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Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on the ICC's Hierarchy of Liability Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2016

MARJOLEIN CUPIDO
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Abstract

On 7 March 2014, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted Germain Katanga for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Katanga's conviction is based on the concept of common purpose liability as regulated in Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. This liability theory establishes criminal responsibility for wilfully or knowingly contributing to the crimes of a group of persons who act together pursuant to a common purpose. The ICC regards common purpose liability as a residual liability theory, which provides for a lower level of blameworthiness than principal forms of criminal responsibility, such as joint perpetration. This article appraises the residual and inferior status of common purpose liability by comparing the ICC's application of common purpose liability and joint perpetration. The comparison makes clear that common purpose liability in theory stipulates lower actus reus and mens rea standards than joint perpetration. However, in practice the ICC applies the requirements of both these liability theories in a context-dependent way in interplay with the particular facts of individual cases. It can therefore not be concluded in general terms that common purpose liability by definition constitutes a less serious type of criminal responsibility than joint perpetration. Instead, it is preferable to adopt a flexible approach, which recognizes that common purpose liability covers a variety of conduct entailing different levels of blameworthiness.

Keywords

common purpose liabilityhierarchy of liability theoriesInternational Criminal Courtjoint perpetrationlaw in practice
Type
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 897 - 915
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2016 

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References

1 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, T.Ch. II, 7 March 2014 (hereinafter Katanga Trial Chamber judgment); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Sentencing judgment (article 76 of the Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07, T.Ch. II, 23 May 2014.

2 ‘Defence and Prosecution discontinue respective appeals against judgment in Katanga case’, 25 June 2014, available at www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1021.aspx (accessed 2 October 2015).

3 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90 (hereinafter Rome Statute), Art. 25(3)(d).

4 Prosecutor v. William Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01-09-01/11, P.T.Ch. II, 23 January 2012 (hereinafter Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision), para. 354.

5 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1638. In addition, see Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/06, P.T.Ch. I, 29 January 2007 (hereinafter Lubanga confirmation of charges decision), para. 337.

6 Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 337; Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, para. 354; Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1618. Eser even argues that common purpose liability is ‘superfluous, since the thresholds of aiding and abetting (. . .) are already so low that it is difficult to imagine many cases needing a special provisions such as subparagraph (d)’. Eser, A., ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 767 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 803.

7 The article does not address the concept of superior responsibility stipulated in Art. 28 of the Rome Statute. Whilst this liability theory addresses the liability of senior leaders, it establishes liability for omissions (failure to prevent or punish) and can therefore not be seen as a principal form of criminal responsibility.

8 Article 25(3) Rome Statute.

9 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06, A.Ch., 1 December 2014 (hereinafter Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment), para. 462.

10 Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/10, P.T.Ch. I, 16 December 2011 (hereinafter Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision), para. 279. Similarly, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06, T.Ch. I, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment), para. 999.

11 K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law (2013), Vol. I, 147. On this issue also see, Werle, G., ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, (2007) 5 JICJ 953, at 956–7Google Scholar; E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), 79–80; Werle, G. and Burghardt, B., ‘Indirect Perpetration: A Perfect Fit for International Prosecution of Armchair Killers?’, (2011) 9 JICJ 85 Google Scholar, at 88; Gil Gil, A. and Maculan, E., ‘Current Trends in the Definition of “Perpetrator” by the International Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case to the Katanga judgment’, (2015) 28 LJIL 349 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 363; Vest, H., ‘Problems of Participation – Unitarian, Differentiated Approach, or Something Else?’, (2014) 12 JICJ 295, at 296–7Google Scholar; Ambos, K., ‘The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues’, (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 115 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 141.

12 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 462. This view is not uncontested. See, e.g., Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1084–6; Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute – Concurring opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 (hereinafter Concurring opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert), paras. 22–30; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Separate opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter Separate opinion Judge Fulford), paras. 8–9.

13 Admittedly, case law on this point is less extensive and explicit as in relation to the hierarchical ordering of principals and accessories. Yet, as Vest notes, it seems fair to conclude that the ICC's approach goes beyond the distinction between perpetration and secondary participation by putting the forms of secondary participation in hierarchical order. Vest, supra note 11, at 305.

