Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-18T18:14:53.957Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The expressive turn of international criminal justice: A field in search of meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2019

Barrie Sander
Barrie Sander*
Affiliation:
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), School of International Relations, Avenue Paulista, 1471, 1st floor, CEP 01311-927, São Paulo, Brazil
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

As the glow that accompanied the kinetic judicialization of the field of international criminal justice has faded over time, scholars have increasingly turned to expressivist strands of thought to justify, assess, and critique the practices of international criminal courts. This expressive turn has been characterized by a heightened concern for the pedagogical value and legitimating qualities of international criminal courts. This article develops a unique typology of expressivist perspectives within the field of international criminal justice, distinguishing between three strands of expressivism: instrumental expressivism, which concerns the justification of different practices of international criminal courts in terms of the instrumental value of their expressive qualities; interpretive expressivism, which concerns the identification of expressive avenues for improving the sociological legitimacy of international criminal courts; and critical expressivism, which concerns the illumination of the expressive limits of international criminal courts, as well as unveiling the configurations of power that underpin the messages and narratives constructed within such courts in different institutional contexts. Reflecting on the limitations of these perspectives, the article elaborates a nascent strand of expressivism – strategic expressivism – which concerns whether and how different actors in the field may harness the expressive power of international criminal justice in line with their strategic social and political agendas.

Keywords

critiqueexpressivisminternational criminal justicelegitimacystrategy
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 851 - 872
Copyright
© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Postdoctoral Fellow, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), School of International Relations, São Paulo, Brazil; Ph.D., International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (summa cum laude avec les félicitations du jury); LL.M., International Law, University of Leiden (cum laude); B.A., M.A., Law, Jesus College, University of Cambridge. The author would like to thank Wui Ling Cheah, Margaret deGuzman, Karen Engle, Ioannis Kalpouzos, Robert Knox, Joanna Kyriakakis, Itamar Mann, Padraig McAuliffe, Alex Batesmith, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this article. All errors remain the author’s own.

References

1 On international criminal justice as a ‘field’, see generally Christensen, M. J., ‘Preaching, Practicing and Publishing International Criminal Justice: Academic Expertise and the Development of an International Field of Law’, (2016) 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar ICLR 239; Dixon, P. and Tenove, C., ‘International Criminal Justice as a Transnational Field: Rules, Authority and Victims’, (2013) 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar IJTJ 393; Hagan, J. and Levi, R., ‘Crimes of War and the Force of Law’, (2005) 83 Social Forces 1499CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Schwöbel, C. E. J., ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’, (2013) 24 Law and Critique 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 172.

3 Nouwen, S. M. H. and Werner, W., ‘Monopolizing Global Justice: International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human Diversity’, (2015) 13 JICJ 157, at 160–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See generally Sander, B., ‘International Criminal Justice as Progress: From Faith to Critique’, in Bergsmo, M. et al. (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4 (2015), 749CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Akhavan, P., ‘The Rise, and Fall, and Rise, of International Criminal Justice’, (2013) 11 JICJ 527, at 529CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Engle, K. et al., ‘Introduction’, in Engle, K. et al. (eds.), Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda (2016), 1 at 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Luban, D., ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’, (2013) 11 JICJ 505, at 506–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Sander, B., ‘The Expressive Limits of International Criminal Justice: Victim Trauma and Local Culture in the Iron Cage of the Law’, 5 European Society of International Law Conference Paper Series (2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For a recent discussion of disciplinary turns, see generally Haskell, J. and Rasulov, A., ‘International Law and the Turn to Political Economy’, (2018) 31 LJIL 243CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 On the disciplinary origins and influences of expressivist theories, see generally Amann, D. M., ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’, (2002) 2 ICLR 93, at 117–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Sunstein, C. R., ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’, (1996) 5 East European Constitutional Review 66, at 66Google Scholar; Kahan, D. M., ‘What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?’, (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 591, at 597CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Garland, D., Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (1990), 255CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis in original).

12 Mégret, F., ‘In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International Criminal Justice’, (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 725Google Scholar; Houge, A. B., ‘Narrative Expressivism: A Criminological Approach to the Expressive Function of International Criminal Justice’, Criminology & Criminal JusticeGoogle Scholar (forthcoming).

13 Sloane, R. D., ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law’, (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of International Law 39, at 84Google Scholar; Amann, supra note 9, at 118.

14 Boyd White, J., Heracles’ Bow: Essays on Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (1985), at 185Google Scholar (emphasis added).

15 The typology is not intended to be exhaustive. For instance, as one of the anonymous reviewers to this article pointed out, recent years have also witnessed a noticeable increase in the making of and scholarship concerning films and documentaries centred on issues of international criminal justice, a body of work that may be understood to constitute an additional strand of expressivism but which is not further explored here. See, for example, Rigney, S., ‘“You start to feel really alone”: defence lawyers and narratives of international criminal law in film’, (2018) 6 London Review of International Law 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 For a similar approach with respect to feminist scholarship see Engle, K., ‘Feminist Governance and International Law: From Liberal to Carceral Feminism’, (2017) University of Texas School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 690, at 2Google Scholar.

