Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T12:26:11.528Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Expropriation in Transition: Evolving Chinese Investment Treaty Practices in Local and Global Contexts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2015

SHEN WEI
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The doctrine and case law on expropriation in international investment law is an unsettled area due to a variety of factors such as the diversity of interests between capital importing and exporting states, the divergence in legal, economic, and cultural concepts of property rights, and, more importantly, the regulatory role of the state in cross-border investment activities. Although China has been an active ‘treaty-maker’ in the universe of international investment arbitration, evidenced by its nearly 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the notion of expropriation in these BITs is in a state of flux. This article scrutinizes the expropriation clauses in China's BITs, in particular, the Peru–China BIT and the Peru–China free trade agreement, by reference to the final award of Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, the first Chinese BIT arbitration case. This article attempts, in a comparative context, to understand the underlying rationale for China's evolving stance on expropriation.

Keywords

Chinese bilateral investment treatiescompensationevolution of expropriation clausesindirect expropriationlawful expropriation
Type
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 579 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 All the BITs cited herein are available at www.ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm (accessed 6 May 2015); <www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch_779.aspx> (accessed 6 May 2015); or <www.kluwerarbitration.com/BITs-countries.aspx> (accessed 6 May 2015).

2 Pinard, L. A., ‘United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Investments: The People's Republic of China's Nationalization Decree of 1950’, (1984) 14 California Western International Law Journal 148.Google Scholar

3 J. Anderlini and G. Dyer, ‘Beijing Accused of Attacking Private Enterprise’; and Dyer, G., ‘Crackdown on Coal Mines Ignites Fears of State Land Grab’, Financial Times, 26 November 2009, at 3Google Scholar.

4 The other case which is related to a Chinese BIT and its expropriation clause is Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29. Ping An, China's insurance giant, filed a claim with the ICSID against the Belgian government for the loss of about 15.7 billion yuan on its investment in Fortis NV, a bank which was nationalized and sold by the Belgian government in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Ping An claimed that the Belgian government's role in dismantling Fortis was tantamount to confiscation. The award on jurisdiction was dispatched on 30 April 2015 by the tribunal to the parties. The award is available at <http://www.italaw.com/cases/3088> (accessed 30 May 2015).

5 The Award was issued in Spanish only, and is available at <www.opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/382–2009.case.1/IIC382(2009)DF.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2013).

6 PRC Ministry of Commerce, China FTA Network, China's Free Trade Agreements, available at <www.fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml> (accessed 6 May 2015).

7 ‘Deal Sealed with a Handshake and Fish’, China Daily, 3 May 2013 (accessed 6 May 2015).

8 Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China, available at <www.aseansec.org/22974.pdf> (accessed 6 May 2015).

9 International investment jurisprudence often equates direct expropriation to a forcible taking by the government of tangible or intangible property owned by individuals or companies through administrative or legislative actions while placing an emphasis on the effect of the measures taken by the host governments on the investment in adjudicating ‘indirect expropriation’ even in absence of formal transfer of title or outright seizure. The situation in which an investment may be affected by measures gradually but eventually resulting in expropriation is known as creeping expropriation. C. McLachlan, L. Shore, and M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (2007), Ch. 8.

10 Coe, J. Jr. and Rubins, N., ‘Regulatory Expropriations and the TECMED Case: Context and Contributions’, in Weiler, T. (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Customary International Law (2005), 601Google Scholar.

11 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration, 17 March 2006, para. 261.

12 US Model BIT 2004, ‘Annex B Expropriations’, at 38.

13 New Zealand–China FTA, Art. 143; Peru–China FTA, Art. 132(2)(c).

14 Germany–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Jordan–China BIT, Art. 5(1); Uganda–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

15 Mexico–China BIT, Art. 7(1).

16 Greece–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

17 Pope and Talbot Inc v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 1) (26 June 2000), para. 99; Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (Merits), paras. 143–5; GAMI Investments, Inc v. Government of the United Mexican States (Merits), para. 131; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v. United Mexican States (Merits), paras. 113–15 and 121; Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, SA v. Republic of Costa Rica (Merits), paras. 71–72 and 76.