14 E.g., Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 337; Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, para. 354; Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 278.

15 Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, para. 354.

16 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, paras. 466, 473. For a scholarly analysis, see, e.g., Vest, supra note 11, at 296–8; Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 79–81; Ambos 2012, supra note 11, at 146; Ohlin, J.D. et al., ‘Assessing the Control-Theory’, (2013) 26 LJIL 725, at 742–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; van Sliedregt, E., ‘Perpetration and Participation in Article 25(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in Stahn, C. (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015), 499 Google Scholar at 508.

17 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 473; Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, paras. 330, 338; Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1396; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/07, P.T.Ch. I, 30 September 2008 (hereinafter Katanga and Chui confirmation of charges decision), para. 484. For a scholarly analysis of this issue, see, e.g., Weigend, T., ‘Perpetration trough an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept’, (2011) 9 JICJ 91, at 92–3Google Scholar; Ambos, K., ‘A Workshop, a Symposium and the Katanga Trial Judgment of 7 March 2014’, (2014) 12 JICJ 219, at 227–8Google Scholar; Van Sliedregt, supra note 16, at 508–9; Werle, supra note 11, at 962–3; Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 83–5.

18 Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 742. See also Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 79.

19 E.g., Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 742; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 363, 365–6; Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 66–8.

20 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1384.

21 E.g., Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 743; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 359; Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 86; Van Sliedregt, supra note 16, at 511–13.

22 Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 744.

23 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1387.

24 Concurring opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 12, para. 22.

25 Separate opinion Judge Fulford, supra note 12, para. 9.

26 Separate opinion Judge Fulford, supra note 12, para. 8. Similarly, Vest, supra note 11, at 305; Ambos, K., ‘The International Criminal Court and Common Purpose: What Contribution is Required Under Article 25(3)(d)?’, in Stahn, C. (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015), 592 Google Scholar at 607.

27 On this issue, see also Ambos 2013, supra note 11, at 147.

28 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 469; Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 346; Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, paras. 999–1000. Similarly, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-02/11, P.T.Ch. I, 11 December 2014 (hereinafter Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision), para. 135. For a critical view, see Separate opinion Judge Fulford, supra note 12, paras. 15–17; Concurring opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 12, paras. 40–8. For a scholarly reflection upon this issue, see, e.g., Weigend, T., ‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges’, (2008) 6 JICJ 471, at 478–80Google Scholar; Ambos 2012, supra note 11, at 140–1.

29 Weigend, supra note 28, at 480. Similarly, Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 357–9.

30 E.g., Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, paras. 1003–5; Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 330; Katanga and Chui confirmation of charges decision, supra note 17, para. 526; Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11, P.T.Ch. II, 23 January 2012 (hereinafter Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision), para. 402.

31 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, paras. 469, 1004; Katanga and Chui confirmation of charges decision, supra note 17, para. 526; Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 732.

32 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 1003. Similarly, Weigend, supra note 28, at 478–9; Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 99; Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 728. This is specifically so when joint perpetration is combined with indirect perpetration. In that case, the ‘essential contribution may consist of activating the mechanisms which lead to the automatic compliance with (. . .) orders and, thus, the commission of crimes’. E.g., Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision, supra note 30, para. 402.

33 Similarly, Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 732.

34 Article 25(3)(d) Rome Statute.

35 Ohlin, J.D., ‘Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, (2007) 5 JICJ 69 Google Scholar, at 79.

36 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, paras. 276–7.

37 Ibid., paras. 282–3. See also Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1632. The significant contribution test is not uncontested. In her separate opinion to the Mbarushimana Appeals Chamber decision on the confirmation of charges, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi argued that a quantitative standard like the significant contribution test is inappropriate for excluding normal economic and social activities from the scope of common purpose liability. She considered it more useful to adopt a qualitative criterion, which restricts criminal responsibility to contributions that increase the risk of criminal conduct. Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges” – Separate opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ICC-01/04-01/10, A.Ch., 30 May 2012. For a scholarly evaluation of this issue, see DeFalco, R.C., ‘Contextualizing Actus Reus under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute’, (2013) 11 JICJ 715 Google Scholar; Ambos, supra note 26, at 605.