17 The expressive significance of punishment is commonly traced to the work of Joel Feinberg in the domestic criminal law context. See, in particular, Feinberg, J., ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’, in Feinberg, J., Doing and Deserving (1970), 95, reprinted in Duff, R. A. and Garland, D., A Reader on Punishment (1994), at 73 Google Scholar. For a critical examination of expressive theories of punishment in the international criminal context, see generally Sander, B., ‘Justifying International Criminal Punishment’, in Bergsmo, M. and Buis, E. J. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of International Criminal Law: Foundational Concepts (2019) 167, at 192–232 Google Scholar.

18 See, for example, Roht-Arriaza, N., ‘Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches’, in Roht-Arriaza, N. (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (1995), 13, at 17–21Google Scholar; Eldar, S., ‘Exploring International Criminal Law’s Reluctance to Resort to Modalities of Group Responsibility: Five Challenges to International Prosecutions and their Impact on Broader Forms of Responsibility’, (2013) 11 JICJ 331, at 345CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 This perspective may be traced back to the work of Jean Hampton in the domestic criminal law context. See generally Hampton, J., ‘The retributive idea’, in Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J., Forgiveness and Mercy (1988), 111, at 122–43Google Scholar; Hampton, J., ‘Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’, (1991–1992) 39 UCLA Law Review 1659Google Scholar.

20 See, for example, Akhavan, P., ‘Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’, (1998) 20 HRQ 737, at 746–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fisher, K. J., Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents of Atrocity Accountable to the World (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at Ch. 3.

21 This perspective may be traced back to the work of Émile Durkheim in the domestic criminal law context. See generally Durkheim, É., The Division of Labor in Society (1933)Google Scholar; Durkheim, É., Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education (1961)Google Scholar. For a useful overview of Durkheim’s work on punishment, see generally Garland, supra note 11, at Chs. 2 and 3; Nimaga, S., ‘An International Conscience Collective? A Durkheimian Analysis of International Criminal Law’, (2007) 7 ICLR 561CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tallgren, I., ‘The Durkheimian Spell of International Criminal Law’, (2013) 71 Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 See, for example, Cassese, A., ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 1, at 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Weinstein, H. M. and Stover, E., ‘Introduction: conflict, justice and reclamation’, in Stover, E. and Weinstein, H. M. (eds.), My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (2004), 1, at 14Google Scholar (referring to this perspective as common amongst proponents of criminal trials).

23 This perspective may be traced back to the work of James Fitzjames Stephens in the domestic criminal law context. See, in particular, Stephens, J. F., A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), at 80–2Google Scholar; Stephen, J. F., Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1967), at 152Google Scholar. For a more contemporary account of this perspective see Murphy, J. G., ‘Hatred: a qualified defense’, in Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J., Forgiveness and Mercy (1988), 88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 See, for example, Drumbl, M. A., Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (2007), at 174CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Luban, D., ‘State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law’, in Isaacs, T. and Vernon, R. (eds.), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (2011), 61, at 75Google Scholar; Osiel, M., Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (1997), at 65Google Scholar. See also Mégret, supra note 12, at 743 (‘One crucial function of international criminal trials … should be to “represent” the nature of the crimes they are judging, by designating and acknowledging the communities that are being affected by them. The designation is a function that trials of international criminals fulfil by what they do … but also merely by what they are. In that respect, international and domestic trials are precisely not functional equivalents and do send very different signals’) (emphasis added). For a more critical characterization of atrocity trials as ‘show trials’, see generally Koskenniemi, M., ‘From Impunity to Show Trials’, (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1Google Scholar; Sander, B., ‘Justice as Identity: Unveiling the Mechanics of Legitimation in Domestic Atrocity Trials’, (2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Douglas, L., The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (2001), at 3Google Scholar.

26 Luban, D., ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’, in Besson, S. and Tasioulas, J. (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 569, at 575Google Scholar.

27 Ibid., at 576.

28 Duff, R. A., ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in Besson, S. and Tasioulas, J. (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 589, at 593Google Scholar.

29 See generally Duff, R. A., Answering for Crime (2007)Google Scholar.

30 Duff, supra note 28, at 594–5.

31 Alvarez, J. E., ‘Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment’, (1997–1998) 96 Michigan Law Review 2031, at 2084CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff. See similarly Damaška, M., ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 329, at 346Google Scholar. Both Alvarez and Damaška rely on Mark Osiel’s theory of civil dissensus. See generally Osiel, M., Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (1997), at 36–55 and 283–301Google Scholar.

32 Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2085.

33 See generally Sander, supra note 8, at 6–13.

34 Felman, S., ‘Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust’, (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 465, at 498 and 502Google Scholar (emphasis in original).