18 Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, Ad Hoc Arbitration, paras. 240–2 (involving the Netherlands–Poland BIT 1992).

19 Indonesia–China BIT, Art. 6(1).

20 Greece–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

21 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, para. 426; Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico (Number II), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award, 20 April 2004, para. 143.

22 CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, UNCITRAL, September 13, 2001, paras. 4–6.

23 A. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, (2005) ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 8, at 8–9.

24 Peru–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

25 Peru–China FTA, Art. 133.

26 China–Finland BIT 2006, Art. 4(1); China–Germany BIT 2003, Art. 4(2); China–Portugal BIT 1992, Art. 4(1). China recognized the concept of indirect expropriation in its model BIT adopted as early as the 1980s. See Chinese Model BIT, reprinted in W. Shan and N. Gallagher, Chinese Investment Treaties, Policies and Practice (2009), App. 4.

27 NAFTA 1992, Art. 1110, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 ILM 289.

28 The Protocol to the TIT includes an identical definition of ‘indirect expropriation’, which details some key perspectives on ‘indirect expropriation’. The Protocol to the TIT, Art. 2(a)(ii).

29 The Award, para. 159.

30 The Award, para. 156.

31 Schreuer, C. H., ‘The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties’, (2005) 5 (2)Transnational Dispute Management 28Google Scholar.

32 Peru–China FTA, Ann. 9, Art. 3(a).

33 The Award, para. 170.

34 Schill, S. W., The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009), 82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Higgins, R., ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’, (1963) 1982-III 176 Recueil des Cours. Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 331Google Scholar

36 Walde, T. and Kolo, A., ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection, and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’, (2001) 50 ICLQ 811CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 814.

37 The official commentary to the OECD Draft Convention of 1967 states that ‘the taking of property, within the meaning of the Article [3], must result in a loss of title or substance – otherwise a claim will not lie’. OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Property, Adopted by the Council in its 150th Meeting on 12 October 1967 (1968) 7 ILM 117, 126.

38 See Higgins, supra note 35, at 271.

39 Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, para. 64.

40 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lituania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, para. 455.

41 See Tecmed, supra note 17, para. 115.

42 Peru–China FTA, Ann. 9, Art. 4.

43 The Tribunal in Lauder held that a ‘formal’ expropriation is a measure aimed at a ‘transfer of property’ while a ‘de facto’ expropriation occurs when a state deprives the owner of his ‘right to use, let or sell (his) property’. Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 September 2001, para. 200. The Tribunal in the case of Nykomb Synergetics went even further. Even if the investment became worthless, the Tribunal still held that ‘the decisive factor for drawing the border line towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking or control over the enterprise the disputed measured entail’. Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia, SCC Case No. 118/2001, Award, 16 December 2003, para. 4.3.1. This more stringent ‘control’ test was adopted in a number of arbitration cases in which the tribunals did not recognize expropriation where the investor retained control over the investment and the government does not have a day-to-day management over the investment. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Republic of Argentina (Merits), ICSID Case Arb/01/8, Award (11 May 2005).

44 See Tecmed, supra note 17, para. 115.

45 CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic (Partial Award 2001), para. 575 (suggesting that a destruction of the legal basis of the investment constituted sufficient expropriatory deprivation).

46 Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No Arb (AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000), para. 103.

47 Dolzer, R., ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’ (2002) 11 New York University Environmental Law Journal 79, at 79–80Google Scholar.

48 Hoffmann, A. K., ‘Indirect Expropriation’, in Reinisch, August (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (2008) 156–8Google Scholar.

