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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 May 2020
In a landmark effort to finally acknowledge the necessity to jointly respond to the global phenomenon of large movements of refugees and migrants, the process initiated in 2016 with the approval of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants eventually led to the adoption of two UN Global Compacts, respectively the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Despite the enthusiastic support shown at first by the international community, the GCM negotiations have been more controversial and ultimately shaken by the clamorous withdrawals of several states. The main argument used by the withdrawing governments to justify the sudden refusal to adopt the GCM was based on the claim that the document − although non-binding − undermines the ‘sovereign right’ of the state. Such a claim, given the centrality that the principle of state sovereignty has acquired since the Peace of Westphalia, deserves to be further analysed from an international law perspective by resorting to the ‘sovereignty test’ developed by Schrijver. The present work, after briefly introducing the main tenets of the GCM, applies the ‘sovereignty test’ to the GCM to dissect the alleged tension between state sovereignty on the one hand and the shared approach to international migration envisaged by the pact on the other. This article’s ultimate goal is to prove that the GCM does not aim to restrain state sovereignty; rather, it strives to remind states of existing international commitments already undertaken at the regional and global level.
1 See D. Kugelmann, ‘Migration’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009), 1; Chetail, V., ‘Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: An Intellectual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel’, (2016) 27 EJIL 901CrossRefGoogle Scholar; V. Chetail, International Migration Law (2019), at 16–36.
2 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, UN Doc. A/RES/45/158. The number of ratifications can be consulted at treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4. On the complexity of the existing framework − and the lack of definition of ‘migrant’ under international law – see, for instance, Dauvergne, C., ‘Irregular Migration, State Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’, in Chetail, V. and Bauloz, C. (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (2014), 78Google Scholar; Obregón Gieseken, H., ‘The Protection of Migrants under International Humanitarian Law’, (2017) 99 International Review of the Red Cross 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 123–4.
3 The co-operation thesis is well known in international legal theory. In his landmark book, The Changing Structure of International Law, Friedman affirmed that international law was shifting from a ‘law of coexistence’ to a ‘law of cooperation’, the latter described as ‘attempts to regulate and promote, by positive co-operation, interests of common concern’. See W. Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 9. The co-operation thesis has been recently questioned by Prof. Hakimi in a thought-provoking article: Hakimi, M., ‘The Work of International Law’, (2017) 58 Harvard International Law Journal 1Google Scholar, at 25–33.
4 Examples of labour migration agreements at the bilateral level abound, see ILO, Bilateral Labour Arrangements (BLAs) on labour migration, available at www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/policy-areas/measuring-impact/agreements/lang--en/index.htm. At the multilateral level, the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), for example, offers a vehicle for temporary migration commitments in relation to services trade. See 1995 GATS, 1869 UNTS 183.
5 See Sykes, A. O., ‘International Cooperation on Migration: Theory and Practice’, (2013) 80 The University of Chicago Law Review 315Google Scholar.
6 See de Guttry, A., Capone, F. and Sommario, E. G., ‘Dealing with Migrants in the Central Mediterranean Route: A Legal Analysis of Recent Bilateral Agreements Between Italy and Libya’, (2018) 56(3) International Migration 44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 On the nature of the EU-Turkey Statement see NF, NG and NM v. European Council Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 [2017], at 62–70. See also Cannizzaro, E., ‘Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism - A Quick Comment on NF v. European Council’, (2017) 2 European Papers 251Google Scholar.
8 According to Wolfrum, international co-operation is ‘the voluntary coordinated action of two or more States which takes place under a legal régime and serves a specific objective’: R Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 2 (1995), at 1242.
9 Sykes, supra note 5, at 335–6.
10 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1 (2016).
11 Previous initiatives − which generally ended in reports and not much else − include the establishment of the Global Migration Group at the UN inter-agency level and the Global Forum on Migration and Development at the inter-state level; the latter is a state-owned consultative process launched in 2007 for strengthening multilateral dialogue and co-operation. See Chetail, V., ‘Paradigm and Paradox of the Migration-Development Nexus: The New Border for North-South Dialogue’, (2008) 51 German Yearbook of International Law 183Google Scholar.
