Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2012
The case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, better known as the ‘Nicaragua case’ or simply Nicaragua, is arguably one of the most important and controversial cases ever to be heard by the International Court of Justice. Twenty-five years after the judgment on the merits was handed down, it is high time to reassess the impact of Nicaragua on international law. The joint efforts of the Grotius Centre of the Leiden Law School, the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University College London, the Netherlands Society of International Law, and the law firm Foley Hoag LLP resulted in a one-day conference, on 27 June 2011, the very day on which the judgment on the merits of the Nicaragua case was handed down, 25 years ago.
1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Republic of Nicaragua v. the United States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep. 3, at 14.
2 It gave rise to one of the longest dissenting opinions in the history of the Court; see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, [1986] ICJ Rep. 3, at 259–527.
3 While the judgment was rendered in 1986, the case was on the docket of the Court for another five years, at which time it was removed from the Court's list and discontinued at the initiative of Nicaragua. In these five years, Nicaragua had filed a Memorial and the United States had filed a Counter-Memorial on the issue of reparation.
4 Reference to Larissa's editorial in this issue.
5 See the letter and statement concerning termination of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ reproduced in (1985) 24-II ILM 1742.
6 And, indeed, the Nicaragua case was used for several years by at least one international lawyer, Professor Luigi Condorelli, as a tool to introduce students at the University of Geneva to international law (see L. Condorelli, Cours de droit international public, Département de droit international public et organisation international, Faculté de droit, Université de Genève, 1994–95).
7 Order of 4 October 1984, [1984] ICJ Rep. 3, at 215; the Court rejected El Salvador's ‘Declaration of intervention’ on the grounds that the Court was not then dealing with the merits, but only with jurisdictional issues. With hindsight, Judges Lachs and Oda expressed their regrets for not having admitted El Salvador's request for permission to intervene – see [1986] ICJ Rep., at 170–1, and 244, para. 66 – Judge Lachs calling it a ‘judicial error’. El Salvador did not, however, make any further attempt to intervene at the merits stage of the proceedings.
8 See the letter of the Agent of the United States cited in the Court's judgment on the merits, [1986] ICJ Rep. 3, at 17, para. 10.
9 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić Case, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94–1-A, 15 July 1999; cf. the Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen.
10 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), [2007] ICJ Rep. 43, at 210–11; see Cassese, A., ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’, (2007) 18 EJIL 649, at 649–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Stahn, C., ‘Nicaragua Is Dead, Long Live Nicaragua: The Right to Self-Defence under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism’, in Walter, C., Schorkopf, F., and Voeneky, S. (eds.), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? (2004), 827CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 See Report of the Study Group Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
13 See Kohen's article in this issue.