Article contents
Against Fairness? International Environmental Law, Disciplinary Bias, and Pareto Justice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 May 2012
Abstract
International environmental law (IEL) as a discipline has failed to respond to problems of fairness in a meaningful and systematic fashion. Whilst IEL has long acknowledged the existence of competing claims regarding the fair distribution of costs, resources, and responsibilities, fairness remains at the periphery of the disciplinary discourse. The present essay considers some possible explanations for this neglect. The first part of the essay examines a set of implicit assumptions and beliefs in which IEL is embedded, which somewhat prevent genuine and critical engagement with fairness issues. The second part of the essay considers normative and policy arguments recently developed in the law and economics literature that explicitly argue against the notion that fairness should play a role in the design and implementation of environmental regimes. The essay concludes by calling for a more robust engagement with fairness issues and by considering some of the implications this project may have for IEL.
Keywords
- Type
- INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE: Symposium: FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2012
References
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2 The North–South divide should not be overstated. Neither the North nor the South is homogeneous. Tensions exist within each group and climate talks have seen alliances form across the dividing line. That said, the North–South divide remains a living reality for many people in the world and a powerful structuring logic in environmental negotiations.
3 We use the term ‘fairness’ as defined by Thomas Franck in his Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1997). Fairness thus defined includes both substantive (i.e., distributive) justice and procedural legitimacy: ‘the fairness of international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first by the degree to which the rules satisfy the participants’ expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with what the participants perceive as right process’ (at 7).
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5 We thank all participants in the inaugural workshop for their support and fruitful collaboration. The full program of the workshop as well as a conference report can be found on the group's website at http://esiligiel.wordpress.com.
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44 Ibid.
46 Posner and Weisbach, supra note 40, at 192.
47 Ibid., at 5.
48 Ibid., at 192.
49 On that issue, the authors’ position differs from the mainstream IEL proposition that distributive claims should be accommodated within environmental regimes.
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59 Ibid., at 100.
60 Ibid., at 103.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., at 104.
64 Ibid., at 183.
65 Ibid., Chapter 7.
66 D. Farber, ‘Climate Justice’, 10 July 2011, 6, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883186.
67 On the need to move beyond the ‘accommodationist’ approach, see Mickelson, supra note 4, at 77–81.
68 Franck, supra note 3, at 22–4, 481–2.
69 For a recent attempt at mapping the sort of issues that arise at the intersection of fairness and effectiveness, see Viñuales, J., ‘Balancing Effectiveness and Fairness in the Redesign of the Climate Change Regime’, (2011) 24 LJIL 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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