35 May, L., Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008), at 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a narrower understanding of expressivism in international criminal judgments see Aloisi, R. and Meernik, J., Judgment Day: Judicial Decision Making at the International Criminal Tribunals (2017), at 130CrossRefGoogle Scholar (defining and examining expressivist statements in judgments as those that ‘(1) do not serve a specific legal purpose; (2) represent a moral statement regarding the actions being litigated; and (3) are intentionally included in opinions by judges when they feel compelled to write as human observers rather than legal adjudicators’). On the expressive qualities of dissenting opinions in the international criminal context, see generally H. Mistry, ‘The Paradox of Dissent: Judicial Dissent and the Projects of International Criminal Justice’, (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 449, at 456–8.

36 Drumbl, supra note 24, at 173 (Drumbl goes on to illuminate some of the limits of the narrative function of international criminal courts). See similarly Borer, T. A., ‘Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity: A Theoretical Overview’, in Borer, T. A. (ed.), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies (2006), 1, at 20–1Google Scholar; Brants, C. and Klep, K., ‘Transitional Justice: History-Telling, Collective Memory, and the Victim-Witness’, (2013) 7 International Journal of Conflict and Violence 37, at 45Google Scholar.

37 See, in this regard, Waters, T. ‘A Kind of Judgment: Searching for Judicial Narratives After Death’, (2010) 42 George Washington International Law Review 279, at 285Google Scholar (discussing the ‘authoritative narrative theory’). See also Orentlicher, D. F., Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (2008), at 93Google Scholar; Ignatieff, M., ‘Articles of Faith’, (1996) 25 Index on Censorship 110, at 117–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 See, for example, Doak, J., ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’, (2011) 11 ICLR 263, at 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O’Connell, J., ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?’, (2005) 46 HILJ 295, at 317 and 321–2Google Scholar.

39 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’, November 2013, paras. 100–6. See similarly Luban, supra note 7, at 511 (identifying complementarity as the ‘single most important achievement’ of the ICC from an expressivist perspective).

40 Stahn, C., ‘Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC’, (2017) 15 JICJ 413, at 420CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 Nimaga, supra note 21, at 616. See similarly Bibas, S. and Burke-White, W. W., ‘International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism’, (2010) 59 Duke Law Journal 637, at 652Google Scholar; deGuzman, M. M., ‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’, (2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 265, at 315Google Scholar; Stahn, C., ‘Between “Faith” and “Facts”: By What Standards Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?’, (2012) 25 LJIL 251, at 280CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Drumbl, supra note 24, at 175. See similarly Golash, D., ‘The Justification of Punishment in the International Context’, in May, L. and Hoskins, Z. (eds.), International Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010), 201, at 218Google Scholar; Danner, A. M., ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’, (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 415, at 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 See, for example, Sloane, supra note 13, at 71; Akhavan, supra note 20, at 747.

44 See, for example, Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2107; Drumbl, supra note 24, at 174.

45 Mégret, F., ‘International criminal justice: A critical research agenda’, in Schwöbel, C. (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (2014), 17, at 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46 See, in this regard, Mégret, F., ‘Practices of Stigmatization’, (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 287Google Scholar; Meijers, T. and Glasius, M., ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What Should Be Expected of International Criminal Courts?’, (2016) 30 Ethics & International Affairs 429CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Buchanan, A. and Keohane, R. O., ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, (2006) 20 Ethics and International Affairs 405, at 405CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Glasius, M. and Meijers, T., ‘Constructions of Legitimacy: The Charles Taylor Trial’, (2012) 6 IJTJ 229, at 231–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; deGuzman, supra note 41, at 268 and 276.

48 See generally Bohrer, Z., ‘Is the Prosecution of War Crimes Just and Effective? Rethinking the Lessons from Sociology and Psychology’, (2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 749Google Scholar.

49 Mohamed, S., ‘Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law’, (2015) 124 Yale Law Journal 1628Google Scholar.

50 Ibid., at 1636–7.

51 Ibid., at 1677–80. See also Drumbl, M. A., ‘Victims who victimise’, (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 217, at 244–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar (calling for international criminal courts ‘to clarify – rather than occlude – how atrocity spreads and, particularly, the roles that those who are dually victims and perpetrators play in that process’).

52 See, for example, Eser, A., ‘Mental Elements – Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law’, in Cassese, A. et al., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I (2002), 889, at 945–6Google Scholar; Ambos, K., Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume I: Foundations and General Part (2013), at 375–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; van Verseveld, A., Mistake of Law: Excusing Perpetrators of International Crimes (2012), at 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mann, I., ‘Eichmann’s Mistake’Google Scholar (draft manuscript on file with author). See also, with regard to superior orders, Osiel, M. J., ‘Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War’, (1998) 86 California Law Review 939, at 1017CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Smeulers, A., ‘Why Serious International Crimes Might Not Seem “Manifestly Unlawful” to Low-level Perpetrators: A Social-Psychological Approach to Superior Orders’, (2019) 17 Journal of International Criminal Justice 105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 deGuzman, supra note 41, at 313.

54 Kahan, D. M., ‘What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions’, (2005–2006) 84 Texas Law Review 2075, at 2087Google Scholar (referring to the following famous passage from Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, in Gardner, M. (ed.), The Annotated Alice: The Definitive Edition (2000), at 213:Google Scholar ‘“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”’).