12 UN General Assembly, ‘Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Final Draft’, 11 July 2018, available at eapmigrationpanel.org/en/global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration-final-draft.
13 UNHCR, ‘Global Compact on Refugees: Final Draft’, 26 June 2018, available at www.unhcr.org/5b3295167.pdf.
14 Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195 (2018).
15 Carrera, S.et al., ‘Some EU Governments Leaving the UN Global Compact on Migration: A Contradiction in Terms?’, (2018) 15 Policy Insights 1Google Scholar.
16 United States Mission to the United Nations, ‘Statement: United States Ends Participation in Global Compact on Migration’, 2 December 2017, available at usun.usmission.gov/united-states-ends-participation-in-global-compact-on-migration/.
17 For an overview of the statements made see S. Fella, ‘The United Nations Global Compact for Migration’, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No 8459, 5 December 2018, at 12–14, available at commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8459/. As reported in the briefing, for example, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz openly expressed fear of ‘a danger to our national sovereignty’. Furthermore, according to a statement issued by the Polish Government Information Centre to explain Poland’s withdrawal from the pact ‘the document did not fulfil Poland’s requirements regarding appropriately strong guarantees of the right of a sovereign state to decide who to let in on its territory…’; ibid., at 13.
18 S. Carrera et al., supra note 15, at 1–3.
19 Gross, L., ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948’, (1948) 42 AJIL 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; van Kleffens, E. N., ‘Sovereignty in International Law’, (1953) 82 Recueil des cours 1Google Scholar.
20 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 2, 4, 18.
21 Other conceivable approaches encompass, for example, an analysis of the GCM in light of the two functions of sovereignty identified by Neil Walker, according to whom the concept of sovereignty has supplied a stable frame through which the legal world as a whole is apprehended and shaped as well as the discursive form of a claim variously and sometimes speculatively or contentiously made. See N. Walker, ‘Sovereignty Frames and Sovereignty Claims’, University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Research Paper Series No. 2013/14. Another possibility is to consider how the GCM interacts with the dimensions of sovereignty, i.e., the external and internal dimension to which some authors add also a distinct territorial one. See N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999), 128–30; R. Perruchoud, ‘State Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement’, in B. Opeskin, R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (eds.), Foundations of International Migration Law (2012), 123.
22 Schrijver, N., ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’, (2000) 70 British Yearbook of International Law 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Ibid., at 67–9.
24 Ibid., at 78.
25 Ibid.
26 A. Peters, ‘The Global Compact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?’, EJIL:Talk!, 21 November 2018, available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-global-compact-for-migration-to-sign-or-not-to-sign/.
27 Ibid., at 4. See also A. Peters, ‘Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance’, in U. Diedrichs, W. Reiners and W. Wessels (eds.), The Dynamics of Change in EU Governance (2011), 21, at 23; Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D., ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, (2000) 54 International Organization 421CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 423–4; Hillgenberg, H., ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’, (1999) 10 EJIL 499CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 500; L. Blutman, ‘In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law’, (2010) 59 ICLQ 605; A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), 211–29; N. Bayne, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Institutions: Complements, Not Alternatives’, in J. J. Kirton and M. J. Trebilcock (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (2004), 347.
28 Baxter, R. R., ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’, (1980) 29 ICLQ 549CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chinkin, C. M., ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’, (1989) 38 ICLQ 850CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 Meyer, T., ‘Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form of International Legal Cooperation’, (2016) 27 EJIL 161CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 162–3. The author provides a number of examples of states’ failure to come up with formal, binding legal rules on issues ranging from climate change to financial regulation. For instance, he reports how ‘when a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol could not be immediately negotiated, states adopted the Copenhagen and Cancun Accords, which provide a non-binding framework for continuing cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions’.
30 The distinction between refugees and migrants, maintained in the two Global Compacts, has been widely debated and thoroughly commented upon, see, for instance, Karatani, R., ‘How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of their Institutional Origins’, (2005) 17 International Journal of Refuge Law 517CrossRefGoogle Scholar; G. S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The International Law of Refugee Protection’, in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (2014), 36; D. S. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-citizens (2008), Chs. 7 and 8.