38 Although the reasoning of the PTC is somewhat ambiguous, the PTC places so much emphasis on the residual character of common purpose liability that it seems fair to conclude that the PTC interpreted the significant contribution standard as a particularly low actus reus standard. For a more elaborate – and critical – discussion of this issue, see Ambos, supra note 26, at 599–604.

39 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1632–3.

40 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1634; Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 284.

41 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1635.

42 Ibid., paras. 1619, 1632.

43 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Minority opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, Jugement rendu en application de l'article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014 (hereinafter Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert), para. 287.

44 Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 349; Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/05-01/08, P.T.Ch. II, 15 June 2009 (hereinafter Bemba confirmation of charges decision), para. 351. These requirements are often indistinguishable in practice. See, e.g., Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision, supra note 30, para. 418; Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, P.T.Ch. II, 9 June 2014 (hereinafter Ntaganda confirmation of charges decision), para. 135.

45 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 1013.

46 Article 30 Rome Statute.

47 Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 352.

48 Ibid.

49 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 1011; Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, paras. 335–6; Bemba confirmation of charges decision, supra note 44, paras. 360–9.

50 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 1012. However, Judge Van den Wyngaert argued in her concurring opinion to the Ngudjolo Trial Chamber judgment that the majority's reasoning in terms of ‘risk’ and ‘probability’ is ‘tantamount to accepting dolus eventualis dressed up as dolus directus second degree’. Concurring opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 12, para. 38.

51 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 447; Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision, supra note 30, para. 411.

52 For a critical assessment of these mens rea requirements in light of Art. 30 of the Rome Statute, see Ohlin, J.D., ‘Joint Criminal Confusion’, (2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review 406, at 417–18Google Scholar; Ohlin, supra note 35, at 78–81.

53 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1638.

54 Ibid., para. 1639; Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 288.

55 For a critical evaluation of the equation between knowledgeable and purposeful actions, see, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 35, at 78–81; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 360–1.

56 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1642.

57 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 445; Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 981; Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 28, para. 134. See also Van Sliedregt, supra note 11, at 100. On the meaning of the common plan element in relation to joint perpetration, see, e.g., Cupido, M., ‘Pluralism in Theories of Liability: Joint Criminal Enterprise versus Joint Perpetration’, in van Sliedregt, E. and Vasiliev, S. (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law (2014), 128, at 133–4Google Scholar.

58 See explicitly Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 271. The common plan and common purpose are also substantiated on the basis of similar factual circumstances. See, e.g., Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 28, paras. 137, 175; Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-01/11-01/11, P.T.Ch. I, 12 June 2014 (hereinafter Gbagbo confirmation of charges decision), paras. 231, 254.

59 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 271. Similarly, Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1625.

60 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 271; Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1626; Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 988; Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 345.

61 Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, para. 344. Similarly, Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 985; Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 271.

62 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 271; Lubanga confirmation of charges decision, supra note 5, paras. 343–5; Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 984. This view is critically assessed by Judge Van den Wyngaert in her minority opinion to the Katanga Trial Chamber judgment. Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, para. 286.

63 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, para. 984.

64 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1627; Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, para. 301. Interestingly, the Kenyatta Pre-Trial Chamber has unified the two distinct interpretation of the common plan by holding that the ‘the common plan must encompass an element of criminality, meaning that it must involve the commission of a crime with which the suspect is charged’. Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision, supra note 30, para. 399.

65 On this issue, Ambos 2012, supra note 11, at 140; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 360–1.

66 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1630. See also Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, para. 191.

67 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1629.

68 Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, para. 284. For a different view, see Ohlin, supra note 52, at 416.

69 Differently, Ohlin, supra note 52, at 416.

70 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1631. For a scholarly analysis of this issue, see, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 52, at 410–16; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008) 213.

71 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1627.

72 See Section 3.2.

73 Ruto and Sang confirmation of charges decision, supra note 4, para. 355.

74 Ibid., para. 359.

75 Ibid., para. 360.

76 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 5.

77 Ibid., para. 317–19.

78 Ibid., paras. 297, 299, 319–20.

79 Ibid., para. 336.

80 Prosecutor v. Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-01/07, P.T.Ch. I, 27 April 2007 (Harun and Kushayb warrant of arrest decision).

81 Ibid., para. 81.

82 -Ibid., paras. 83–6.