55 See similarly, from the perspective of victimhood, Kendall, S. and Nouwen, S. M. H., ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’, (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 235, at 241Google Scholar.

56 Steinke, R., The Politics of International Criminal Justice: German Perspectives from Nuremberg to The Hague (2012), at 16Google Scholar (‘To place a person in the dock in this particular judicial system with its symbolic trials means to symbolically place a (political or military) group in the dock’) (emphasis added).

57 Mégret, F., ‘What Sort of Global Justice is “International Criminal Justice”?’, (2015) 13 JICJ 77, at 88 and 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 See, in this regard, Ford, S., ‘Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments’, (2013) 39 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 45, at 69Google Scholar (calculating that the largest number of indictees at the ICTY were ethnically Serbian (68%), followed by smaller numbers of Croatians (21%) Bosniaks (4%), Kosovar Albanians (4%), Macedonians (1%)); L. Côté, ‘Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law’, (2005) 3 JICJ 162, at 176 (describing how prosecutorial reliance on criteria related to whether a potential indictee belonged to or was affiliated with a particular group was ‘an open secret’).

59 deGuzman, supra note 41, at 317. See also Kotecha, B., ‘The Art of Rhetoric: Perceptions of the International Criminal Court and Legalism’, (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 939CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that the ICC Prosecutor’s general message of legalism constitutes a weak tactic of legitimation and offering recommendations to help the OTP improve its rhetoric towards communities that are essential to the Court’s perceived legitimacy).

60 Ibid., at 318. See also Damaška, supra note 31, at 349 (‘a high priority demand on international criminal courts should be to establish effective lines of communication with local audiences’).

61 See generally, ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation’, 15 September 2016, available at www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf (accessed 23 July 2019).

62 For an examination of the cultural sensitivity of international criminal courts in their evaluation of evidence, see generally Sander, supra note 8, at 13–16.

63 Amann, supra note 9, at 142–3 (emphasis added).

64 Danner, supra note 42, at 495 (emphasis added).

65 Ibid., at 495. For a further illustration of this type of reasoning see O’Regan, F., ‘Prosecutor vs. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo: The Cumulative Charging Principle, Gender-Based Violence, and Expressivism’, (2012) 43 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1323, at 1354Google Scholar (concerning the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to decline a number of cumulative charges concerning acts of gender-based violence).

66 Damaška, supra note 31, at 350–6. See similarly Aksenova, M., ‘Symbolism as a Constraint on International Criminal Law’, (2016) 30 LJIL 475, at 494–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Ibid., at 351. For an examination of calls for international criminal courts to rely on anthropological experts to inform their interpretation of modes of participation doctrines in different cultural contexts, see generally Sander, supra note 8, at 17–18.

68 For recent overviews of this crisis of faith see Kyriakakis, J., ‘Corporations before International Criminal Courts: Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project’, (2017) 30 LJIL 221, at 224CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff; Guilfoyle, D., ‘This is not fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble’, EJIL Talk!, 21–25Google Scholar March 2019 (a three-part series of posts), available at www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/; T. Cruvellier, ‘Mark Drumbl: “Law Cannot Solve the Biggest Problems We Face”’, Justiceinfo.net, 16 July 2019, available at www.justiceinfo.net/en/justiceinfo-comment-and-debate/in-depthinterviews/41932-mark-drumbl-law-cannot-solve-the-biggest-problems-we-face.html (accessed 23 July 2019).

69 Amann, supra note 9, at 132. See similarly Cockayne, J., ‘Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies’, (2005) 4 Journal of Human Rights 455, at 462CrossRefGoogle Scholar; deGuzman, supra note 41, at 278; Glasius and Meijers, supra note 47, at 252; Fisher, supra note 20, at 65.

70 See, in this regard, Damaška, supra note 31, at 348 (acknowledging in general terms that while circumstances exist in which ‘global horizons of concern clearly should prevail’, nonetheless ‘the importance of considering local responses to the decisions of international criminal courts can hardly be overemphasised’). At least in terms of categories of culpability, however, some scholars have begun to outline specific avenues for the judicial development of a more pluralistic form of international criminal law, one informed by a heightened sensitivity to different local cultural contexts. See, for example, I. Mann, supra note 52 (putting forward a version of international criminal law which ‘recognises the reality of global cultural and moral difference, without relinquishing the discipline’s commitment to account for the worse of crimes’); W. L. Cheah, ‘Courts as Cross-cultural Translators: An Expressivist Analysis of the Judicial Accommodation of Cultural Evidence in International Criminal Law Trials’, paper presented at 2018 European Society of International Law Annual Conference, 13–15 September 2018, Manchester University (manuscript on file with the author) (arguing that international criminal courts should act as ‘cross-cultural translators that accommodate, rather than ignore or dismiss, cultural evidence’ and suggesting that the language of international criminal law ‘has the potential and flexibility to accommodate different cultural perspectives’).