31 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137.
32 V. Türk and R. Dowd, ‘Protection Gaps’, in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., supra note 30, at 278; on the possible role of the Global Compact on Refugees in addressing the existing gaps see Betts, A., ‘The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?’, (2018) 30 International Journal of Refugee Law 623CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 See Spiro, P. J., ‘The Possibilities of Global Migration Law’, (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 4. See also T. A. Aleinikoff, ‘International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without Architecture’, in R. Cholewinski, E. Macdonald and R. Perruchoud (eds.), International Migration Law Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges (2007), 467; V. Chetail, ‘The Transnational Movement of Persons under General International Law – Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration Law’, in Chetail and Bauloz (eds.), supra note 2, at 1.
34 Ramji-Nogales, J., ‘Migration Emergencies’, (2017) 68 Hastings Law Journal 609Google Scholar, at 625–6; Chetail (2019), supra note 1, at Chs. 3–5; Opeskin, Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross (eds.), supra note 21; R. Plender (ed.), Issues in International Migration Law (2015).
35 Ramji-Nogales, ibid., at 654.
36 Guild, E., ‘The Global Compact as a Milestone in Global Governance of Migration’, (2018) 18 Global Social Policy 325CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 326.
37 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note 10, Annex II, at 24, paras. 14–15.
38 Guild, supra note 36, at 327. The non-binding nature of the Compacts does not infer that they do not have any legal effects or functions. With regard to the GCM see Peters, supra note 26; K. Allinson et al., ‘GCM Commentary: The Legal Status of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in International and UK Law’, Refugee Law Initiative Blog on Refugee Law and Forced Migration, 31 January 2019, available at rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/01/31/gcm-commentary-the-legal-status/. More generally see Ellis, J., ‘Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law’, (2012) 25 LJIL 313, at 320; J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (2011), at 129.Google Scholar
39 E. Guild and T. Basaran, ‘The UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Analysis of the Final Draft, 13 July 2018, Objective by Objective’, November-December 2018, available at rli.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/Global%20Compact%20for%20Migration_RLI%20blog%20series.pdf.
40 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 4, para. 15.
41 Ibid., at 5, para. 16.
42 Newland, K., ‘The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: An Unlikely Achievement’, (2018) 30 International Journal of Refugee Law 657CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
43 Ibid., at 2.
44 Ibid.
45 Guild, supra note 36, at 326.
46 Betts, supra note 32, at 627.
47 K. Groenendijk, ‘Objective 5: Enhance Availability and Flexibility of Pathways for Regular Migration’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 19.
48 Ibid., at 20. See Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 12, para. 21(g).
49 See J. N. Stefanelli, ‘Objective 13: Use Immigration Detention only as a Measure of Last Resort and Work towards Alternatives’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 39–40.
50 Newland, supra note 42, at 660.
51 A. Spagnolo, ‘“We Are Tidying up”: The Global Compact on Migration and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law’, EJIL:Talk!, 1 March 2019, available at www.ejiltalk.org/we-are-tidying-up-the-global-compact-on-migration-and-its-interaction-with-international-human-rights-law/.
52 J. P. Gauci and F. R. Partipilo, ‘Objective 9: Strengthen the Transnational Response to Smuggling of Migrants’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 28–9.
53 2004 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, 40 ILM 384.
54 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 16, para. 25.
55 S. Lavenex, ‘GCM Commentary: Implementation, Follow-Up and Review’, Refuge Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study University of London, 25 October 2018, available at rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/10/25/gcm-commentary-implementation-follow-up-and-review/.
56 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 34, para. 53.
57 Ibid., at 34, para. 49(c).
58 Ibid., at 34, para. 54.
59 On the relationship between the UN and IOM see Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration, UN Doc. A/70/976 (2016).
60 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 33, para. 45(a).
