures in Interpretation Proceedings – A New Way to Extend the Court's Jurisdiction? The Practice of the Court in the Avena and Temple of Preah Vihear Cases’, in Jalloh, C. and Elias, O. (eds.), Shielding Humanity – Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Abdul G. Koroma (2015), 61Google Scholar; Tanaka, Y., ‘A New Phase of the Temple of Preah Vihear Dispute before the International Court of Justice: Reflections on the Indications of Provisional Measures of 18 July 2011’, (2012) 11 Chinese J. Int'l L. 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar; d'Argent, P., ‘Juge ou Policier?: les Mesures Conservatoires dans l'Affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar’, (2011) 57 Annuaire Français de Droit International 147CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

163 Temple of Preah Vihear (Interpretation), supra note 10, at 546, para. 38.

164 Judge Donoghue criticized the Court for indicating provisional measures in interpretation proceedings since, in her view, the Court's jurisdiction under Art. 60 of the Statute does not include the power to indicate provisional measures. See ibid., at 613 (Dissenting Opinion Donoghue).

165 Ibid. at 546, para. 39.

166 Ibid., at 546, para. 40.

167 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment of 27 November 1950, [1950] ICJ Rep. 395, at 402–3.

168 Ibid., at 403.

169 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment of 25 March 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 31, at 36–7, para. 12; Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment of 10 December 1985, [1985] ICJ Rep. 192, at 223, para. 56.

170 CR 2011/14, pp. 41–2, paras. 23–4 (Crawford); CR 2011/16, pp. 18–24, paras. 1–25 (Crawford).

171 CR 2011/15, pp. 23–4, paras. 12–13 (Berman).