71 Sloane, supra note 13, at 84.

72 deGuzman, supra note 41, at 319 (acknowledging that ‘[t]here is no guarantee that the dialogic process … will succeed in generating consensus over time’ and that ‘[t]he various audiences may simply disagree about the norms the ICC should promote’).

73 Ibid., (noting the advantages of ‘transparency about values … and the open debate it engenders’ if a dialogic approach to prosecutorial discretion were adopted in practice at the ICC). See also C. Laverty, ‘What lies beneath? The turn to values in international criminal legal discourse’, EJIL Talk!, 23 April 2018 (arguing that ‘inquiring into exactly what norms and values may be articulated by prosecutions for particular crimes would seem critical for a better understanding of what international criminal justice is actually doing, or has the potential to do’), available at www.ejiltalk.org/what-lies-beneath-the-turn-to-values-in-international-criminal-legal-discourse/ (accessed 23 July 2019).

74 See, for example, Whiting, A., ‘Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court’, (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 163Google Scholar.

75 See generally Ford, S., ‘A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms’, (2012) 45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 405Google Scholar; Milanović, M., ‘Establishing the Facts about Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to Persuade Target Audiences’, (2016) 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1321Google Scholar; Milanović, M., ‘Courting Failure: When are International Criminal Courts Likely to be Believed by Local Audiences?’, in Heller, K. J. et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal LawGoogle Scholar (forthcoming).

76 Noor, M. et al., ‘When Suffering Begets Suffering: The Psychology of Competitive Victimhood Between Adversarial Groups in Violent Conflicts’, (2012) 16 Personality & Social Psychology Review 351, at 352CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 Fletcher, L. E. and Weinstein, H. M., ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, (2002) 24 HRQ 573, at 588CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 A number of empirical studies have confirmed this trend. See, for example, with respect to the ICTY, Milanović, M., ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Postmortem’, (2016) 110 AJIL 233CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79 Clark, J. N., ‘The Impact Question: The ICTY and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace’, in Swart, B., Zahar, A. and Sluiter, G. (eds.), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2011), 55, at 76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 See generally Henry, N., War and Rape: Law, Memory and Justice (2011), 119–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Milanović (2016), supra note 75, at 1330–6.

81 See, for example, Ramulić, E., ‘Victims’ Perspectives’, in Steinberg, R. H. (ed.), Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (2011), 103, at 105Google Scholar; HodžiJunkć, R., ‘A Long Road Yet to Reconciliation: The Impact of the ICTY on Reconciliation and Victims’ Perceptions of Criminal Justice’, in Steinberg, R. H. (ed.), Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (2011), 115, at 117Google Scholar; Klarin, M., ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia’, (2009) 7 JICJ 89, at 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 van den Herik, L., ‘International Criminal Law as a Spotlight and Black Holes as Constituents of Legacy’, (2016) 110 AJIL Unbound 209, at 210Google Scholar. See similarly Douglas, L., ‘The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom’, (2006) 14 European Review 513, at 515–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the historical function of international criminal courts, see generally Sander, B., ‘History on Trial: Historical Narrative Pluralism Within and Beyond International Criminal Courts’, (2018) 67 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 547CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sander, B., ‘Unveiling the Historical Function of International Criminal Courts: Between Adjudicative and Sociopolitical Justice’, (2018) 12 International Journal of Transitional Justice 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sander, B., ‘The Method is the Message: Law, Narrative Authority and Historical Contestation in International Criminal Courts’, (2018) 19 Melbourne Journal of International Law 299Google Scholar.

83 Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 55, at 241–7.

84 See, for example, Dembour, M.-B. and Haslam, E., ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, (2004) 15 EJIL 151CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fletcher, L. E., ‘Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International Criminal Court’, inde Vos, C. et al. (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practices of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015), 302CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schwöbel-Patel, C., ‘Spectacle in International Criminal Law: The Fundraising Image of Victimhood’, (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 Vasiliev, S., ‘Victim Participation Revisited – What the ICC is Learning about Itself ’, in Stahn, C. (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015), 1133, at 1185Google Scholar.

86 van den Wyngaert, C., ‘Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’, (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475, at 477Google Scholar.

87 Stolk, S., ‘The Victim, the International Criminal Court and the Search for Truth: On the Interdependence and Incompatibility of Truths about Mass Atrocity’, (2015) 13 JICJ 973, at 984 and 989CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Elander, M., ‘The Victim’s Address: Expressivism and the Victim at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, (2013) 7 IJTJ 95, at 110–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 Skillen, A. J., ‘How to Say Things with Walls’, (1980) 55 Philosophy 509, at 513CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis in original).

89 See, in this regard, M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison (1991), 194 (‘We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces: it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’).

90 See similarly Miller, Z., ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice’, (2008) 2 IJTJ 266, at 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buss, D., ‘Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law’, (2011) 11 ICLR 409, at 411CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Löytömäki, S., Law and the Politics of Memory: Confronting the Past (2014), at 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Golder, B., ‘Beyond redemption? Problematising the critique of human rights in contemporary international legal thought’, (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 77, at 83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91 Kendall, S., ‘Critical orientations: a critique of international criminal court practice’Google Scholar, in Schwöbel, supra note 45, 54, at 56.

