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The control of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights over amnesty laws and other exemption measures: Legitimacy assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2020

Juan Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo
Juan Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo*
Affiliation:
PluriCourts, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo; Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, University of Jyväskylä (Finland) Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) seminally found self-amnesty laws on serious human rights violations to be null and void. However, later national reactions showed that this supranational control has faced challenges. Such supranational judicial authority has been exercised where amnesty laws and other exemption measures blocked judicial cases, democratic referendums upheld legislation, and peace-making processes existed.

This article seeks to determine whether the traditionally interventionist jurisprudence of the IACtHR on amnesty laws/exemption measures has been legitimate under global constitutionalism standards. The standards considered are: human rights, namely, rights of victims of mass atrocities; consistency or coherence of this jurisprudence with international, regional and national practices; and democratic legitimacy and/or accountability considerations.

Victim rights have underlain the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on amnesty laws and similar measures. Importantly, developments on victim rights are not exclusive to the IACtHR as case law of other supranational human rights bodies evidences. Among human rights courts and bodies, the IACtHR has exercised the highest level of control over amnesty laws/exemption measures, even nullifying national legislation. However, the IACtHR’s case law shares common principles with UN/regional jurisprudential developments and domestic practices in terms of inadmissibility of amnesties and other exemption measures in cases of serious abuses. Unlike the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the IACtHR has not deferred to sovereign state appreciation (conventionality control doctrine). Nevertheless, the IACtHR has arguably begun to move towards more ‘moderated’ approaches. This is advisable under democratic legitimacy considerations.

Keywords

amnestiescontroldemocracyInter-American Court of Human Rights
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 667 - 687
Copyright
© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2020

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Footnotes

*

Post-Doctoral Fellow/Lecturer (University of Jyväskylä); Guest Researcher (PluriCourts, University of Oslo). Article funded by the Research Council of Norway: Project Number 223274 – PluriCourts: The Legitimacy of the International Judiciary; and the Max Planck Society (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law). Article prepared when the author was a fellow at PluriCourts, Law Faculty, University of Oslo.

References

1 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C., No. 75.

2 D. Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’, in J. Dunoff and M. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (2012), 321, at 326–7; I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005), 18–19; S. Langvatn and T. Squatrito, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’, in N. Hayashi and C. Bailliet (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017), 41, at 43.

3 Bodansky, ibid., at 327.

4 Langvatn and Squatrito, supra note 2, at 51–2.

5 A. Wiener et al., ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, (2009) 1 Global Constitutionalism 1, at 1.

6 See E. de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’, (2006) 19 LJIL 611.

7 Report of the Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004), para. 6.

8 Grossman, N., ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’, (2013) 86 Temple Law Review 61, at 65Google Scholar.

9 Ibid., at 105.

10 Ibid., at 103.

11 G. Ulfstein, ‘The International Judiciary’, in J. Klabbers et al. (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2011), 126, at 126–8.

12 A. Føllesdal, ‘Constitutionalization, Not Democratization: How to Assess the Legitimacy of International Courts’, in N. Grossman et al. (eds.), Legitimacy and International Courts (2018), 307, at 330.

13 Ulfstein, supra note 11, at 62.

14 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 7, paras. 6, 37, 64(e).

15 T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), 147–8.

16 Ulftsein, supra note 11, at 135–42.

17 Grossman, supra note 8, at 103.

18 Ibid., at 104.

19 M. Andenas, ‘Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation to Convergence in International Law’, (2015) 46 Georgetown Journal of International Law 685, at 692; B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, (2009) 20 EJIL 265, at 267.

20 Ibid.

21 E.g., C. Binder, ‘The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1203, at 1218–26; L. Mallinder, ‘The End of Amnesty or Regional Overreach? Interpreting the Erosion of South America’s Amnesty Law’, (2016) 65 International and Comparatively Law Quarterly 645, at 658.

22 See H. Cohen et al., ‘Legitimacy and International Courts – A Framework’, in Grossman et al., supra note 12, at 7–8.

23 See ibid., at 8.

24 Føllesdal, supra note 12, at 325.

25 See J. Pauwelyn and M. Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals’, in Dunoff and Pollack, supra note 2, at 445–73.