49 The approach taken by the US in negotiating its BITs is to ensure that the standards created by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution are also applied to the protection of investment. To this end, the term ‘expropriation’ explicitly covers both direct and indirect expropriation. Accordingly, any expropriation is required to be consistent with the general absolute treatment standards such as fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and treatment in accordance with customary international law. Vandevelde, K. J., US International Investment Agreements (2009)Google Scholar, Ch. 7.

50 Finland–China BIT, Art. 4; Netherlands–China BIT, Art. 5.

51 New Zealand–China FTA, Ann. 13.

52 Protocol to India–China BIT, Art. III, Ad Art. 5.

53 US Model BIT 2004, Ann. B, Art. 4.

54 Peru–China FTA, Ann. 9, Art. 4. Identical terminology also appears in the Protocol to the TIT, Art. 2(b), para.1.

55 Canadian Model BIT 2004, Ann. B 13(1)(b).

56 Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law (1992), 916–17Google Scholar.

57 Dolzer, R. and Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law (2008), 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 UK–China BIT, Art. 5(1).

59 Italy–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

60 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 13(1)(a); NAFTA, Art. 1110(1).

61 Argentina–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

62 The Philippines–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

63 New Zealand–China FTA, Ann. 13.

64 The Award, para. 171.

65 CMD paras. 256–65.

66 Saluka, supra note 11, para. 255.

67 The Award, para. 181.

68 The Award, para. 179.

69 LG&E, para. 191.

70 GAMI, supra note 17, para. 131; SD Myers I para. 283.

71 Pope and Talbot Inc v. Canada, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para. 99.

72 Archer Daniels Midland Co et al. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, 21 November 2007, para. 250.

73 Pakistan–China FTA, Art. 49.

74 New Zealand–China FTA, Art. 145.

75 TIT here refers to the Agreement among the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Government of Japan for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, signed by China, Japan, and South Korea in 2012.

76 TIT, Art. 11.

77 Czech Republic–China BIT.

78 Austria–China BIT; Mexico–China BIT; Sweden–China BIT.

79 New Zealand–China BIT, Art. 6(1); Singapore–China BIT, Art. 6(1).

80 United Arab Emirates–China BIT, Art. 6(1)(b); Guyana–China BIT, Art. 4(1)(b); Kuwait–China BIT, Art. 5(2).

81 TIT, Art. 11.

82 Table 1 above.

83 Most BITs China signed with European countries adopt ‘due process of law’ instead of ‘under domestic legal procedure’. China–France BIT, Art. 4(3); China–Denmark BIT, Art. 4(1); China–Spain BIT, Art. 4(1).

84 UK–China BIT, Art. 5(1).

85 Germany–China BIT.

86 Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009), §2.7Google Scholar.

87 The Award, para. 95.

88 The Award, para. 209.

89 Paulsson, J., Denial of Justice in International Law (2005), 100CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 Jan de Nul NV Dredging International NV v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. Arb/04/13, Award, 6 November 2008, para. 258.

91 A. O. Adede, ‘A Fresh Look at the Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice under International Law’, (1976) 14 Can YBIL 72, at 91.

92 See Paulsson, supra note 89, at 204.

93 Alex Genin and others v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. Arb/99/2, Award (25 June 2001), para. 368.

94 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 13(1)(b); NAFTA, Art. 1110(1)(b).

95 BP v. Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297, at 329; Libya v. Libyan Am. Oil Co., (1981) 20 ILM 20, 58.

96 Brownlie, I., System of The Law of Nations (1983), 81Google Scholar.

97 Shaw, M. N., International Law (2003), 751.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

98 Pope and Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, June 26, 2000, para. 99.

99 Peru–China FTA, Ann. 9, Art. 5.

100 Ibid., Ann. 9, Art. 6.

101 The Award, para. 181.

102 Peru–China FTA, Ann. 5, Art. 3(b).

103 Marion Unglaube and Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Consolidated Cases Nos. Arb/08/1 and Arb/09/20, Award (16 May 2012).