61 Ibid., at 33, para. 46. See A. Pécoud, ‘What Do We Know about the International Organization for Migration?’, (2018) 44 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1621, at 1623–6; M. Cullen, ‘The IOM’s New Status and its Role under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Pause for Thought’, EJIL:Talk!, 29 March 2019, available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-ioms-new-status-and-its-role-under-the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration-pause-for-thought/.
62 Lavenex, supra note 55, at 7–8.
63 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 32, para. 43. Updates on the start-up fund for safe, orderly and regular migration, which has already been established, are available at www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/trust-fund-for-migration.html.
64 Newland, supra note 42, at 661.
65 See Peters, supra note 26, at 1.
66 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1998), 289.
67 R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (2008), 564; M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017), 11. Reference should be made to Jean Bodin’s theorization of the idea of sovereignty, see, in particular, J. Bodin (edited by M. Turchetti, Q. Skinner and N. De Araujo), Les Six Livres De La République: Livre I (2013) Chs. 1 and 9; W. A. Dunning, ‘Jean Bodin on Sovereignty’, (1896) 11 Political Science Quarterly 82; D. Grimm and B. Cooper, ‘Bodin’s Significance for the Concept of Sovereignty’, in D. Grimm (ed.), Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (2015), 13.
68 van Kleffens, supra note 19, at 9; N. Walker (ed.), Relocating Sovereignty (2006); P. Piirimäe, ‘The Westphalian Myth and the Idea of External Sovereignty’, in H. Kalmo and Q. Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (2010), 64, at 66–9; S. Besson, ‘Sovereignty’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011), paras. 69–73.
69 Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States v Netherlands, Award, (1928) II RIAA 829, at 838,
70 H. Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. IV (1987), 397. See also Lauterpacht, E., ‘Sovereignty - Myth or Reality?’, (1997) 73 International Affairs 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 141; Zarmanian, T., ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to International’, (2006) 19 LJIL 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 47; S. D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999), 43.
71 Schrijver, supra note 22, at 70.
72 Ibid., at 83.
73 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note 10, at 24, paras. 14–15.
74 Modalities for the Intergovernmental Negotiations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc. A/RES/71/280 (2017), at 4, para. 15. An overview of the sessions and consultations is available at www.iom.int/gcm-development-process.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., para. 17.
77 Ibid., para. 21 (emphasis added).
78 Ibid., para. 23.
79 Chair’s summary, Preparatory (stocktaking) meeting, 4–6 December 2017, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, available at refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/171222_final_pv_summary_0.pdf.
80 Making migration work for all, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/643 (2017).
81 Chair’s summary, supra note 79, at 17–18.
82 Letter from the co-facilitators, International negotiations, first round, 5 February 2018, available at www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/02/180205_GCM-zero-draft_final.pdf.
83 The letter of appointment of Ms. Arbour, which unfortunately did not specify the tasks of her role, is available at www.un.org/pga/71/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2015/08/letter-for-SG-appointment-of-Arbour-as-SG-of-migration-conference.pdf.
84 A summary of all the interventions, mostly made by states, that took place during the plenary meetings is available at www.un.org/press/en/2018/dev3378.doc.htm.
85 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 2, para. 7.
86 Ibid., at 4, para. 15 (emphasis added).
87 Ibid., at 18, para. 27.
88 Ibid.
89 Zero Draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and regular Migration, 5 February 2018, at 14, para. 25, available at www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/02/180205_GCM-zero-draft_final.pdf.
90 E. Mendos Kuşkonmaz, ‘Objective 11: Manage Borders in an Integrated, Secure and Coordinated Manner’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 33.
91 Ibid.
92 M. Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building New Legal Orders (2015), 145; Trevisanut, S., ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement and the De-Territorialization of Border Control at Sea’, (2014) 27 LJIL 661CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 664–7.
93 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 4, para. 15.
94 R. Perruchoud, ‘State Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement’, in Opeskin, Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross (eds.), supra note 21, 125, at 126. See also Kesby, A., ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’, (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101Google Scholar.