26 A. von-Bogdandy and I. Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (2014), 28.

27 M. Sellers, ‘Democracy, Justice and the Legitimacy of International Courts’, in Grossman et al., supra note 12, at 342.

28 See Føllesdal, supra note 12, at 307–37.

29 A. Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’, in Klabbers et al., supra note 11, at 264; Wiener et al., supra note 5, at 3, 10.

30 Ulfstein, supra note 11, at 75.

31 T. Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement’, in G. Fox and B. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (2009), 25, at 31.

32 Ulfstein, supra note 11, at 150.

33 Ibid.

34 Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment no 12-P/2016, 19 April 2016.

35 Venezuelan Supreme Court, Judgment, File No. 08-1572, 9 December 2008.

36 G. Ulfstein, ‘Institutions and Competences’, in Klabbers et al., supra note 11, at 45, 57.

37 Barrios Altos, supra note 1, para. 42.

38 Ibid., para. 43.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., para. 47.

41 Ibid., paras. 48–9.

42 Almonacid Arrellano v. Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C., No. 154, para. 110.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., paras. 127–8.

45 Ibid., para. 145.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., para. 148.

48 Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil, Judgment of 24 November 2010, paras. 126–82.

49 Ibid., para. 139.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., para. 172.

52 Ibid., para. 173.

53 E.g., Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 August 2001, [2001] ECHR 330; Kelly and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 August 2001, [2001] ECHR 328. See also J. C. Ochoa, The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations (2013), 122–31.

54 E.g., Edwards and Edwards v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 March 2002, [2002] ECHR 303, para. 70.

55 E.g., Orhan v. Turkey, Application No. 25656/94, Judgment of 18 June 2002, paras. 346, 348.

56 E.g., Edwards and Edwards, supra note 54, paras. 84, 87; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment of 7 January 2010, 51 EHRR 1, para. 286.

57 Ochoa, supra note 53, at 130.

58 Kelly and Others, supra note 53, para. 115.

59 Gul v. Turkey, Judgment of 14 December 2000, (2002) 34 EHRR 719, para. 93.

60 Ibid., para. 118; Ogur v. Turkey, Application No. 21594/93, Judgment of 20 May 1999, ECHR 1999-III, para. 92.

61 Ibid.

62 Slimani v. France, Judgment of 27 July 2004, 43 EHRR 1068, para. 47.

63 Kelly and Others, supra note 53, para. 128.

64 Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 19 February 1998, [2000] ECHR 129, para. 107.

65 Perez v. France, Judgment of 12 February 2004, ECHR 2004-I, paras. 62–3.

66 Ochoa, supra note 53, at 127.

67 HCMA. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 213/1986, Views, 3 April 1989, para. 11.6; Vicente et al. v. Colombia, Communication No. 612/1995, Views, 14 June 1994.

68 HRC, Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988, Views, 19 July 1994, para. 14; CAT, Abdulrahman Kabura v. Burundi, Communication No. 549/2013, Views, 11 November 2016, para. 7(5).

69 HRC, Aliboev v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 985/2001, Views, 18 October 2005, paras. 6–7.

70 CAT, Guridi v. Spain, Communication No. 212/2002, Views, 24 May 2005, paras. 6.3–6.8.

71 CED, Estela-Deolinda Yrusta/Alejandra del-Valle-Yrusta v. Argentina, Communication No. 1/2013, Views, 12 April 2016, paras. 10(9), 12.

72 HRC, Angel Olo-Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 468/1991, Views, 20 October 1993, para. 9.4.

73 Guridi, supra note 70, paras. 6.3–6.8; HRC, Laureano-Atachahua v. Peru, Communication No. 540/1993, Views, 16 April 1996, para. 10; CED, Estela-Deolinda Yrusta/Alejandra del-Valle-Yrusta, supra note 71, para. 12.

74 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985.

75 HRC, Rodríguez v. Uruguay, supra note 68, para. 12.4.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., para. 14.

78 General Comment 20, UN Doc. A/44/40, 10 March 1992, para. 15; General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 29 March 2004, para. 18.

79 Guridi, supra note 70, paras. 6.6–6.7.

80 Ibid., para. 8.

81 Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005.