104 Hull Formula or Hull Rule refers to the formula of ‘adequate’ or ‘just’ compensation as a prerequisite of expropriation required by customary international law. The formula also requires that compensation be ‘effective’ and ‘prompt’. It is named after the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull who put forward these standards in his note to the Mexican Government in 1938 on the expropriation of assets of US nationals by the Mexican government. G. H. Hackworth, US Department of State, Pub. No. 1708, (1942) 3 Digest of International Law 655, at 655–61.

105 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (2007) 52Google Scholar.

106 Norway–China BIT, Art. 5(2).

107 UK–China BIT, Art. 5(1).

108 China–ASEAN Treaty, Art. VI(1).

109 NAFTA, Article 1110(2); ECT, Art. 13(1).

110 UK–USSR BIT, France Model BIT 2006, Art. 6(2).

111 Czech Republic–the Netherlands BIT, Art. 5.

112 World Bank, Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992) 31 ILM 1366, Art. IV.3.

113 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (2007), 52Google Scholar.

114 Austria–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

115 Mauritius–China BIT, Art. 6(1)(c); Zimbabwe–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Brunei–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

116 Belgium–Luxembourg–China BIT.

117 Australia–China BIT, Barbados–China BIT, Spain–China BIT.

118 The Netherlands–China BIT, Art. 5(1)(c); Finland–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Mexico–China BIT, Art. 7(2)(a).

119 CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award, March 14, 2003, para. 493.

120 Peru–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

121 New Zealand–China FTA, Art. 145.

122 Peru–China FTA, Art. 133(2).

123 Cai, C., ‘China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications’, (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 457, at 476Google Scholar.

124 NAFTA, Art. 1110(2).

125 Houtte, H. V., The Law of International Trade (2002), 252Google Scholar.

126 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 13(1).

127 NAFTA, Art. 1110(3)–(6).

128 Sweden–China BIT, Art. 3(1).

129 Greece–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

130 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] YILC pt. 2 at 20, 47–49, 52–54, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.

131 The Award, para. 254.

132 Zimbabwe–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

133 Guyana–China BIT.

134 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992) 31 ILM 1366, Article IV.5; NAFTA, Art. 1110(2); CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award March 14, 2003, para. 103.

135 Austria–China BIT, Art. 4(1).

136 The Netherlands–China BIT, Art. 5(1)(c); New Zeland–China FTA, Art. 145(2); Mexico–China BIT, Art. 7(2)(a).

137 Greece–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

138 China–ASEAN Treaty, Art. 8(2).

139 Ibid., Art. 8(2).

140 CME Czech Republic BV v. The Czech Republic, Final Award and Separate Opinion UNCITRAL (14 March 2003), paras. 490–5.

141 Bulgaria–China BIT; Algeria–China BIT; Syria–China BIT.

142 Dolzer, R. and Stevens, M., Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995), 112–14Google Scholar.

143 Chile–China BIT; Iceland–China BIT; UK–China BIT.

144 Jordan–China BIT; New Zealand–China FTA.

145 Denmark–China BIT; Greece–China BIT.

146 India–China BIT.

147 Lebanon–China BIT.

148 Oman–China BIT; Russia–China BIT.

149 China–ASEAN Treaty, Art. 8(3).

150 Iceland–China BIT, Art. 4.

151 World Bank Guidelines, Art. IV.7.

152 China–ASEAN Treaty, Art. 1(1)(b).

153 The Article of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. XXX(f).

154 Israel–China BIT, Art. 4(1); Laos–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Mongolia–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Spain–China BIT.

155 Australia–China BIT.

156 Korea–China BIT.

157 Greece–China BIT, Art. 4(2).

158 Peru–China BIT, Art. 4(2); Peru–China FTA, Art. 133(2).

159 The Communist Party of China held its Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee from 20–23 October 2014 and assigned the latest gravity to advance the rule of law and the overarching role of the Constitution in China's legal system. See ‘Party's Leadership “Most Fundamental Guarantee” for Rule of Law in China: Communique’, available at <www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014–10/23/c_133738127.htm> (accessed 6 May 2015).