92 Fletcher, G. P., ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1499, at 1514CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See similarly Drumbl, supra note 24, at 153 (referring to a ‘retributive shortfall’); Ainley, K., ‘Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics’, (2011) 25 Ethics & International Affairs 407, at 412CrossRefGoogle Scholar (referring to ‘excesses of responsibility’).

93 Krever, T., ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’, (2013) 26 LJIL 701, at 722CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis in original). See similarly Tallgren, I., ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, (2002) 13 EJIL 561, 593–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baars, G., ‘Making ICL history: On the need to move beyond pre-fab critiques of ICL’Google Scholar, in Schwöbel, supra note 45, 196, at 206; Z. Miller, ‘Anti-Impunity Politics in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, in K. Engle et al., supra note 6, 149, at 169.

94 See, for example, Kalpouzos, I. and Mann, I., ‘Banal Crimes Against Humanity: The Case of Asylum Seekers in Greece’, (2015) 16 MJIL 1, at 1–4Google Scholar; Kiyani, A., ‘International Crime and the Politics of Criminal Theory: Voices and Conduct of Exclusion’, (2015) 48 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law & Politics 129, 183Google Scholar ff; Miller, supra note 93, at 169.

95 See, for example, Krever, supra note 93, at 715–22; Mamdani, M., ‘Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Significance of the Post-apartheid Transition in South Africa’, (2015) 43 Politics & Society 61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; V. Nesiah, ‘Doing History with Impunity’, in K. Engle et al., supra note 6, at 95.

96 See, for example, Simpson, G., ‘International criminal justice and the past’, in Boas, G. et al. (eds.), International Criminal Justice: Legitimacy and Coherence (2012), 123, at 144CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nouwen, S. M. H., ‘Legal Equality on Trial: Sovereign and Individuals before the International Criminal Court’, (2012) 43 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 151CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bosco, D., Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (2014), at 184–7Google Scholar; Cowell, F., ‘Inherent Imperialism: Understanding the Legal Roots of Anti-Imperialist Criticism of the International Criminal Court’, (2017) 15 JICJ 667CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 Hillebrecht, C. and Straus, S., ‘Who Pursues the Perpetrators? State Cooperation with the ICC’, (2017) 39 HRQ 162, at 167–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 Kiyani, A., ‘Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity’, (2016) 14 JICJ 939, at 955CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See similarly Nouwen, S. M. H. and Werner, W., ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’, (2010) 21 EJIL 941CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Branch, A., ‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention’, (2007) 21 Ethics and International Affairs 179CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tiemessen, A., ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions’, (2014) 18 International Journal of Human Rights 444; Mégret, F., ‘Is the ICC Focusing Too Much on Non-State Actors?’, in deGuzman, M. M. and Amann, D. M. (eds.), Arcs of Global Justice (2018), 173Google Scholar.

99 Krever, supra note 93, at 718.

100 Kiyani, supra note 98, at 952.

101 A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (2011), at 206.

102 Ibid., at 186.

103 Milanović (forthcoming), supra note 75.

104 See, for example, Schwöbel, supra note 2; Mégret, F., ‘The Anxieties of International Criminal Justice’, (2016) 29 LJIL 197CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 See, for example, Drumbl, supra note 24; Ajevski, M., ‘International Criminal Law and Constitutionalisation: On Hegemonic Narratives in Progress’, (2013) 6 Erasmus Law Review 50, at 578Google Scholar; Schwöbel, C., ‘The market and marketing culture of international criminal law’Google Scholar, in Schwöbel, supra note 45, 264, at 267–8; Nouwen and Werner, supra note 3.

106 Koller, D., ‘… and New York and The Hague and Tokyo and Geneva and Nuremberg and … The Geographies of International Law’, (2012) 23 EJIL 97, at 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘By introducing new voices, crits … identify where the law has failed to meet the needs of the excluded and chart a desired path for new progress’). See also C. Schwöbel, ‘Introduction’, in Schwöbel, supra note 45, 1, at 6 (describing critique as a political project).

107 See similarly in the field of human rights O’Connell, P., ‘Human Rights: Contesting the Displacement Thesis’, (2018) 69 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 19Google Scholar; O’Connell, P., ‘On the Human Rights Question’, (2018) 40 HRQ 962CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 See, however, McAuliffe, P. and Schwöbel-Patel, C., ‘Disciplinary Matchmaking: Critics of International Criminal Law Meet Critics of Liberal Peacebuilding’, (2019) Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 985CrossRefGoogle Scholar (examining what structural critiques of international criminal law and liberal peacekeeping may learn from each other, including the power of law and its institutions for ‘tactical radical purposes’).

109 Rajagopal, B., ‘The International Human Rights Movement Today’, (2009) 24 Maryland Journal of International Law 56, at 56Google Scholar.