82 Ibid., Principles 24(a) and 19.

83 Ibid., Principle 24(b).

84 Marguš v. Croatia, Judgment of 27 May 2014, [2014] ECHR 523, para. 127.

85 Ibid., para. 139.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., para. 140.

88 Lexa v. Slovakia, Judgment of 23 September 2008, [2008] ECHR, paras. 94–5.

89 Ibid., paras. 96–9, 139.

90 Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey, Application No. 32446/96, Judgment of 2 November 2004, paras. 55, 61; Taylan v. Turkey, Application No. 32051/09, Judgment of 3 July 2012, para. 45 and operative paragraph 3.

91 Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, Application No. 25091/07, Judgment of 26 April 2011, para. 274.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid., para. 275 and operative paragraph 3.

94 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Communication No. 245/02, Decision, 21 May 2006, paras. 211, 215; MIDH v. Ivory Coast, Communication No. 246/2002, Decision, 29 July 2008, paras. 97–8.

95 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, T.Ch., 10 December 1998, para. 155.

96 Ibid.

97 Prosecutor v. Kallon/Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction, SCSL-2004-15-PT/SCSL-2004-16-PT, A.Ch., 13 March 2004, paras. 66–74.

98 Ibid., para. 85.

99 Ibid., para. 82.

100 Case 002, Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, T.Ch., 3 November 2011, paras. 37–53.

101 Ibid., para. 53

102 Ibid.

103 E.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Review Concerning Reduction of Sentence, ICC-01/04-01/06-3173, A.Ch., 22 September 2015.

104 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3615, A.Ch., 13 November 2015.

105 F. Lessa et al., ‘Persistent or Eroding Impunity? The Divergent Effects of Legal Challenges to Amnesty Laws for Past Human Rights Violations’, (2014) 47 Israel Law Review 105, at 106–11; Mallinder, supra note 21, at 673–6.

106 Ibid.

107 A. Reiter, ‘Examining the Use of Amnesties and Pardons as a Response to Internal Armed Conflict’, (2014) 47 Israel Law Review 133, at 146.

108 J. Elster, Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (2006), 188–215.

109 Available at ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule159.

110 Law 27156 (2015).

111 Law on Amnesty (1999).

112 Penal Code (2009).

113 Penal Code (2010).

114 Justice and Peace Law (2005).

115 Ordinance on a Collective Pardon (2010).

116 Constitution (2008), Art. 80.

117 Constitution (1994), Art. 28(1).

118 National Reconciliation Law (1996).

119 Amnesty Law (2003).

120 Proclamation 1377 (2007).

121 Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (1998).

122 Decree No. 5544 (1992).

123 Legislative Decree No. 2011-1 (2011).

124 Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006).

125 Constitution (2009), Art. 29; Law of General Political Amnesty (2000).

126 Supreme Court, Julio Mazzeo et al., Judgment, 13 July 2007.

127 Supreme Court, Claudio Lecaros-Carrasco, 18 May 2010.

128 E.g., Constitutional Court, C-370/06, Judgment, 18 May 2006.

129 E.g., Court of Cassation, Aussareses, Judgment, 17 June 2003.

130 Supreme Court, Hernandez Santos, 18 January 1996.

131 Supreme Court, Nibia Sabalsagaray-Curutchet, 19 October 2009.

132 See Binder, supra note 21, at 1218–26

133 Mallinder, supra note 21, at 657–8.

134 Federal Regional Tribunal-2nd Region, Antonio-Waneir Pinheiro-Lima, 14 August 2019. See also A. Gurmendi, ‘At Long Last, Brazil’s Amnesty Law Is Declared Anti-Conventional’, Opinio Juris, 16 August 2019, available at opiniojuris.org/2019/08/16/at-long-last-brazils-amnesty-law-is-declared-anti-conventional/.

135 See S.T.F., 2008/148623, 29 April 2010, 180, Diario do Judiciario, 19 September 2011.

136 Court of Cassation, 23 October 2002, Bull. Crim. 2002, No. 195.

137 Audiencia Nacional, Pinochet, Judgment, 5 November 1998.

138 District Court (The Hague), Public Prosecutor v. F, 09/75001-06, 25 June 2007.

139 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (2005).

140 Law on Outlawing the Group of Democratic Kampuchea (1994).

141 Law relating to Amnesty (1994).

142 Lome Peace Accord (1999).

143 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995); AZAPO v. the President of the Republic of South Africa, Case CCT 17/96, 25 July 1996.