160 Griffith, S. S., ‘US–China BIT Negotiations March On: The Road Ahead Is Challenging But Worthwhile’, (2009) China Brief 13Google Scholar.

161 Zhang, K. and Prosterman, R., ‘Land Reform Efforts in China’, China Business Review, 1 October 2012, available at <www.chinabuisnessreview.com/land-reform-efforts-in-china/> (accessed 6 May 2015).Google Scholar

162 State Council's Regulations Regarding the Expropriation and Compensation of Housing on State-owned Land.

163 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, xiii; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, at 7.

164 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, xvi.

165 Ibid., at 5.

166 See People.com.cn, available at <www.finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/126457/8313172.html> (accessed 6 May 2015); see also Ministry of Commerce of the PRC-MOFCOM, available at <www.njtb.mofcom.gov.cn/subject/zcq/index.shtml> (in Chinese) (accessed 6 May 2015); see also Communist Party of China's Central Committee, Improvement of the Social Economy Market, available at <www.news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003–10/21/content_1135402.htm> (accessed 6 May 2015).

167 See U. C. V. Haley, ‘Hearing on China's World Trade Compliance: Industrial Subsidies and the Impact on US and World Markets Statement before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission on 4 April 2006’, available at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_04_04wrts/06_04_04_haley.php> (accessed 6 May 2015).

168 F. Jubany and D. Poon, ‘Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective’, FOCAL, March 2006, available at <www.focal.ca/pdf/China-Latin%20America_Jubany-Poon-FOCAL_Chinese%20Engagement%20Latin%20America%20Caribbean%20Canadian%20Perspective_March%202006.pdf> (accessed 6 May 2015).

169 China's State Council, Decision on Reforming the Investment System, Parts II and III, available at <www.news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004–07/26/content_1648074.htm> (in Chinese) (accessed 6 May 2015).

170 See Editorial, ‘China's Forex Reserve Overtakes the Total Amount of G7 Countries’, available at <www.news.163.com/08/0603/02/4DFRH5E00001234J.html> (in Chinese) (accessed 6 May 2015).

171 H. Shen, ‘Beijing Steps in to Tame Currency’, Wall Street Journal, 16 October 2013, C2.

172 D. H. Rosen and T. Hanemann, ‘The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means for American Businesses’, available at <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-rise-in-chinese-overseas-investment-and-what-it-means-for-american-businesses/> (accessed 6 May 2015).

173 Jiang, J. and Sinton, J., ‘Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies’, Information Paper (February 2011)Google Scholar.

174 Schill, S. W., ‘Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's Republic of China’, (2007) 15 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 73, at 73–118 (2007)Google Scholar; Zhang, Y., ‘The Case of China’, in Moser, M. (ed.) Investor–State Arbitration – Lessons for Asia (2008), at 156Google Scholar.

175 It is usually the case that the bilateral trade agreements offer more preference margins than the multilateral ones. Barry, D. and Keith, R. (eds.), Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade (1999)Google Scholar.

176 Kotera, A., ‘Regulatory Transparency’, in Muchlinki, P, et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) 617, at 623Google Scholar.

177 Cai, C., ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Multilateralization of International Investment Law’, (2013) 6 Journal of East Asia and International Law 385, at 400CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

178 Liu, Z. and Shen, J., ‘The Review of Research Frontier and Frameworks of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)’, (2012) 36 Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies 44, at 44–45 (in Chinese).Google Scholar

179 Chapter 12, P-4, available at <http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_tpfta.asp?hl=12> (accessed 6 May 2015).

180 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, xix.

181 Harten, G. v. and Loughlin, M., ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’, (2006) 17 (1)EJIL 121, at 121–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar(claiming the emergence of global administrative law based on international investment arbitration).