110 H. Duffy, Strategic Human Rights Litigation: Understanding and Maximising Impact (2018), at 3.

111 Ibid., at 41 and 46. See also Kaleck, W., ‘Seizing opportunities and broad strategy both essential in human rights litigation’, Open Global Rights, 26 February 2019, available at www.openglobalrights.org/seizing-opportunities-and-broad-strategy-both-essentialin-human-rights-litigation/ (accessed 23 July 2019)Google Scholar.

112 Fairlie, M. A., ‘The Hidden Costs of Strategic Communications for the International Criminal Court’, (2016) 51 Texas International Law Journal 281, at 283Google Scholar. Fairlie’s deployment of the term ‘strategic’ is, therefore, relatively narrow, excluding communications submitted to the ICC that are made with the genuine aim of securing action from the Court. See also Fairlie, M. A., ‘A Newly-Revealed Cost of Article 15 Communications’, IntLawGrrls, 29 June 2018Google Scholar, available at ilg2.org/2018/06/29/a-newly-revealed-cost-of-article-15-communications/ (accessed 23 July 2019). The notion of strategy has also appeared in discussions of ‘lawfare’ in the international criminal context, though typically with a narrow focus on the political agendas of states and the UN Security Council. See, for example, A. Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the lawfare of judicial intervention’, (2016) 30 International Relations 409, at 414 (defining ‘lawfare’ in the ICC context as ‘the coercive and strategic element of international criminal justice in which the ICC’s judicial interventions are used as a tool of lawfare for States Parties and the UNSC to pursue political ends’); K. J. Fisher and C. Stefan, G., ‘The Ethics of International Criminal ‘Lawfare’’, (2016)Google Scholar International Criminal Law Review 237, at 243 (defining ‘international criminal lawfare’ as ‘the use of international criminal judicial interventions as a tool for states, parties to conflict, and other interested actors, including the UNSC, to pursue political ends’).

113 For an examination of the different levels of impact that strategic litigation may contribute towards, see generally Duffy,supra note 110, at Ch. 4 (outlining eight levels of impact: on victims, law, policy and practice, institutions, information gathering and truth telling, social and cultural change, mobilization and empowerment, and democracy and the rule of law).

114 Knox, R., ‘Strategy and Tactics’, (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 193, at 227Google Scholar. For a recent example of reliance on the strategy-tactics distinction in the international law context, see C. Schwöbel, ‘Populism, International Law and the End of Keep Calm and Carry on Lawyering’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (forthcoming).

115 Reynolds, J., ‘Anti-Colonial Legalities: Paradigms, Tactics & Strategy’, (2015) 18 Palestinian Yearbook of International Law 8, at 35Google Scholar.

116 Knox, R., ‘What is to be Done (with Critical Legal Theory)?’, (2011) 22 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 31, at 44Google Scholar (explaining how legal tactics may be ‘dictated by a broader political logic, which may at times be unconventional or even counterproductive in legal terms’) (emphasis added); Duffy, supra note 110, at 41 (‘What we explore then may be not so much whether litigation provided a solution (which will only rarely be the case, given the broad-reaching social or political problems that underpin many rights violations), nor whether change is caused by or attributable to it; rather we should consider the contribution – perhaps indirect and gradual – that litigation may have made alongside and in relationship with other processes and factors’) (emphasis in original). See also Knox, supra note 114, at 227–8 (‘actualising strategic concerns does not necessarily mean jettisoning practical interventions in everyday legal struggles, but rather framing these struggles in terms of the overall strategic goal’) (emphasis added).

117 See also S. Vasiliev, ‘The Crises and Critiques of International Criminal Justice’, in K. J. Heller et al., The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (forthcoming), at 19 (noting how critical voices in the field rarely demand the dismantling of the system of international criminal justice and ‘still deploy it to promote a specific agenda – for example, in strategic litigation – albeit without a true attachment to the discipline’).

118 GLAN and Stanford International Human Rights Clinic, ‘The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes Against Humanity in the Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers’, Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, 13 February 2017, available at law.stanford.edu/publications/communique-to-the-office-of-the-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court-under-article-15-of-the-rome-statute-the-situation-in-nauru-and-manus-island-liability-for-crimes-against-humanity/ (accessed 23 July 2019).

119 Ibid., at 114.

120 Ibid.

121 Kalpouzos and Mann, supra note 94, at 5.

122 GLAN and Stanford International Human Rights Clinic, supra note 118, at 115.

123 Kalpouzos and Mann, supra note 94, at 4. See similarly Kyriakakis, supra note 68, at 230–7.

124 Several of the signatories to the communication have conducted highly critical examinations of the ICC in their academic capacity.

125 ‘The Refugee Crisis and International Criminal Law’, City University of London, 13 February 2017, available at echo360.org.uk/media/825021ac-6d90-4b4e-a9fa-a9b4a02ba001/public (accessed 16 April 2018).