144 Constitutional Court, Kwoyelo v. Uganda, Ruling on Petition 036/11, 22 September 2011.

145 M. Jachtenfuchs and N. Krisch, ‘Subsidiarity in Global Governance’, (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 1, at 3.

146 A. Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights-Or Neither?’, (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 147, at 148; M. Kumm, ‘Sovereignty and the Right to Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-Sensitive Externalities, and the Proper Domain of the Consent Requirement in International Law’, (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 239; J. Contesse, ‘Contestation and Deferrence’, (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems, 123, at 125–6.

147 A. Cançado-Trindade, El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos en el Siglo XXI (2001), 386–7.

148 Almonacid Arrellano, supra note 42, para. 124.

149 Gelman v. Uruguay, Order of 20 March 2013, para. 66.

150 A. Dulitzky, ‘An Inter-American Constitutional Court? The Invention of the Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2015) 50 Texas International Law Journal 45, at 52.

151 Ibid., at 52–64.

152 See ibid.; J. Contesse, ‘The international authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights-a critique of the conventionality control doctrine’, (2017) 21 International Journal of Human Rights 1, at 7–11.

153 2008/148623, supra note 135, para. 42.

154 Gomes Lund, supra note 48, para. 177.

155 Dulitzky, supra note 150, at 69.

156 A. Føllesdal, ‘Exporting the margin of appreciation: Lessons for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 359, at 360–2; Contesse, supra note 146, at 127–8, 134.

157 Gelman v. Uruguay, Judgment of 24 February 2011, Series C., No. 221, para. 312(6).

158 Ibid., para. 312(11).

159 Ibid., paras. 238–9.

160 R. Gargarella, ‘No Place for Popular Sovereignty? Democracy, Rights, and Punishment in Gelman v. Uruguay’, 2013, 7, 11, available at digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=yls_sela.

161 Ibid., at 7–13.

162 Ibid., at 14.

163 Ibid., at 36.

164 Føllesdal, supra note 156, at 360, 369. See also Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, [1976] ECHR, paras. 4, 49–50.

165 Føllesdal, supra note 156, at 369–71.

166 See Mallinder, supra note 21, at 662–8; N. Tseretelli, ‘Emerging doctrine of deference of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights?’, (2016) 20 International Journal of Human Rights, at 1097–112.

167 Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Judgment of 26 November 2008, Series C., No. 190, paras. 89–90; Garcia-Lucero et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 28 August 2013, Series C., No. 267, paras. 152–3.

168 La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment of 11 May 2007, Series C., No. 163, paras. 192–3.

169 El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador, Concurring Opinion of Judge García-Sayán-Judgment, 25 October 2012, Series C., No. 252, para. 4.

170 Fujimori, Judgment, 7 April 2009, para. 823.

171 Barrios Altos and La Cantuta v. Peru, Resolution of 30 May 2018, paras. 64, 68 (author’s translation).

172 Ibid., para. 70 (author’s translation).

173 Ibid., paras. 36–53.

174 Ibid., para. 69 (author’s translation).

175 J. Contesse, ‘Case of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta v. Peru’, (2019) 113 American Journal of International Law, at 568, 574.

176 L. Cornejo, J. Perez-Leon-Acevedo and J. Garcia-Godos, ‘The Presidential Pardon of Fujimori: Political Struggles in Peru and the Subsidiary Role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2019) 13 International Journal of Transitional Justice, at 342, 348.

177 Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, supra note 171, para. 64 (author’s translation).

178 Ibid., para. 71(4).

179 Resolution 10, Case 00006-2001-4-5001-SU-PE-01, 3 October 2018.

180 See elcomercio.pe/politica/alberto-fujimori-53-desaprueba-anulacion-indulto-encuesta-comercio-ipsos-noticia-567562.

181 Residents of the Village of Chichupac and Neighbouring Communities, Municipality of Rabinal, Molina Theissen and 12 Other Cases v. Guatemala, Provisional Measures and Supervision of Compliance Order, 12 March 2019, Operative para. 2.

182 Ibid., para. 39.

183 Residents of the Village of Chichupac et al., supra note 181, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Vio Grossi, at 8 (conclusion).

184 See above Section 5.1.