83 Ibid., para. 88.

84 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1671, 1674–80. In addition, the Trial Chamber holds that Katanga acted as a key protagonist in the alliances which the militia had forged and was the intermediary between the suppliers of weapons and ammunition and the physical perpetrators of the crimes. Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, para. 1680.

85 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1674, 1676, 1678–9.

86 Similarly, Minority opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, paras. 301–8.

87 Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, supra note 10, para. 292.

88 Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 9, para. 436.

89 In the Ntaganda and Harun and Kushayb cases as well, the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the accused's prominent position within the organization in evaluating their contribution. Ntaganda confirmation of charges decision, supra note 44, para. 108; Harun and Kushayb warrant of arrest decision, supra note 80, para. 103. This practice has been criticized, since it creates ‘the risk of holding the defendant accountable solely on the basis of his/her position in the hierarchy and on the dereliction of duties inherent in this status’. Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 357.

90 Gbagbo confirmation of charges decision, supra note 58, para. 276.

91 This practice has been criticized. See, e.g., Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 356–62; Concurring opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 12, para. 34.

92 Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 28, para. 142.

93 Ibid., para. 145.

94 Ibid., paras. 144–6.

95 Ibid., para. 146.

96 It is interesting to see that whilst the PTC rejected to confirm the charges of specific crimes on the basis of joint perpetration, the PTC confirmed these charges on the basis of ordering, considering that the accused gave specific instructions to carry out actions that resulted in crimes and had a direct effect on the commission of crimes. This raises the question of why the PTC considered that the accused did not control these crimes. Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 28, para. 161. In the case against Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial Chamber also seems to have used the essential contribution standard in a restrictive way. In particular, the Trial Chamber held that the accused's high social status, extensive military experience, regular contacts with various regional officials and his position as colonel during various meetings cannot prove that he commanded the physical perpetrators during their commission of crimes, nor that the accused had issued military orders to that account. Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment pursuant article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012, para. 501.

97 Similarly, Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 732.

98 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1684–9. This reasoning has been criticized by Judge Van den Wyngaert in her minority opinion. Minority opinion Judge van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, para. 290. Similarly, in relation to Bemba's intent to commit crimes as a joint perpetrator, the Pre-Trial Chamber has refused to accept that an accused's ‘mens rea under article 30 of the Statute could be generally inferred from alleged past behavior. . . . The fact that certain crimes were committed in prior events does not necessarily mean that they would certainly take place subsequently’. Bemba confirmation of charges decision, supra note 44, para. 377.

99 Similarly, Minority opinion Judge van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, para. 291.

100 In various cases, the ICC has established the accused's intent and knowledge under Art. 25(3)(d) on the basis of facts that are largely analogous to the facts that are used in relation to the mens rea elements of joint perpetration. See, e.g., Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 28, paras. 155, 180; Gbagbo confirmation of charges decision, supra note 58, paras. 237–8, 257–8, Ntaganda confirmation of charges decision, supra note 44, paras. 122-135, 162. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this practice, considering that the accused in these cases are charged alternatively under different modes of liability.

101 Katanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 1, paras. 1142–51. This approach has been criticized by Judge van den Wyngaert in her minority opinion. Minority opinion Judge van den Wyngaert, supra note 43, paras. 208–21.

102 See Section 3.2.

103 Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 10, paras. 1277–8.

104 Ibid

105 Kenyatta confirmation of charges decision, supra note 30, para. 415.

106 Ibid., para. 415.

107 The context-dependent character of the ICC's assessment of the mens rea elements is also illustrated by the findings of the Bemba PTC. By using terms such as ‘generally’ and ‘necessarily’, the PTC clarifies that its findings should be seen in light of the specific facts of the Bemba case. Bemba confirmation of charges decision, supra note 44, paras. 377, 389, 400.

108 For a critical view on the need for distinguishing between different liability theories, see Stewart, J., ‘The End of Modes of Liability for International Crimes’, (2012) 25 LJIL 165CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

109 Ohlin et al., supra note 16, at 745. Similarly, Ambos 2012, supra note 11, at 144–5; Werle, supra note 11, at 956–7; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 11, at 363; Vest supra note 11, at 302; Van Sliedregt, supra note 16, at 511; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, Dissenting opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 November 2012, para. 20.