126 Ibid., at 1 hour 28 minutes.

127 Ibid., at 57 minutes.

128 Ibid., at 1 hour 28 minutes. For media coverage of the communication see B. Doherty, ‘International Criminal Court told Australia’s detention regime could be a crime against humanity’, Guardian, 13 February 2017; R. Hamilton, ‘Australia’s Refugee Policy Is A Crime Against Humanity’, Foreign Policy, 23 February 2017. See also, Jacobs, D., ‘Jumping Hurdles Backwards: The Armenian Genocide and the International Criminal Court’, (2014) International Criminal Law Review 274, at 288–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘because legal claims are but one dimension of Armenian strategies for recognition and reparations, legal action need not necessarily be premised on the chances of success. In this sense, one should not underestimate the symbolic dimension of approaching the ICC with the matter, despite the near certainty of actual failure … Indeed, addressing the Court will create a considerable amount of media attention that will necessarily keep the spotlight on the issue and be an additional tool of pressure for the Armenians’).

129 ‘The Refugee Crisis and International Criminal Law’, supra note 125, at 1 hour 23 minutes. See also Duffy, supra note 110, at 44 (observing how the failure of strategic litigation in the courtroom may still serve the function of ‘exposing to public criticism and international scrutiny the extent of the denial of justice, or paving the way for … other forms of pressure’); Deeks, A., ‘The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference’, (2013) 82 Fordham Law Review 827, at 830Google Scholar (examining the application in the legal field of the ‘observer effect’, namely ‘the changes that an act of observation makes on the phenomenon being observed’).

130 O’Connell, P., ‘Human Rights: Contesting the Displacement Thesis’, Critical Legal Thinking, 18 June 2015, available at criticallegalthinking.com/?s=Human+Rights%3A+Contesting+the+Displacement+Thesis (accessed 23 July 2019).Google Scholar See also Stewart, J. G., ‘Towards Synergies in Forms of Corporate Accountability for International Crimes’, Blog of J.G. Stewart, 23 February 2019Google Scholar (discussing ‘possibilities of synergistic accountability’).

131 For further examples of proactive strategic interventions in the field of international criminal justice, see M. Kersten, ‘Making a Distinction: the Rome Statute is not the ICC: it is much more than that’, Justice in Conflict, 17 July 2018 (discussing the strategic deployment of the Rome Statute at the domestic level in India and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), available at justiceinconflict.org/?s=making+a+distinction (accessed 23 July 2019).

132 Branch, A., ‘Dominic Ongwen on Trial: The ICC’s African Dilemmas’, (2017) 11 IJTJ 30, at 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

133 Ibid.

134 Knox, supra note 114, at 225.

135 J. Vergès, De La Stratégie Judiciaire (1968), 104, cited in and translated by Knox, supra note 114, at 225. For a similar strategy utilized by dissenting judges see N. Jain, ‘Radical Dissents in International Criminal Trials’, (2017) 28 EJIL 1163.

136 Lugano, G., ‘Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya’, (2017) 11 IJTJ 9, at 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

137 Ibid.

138 On TWAIL perspectives on international criminal justice, see generally Kiyani, supra note 94; and the papers that comprise the TWAIL Symposium in (2016) JICJ 915–1009.

139 Kyriakakis, supra note 68.

140 Reynolds, J. and Xavier, S., ‘“The Dark Corners of the World”, TWAIL and International Criminal Justice’, (2016) 14 JICJ 959, at 981CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

141 Kyriakakis, supra note 68, at 238–9; Reynolds and Xavier, supra note 140, at 982–3.

142 Mamdani, supra note 95.

143 Ibid., at 80–1.

144 Ibid., at 81.

145 Ibid., at 81–2.

146 Duffy, supra note 110, at 5.

147 See generally Duffy, supra note 110, at 5 and 77–80; Fairlie, supra note 112, at 291–8.

148 See generally Duffy, supra note 110, at 39–45 and Ch. 10.

149 See, in this regard, Houge, A. B. and Lohne, K., ‘End Impunity! Reducing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence to a Problem of Law’, (2017) 51 Law & Society Review 755, at 780–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar (identifying challenges of framing and communicating conflict-related sexual violence as a complex phenomenon within advocacy network strategies).

150 On the growing interest in creating hybrid courts in the field of international criminal justice, see generally Kersten, M., ‘Hybrid Justice – A Justice in Conflict Symposium’, Justice in Conflict, 12 March 2018, available at justiceinconflict.org/2018/03/12/hybrid-justice-a-justice-in-conflict-symposium/ (accessed 23 July 2019)Google Scholar. On the growing practice of investigating and trying violations of international criminal law on the basis of universal jurisdiction before domestic courts, see generally Langer, M. and Eason, M., ‘The Quiet Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction’, (forthcoming) European Journal of International LawGoogle Scholar. On the increasingly ‘outside-the-box’ thinking required to advance international criminal justice efforts given political constraints at the international level, see generally Cannock, M., ‘International Justice Trends in Microcosm at the OPCW – Three Observations as States Adopt “Attribution Mechanism”’, Amnesty International, 27 July 2018, available at hrij.amnesty.nl/three-observations-as-states-adopt-attribution-mechanism/ (accessed 23 July 2019)Google Scholar.