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96 F. Pizzuttelli, ‘The Human Rights of Migrants as Limitations on States’ Control Over Entry and Stay in Their Territory’, EJIL:Talk!, 21 May 2015, available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-human-rights-of-migrants-as-limitations-on-states-control-over-entry-and-stay-in-their-territory/; Guild, E., ‘The UN’s Search for a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration’, (2017)18 German Law Journal 1779CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 1780–1.
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98 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 8, para. 18.
99 E. Fornale and A. Yildiz, ‘Objective 2: Minimize the Adverse Drivers and Structural Factors that Compel People to Leave their Country of Origin’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 10.
100 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 8, para. 18(a).
101 I. Majcher, ‘Objective 21: Cooperate in Facilitating Safe and Dignified Return and Readmission, as well as Sustainable Reintegration’, in Guild and Basaran, supra note 39, at 60.
102 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 29, para. 37.
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105 Ibid.; W. D. Coleman, ‘Governance and Global Public Policy’, in D. Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (2012), 673; I. Goldin, Divided Nations: Why Global Governance is Failing, and What We Can Do About It (2013), 20–35; A. Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (2007), 287–315.
106 See Section 2.1, infra.
107 Pouliot, V. and Thérien, J. P., ‘Global Governance: A Struggle over Universal Values’, (2018) 20 International Studies Review 55CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 60.
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110 Schrijver, supra note 22, at 91.
111 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 2, para. 7.
112 Ibid., at 4, para. 15.
113 Meyer, supra note 29, at 163.
114 Schrijver, supra note 22, at 92.
115 See Section 2.2, infra.
116 Lavenex, supra note 55, at 6.
117 Zero Draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and regular Migration, supra note 89, at 25, para. 43.
118 Revised draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 26 March 2018, at 26, para. 45, available at refugeesmigrants.un.org/intergovernmental-negotiations.
119 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 33, para. 48 (emphasis added).
120 Ibid., at 32, para. 41.
121 See Section 2.2, infra. See E. Guild and T. Basaran, ‘The UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Analysis of the Final Draft and Monitoring Implementation’, August 2019, available at rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/themed-content/global-compact-for-migration/.
122 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 34, para. 53.
123 Ibid., at 33, para. 49(b).
124 Lavenex, supra note 55, at 7.
125 2015 Paris Agreement in UNFCCC, COP Report No. 21, Addendum, at 21, Art. 3, 1771 UNTS 107.
126 On the more ambiguous nature of the NDCs see S. Tahura Zaman, ‘Exploring the Legal Nature of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under International Law’, (2015) 26 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 98, at 124.
127 Paris Agreement, supra note 125, Art. 13. See Falkner, R., ‘The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics’, (2016) 92 International Affairs 1107CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 1114–15; Bodansky, D., ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’, (2016) 110 AJIL 288CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 304–6.
128 Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and Use of a Public Registry Referred to in Art. 4, para. 12, of the Paris Agreement, Decision 5/CMA.1, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1.
129 Ibid., at para. 4.
130 Paris Agreement, supra note 125, Art. 13(11).
131 See Falkner, supra note 127, at 1121.
132 Global Compact for Migration, supra note 12, at 34, para. 54.
133 Ibid., at 33, para. 45(a).
134 Ibid., at 32, para. 41, where states emphasize that the Global Compact is to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with their rights and obligations under the exiting legal framework.
135 Schrijver, supra note 22, at 94.
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143 D. Thürer, ‘Soft Law’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009), 8.
144 General Assembly Endorses First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among Member States in Protecting Migrants, Meeting Coverage, 19 December 2018, available at www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12113.doc.htm; see Peters, supra note 26, at 4–5.
145 Boyle, supra note 136, at 902. Speaking of the normative significance of soft law in general, Boyle stresses that ‘there is at least an element of good faith commitment, and in many cases, a desire to influence state practice and an element of law-making intention and progressive development’.
146 Statement by H.E. Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, President of the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly, at Final Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 13 July 2018, available at www.peacebuildingdata.org/liberia/results/war-peace-transition-addressing-needs-survivors/measures-victims.
147 Meyer, supra note 29, at 161.
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149 Pouliot and Thérien, supra note 107, at 58.
150 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 US 659 (Sup.Ct. 1892).