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Verifying Non-Proliferation Pledges: The Evolution and Future Direction of the IAEA Safeguards System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2009

Mohamed ElBaradei
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Extract

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded its work last May in New York and decided that, in accordance with the provisions of Article X(2) of the Treaty, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

Keywords

International Atomic Energy Agencynon-proliferationverification.
Type
Current Legal Developments
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , Autumn 1995 , pp. 347 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 1995

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References

1. See 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS161 (1970). 179 nonnuclear-weapon states are party to the Treaty as at 15 May 1995.

2. For decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/474 (1995); See also NPT/Conf.1995/32/Dec.l–3 (1995).

3. See Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/474, supra note 2.

4. See Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/474, supra note 2.

5. See Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/474, supra note 2.

6. See, e.g., 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1; 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 634 UNTS 281 (1968), reproduced in 6 ILM 521 (1967); and 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 24 ILM 1442 (1985).

7. Concern among many supplier states that Agency safeguards would not by themselves prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology had led them to attach additional conditions and restraints to export of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. In addition to the condition that safeguards should be linked to the safeguarded material and equipment irrespective of the duration of the safeguards agreement, these conditions related to physical protection requirements; restraints on the transfer of ‘sensitive’ facilities, technology, and material; and control by the supplier on supplied items and their subsequent generations. See Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technology, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.l/Part 1/Mod.3 (1994).

8. The physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, transport, and storage is subject to non-binding standards developed by the IAEA. See the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 (1993). Binding standards have been developed under the auspices of the IAEA for nuclear material in international transport. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 18 ILM 1419 (1979).

9. Under the Statute of the IAEA the Agency is authorized “[t]o establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. See IAEA Statute, Art.III(A.5).

10. See note 6, supra.

11. See note I, supra.

12. See note 6, supra.

13. Safeguards agreements concluded with states that have made comprehensive non-proliferation commitments but have no nuclear material that requires the application of safeguards are coupled with a protocol that suspends most of the procedures for the application of safeguards until such time as the state has nuclear material that requires the implementation of these procedures. See, e.g., 1988 Agreement Between Nigeria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/358 (1988).

14. Safeguards are generally terminated by the Agency upon determination that the material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practically irrecoverable. See The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc.INFCIRC/153(corrected)(1983), paras. 11–13 and 35 (hereinafter IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153); and IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, s(s). 26–28 (1968).

15. All comprehensive safeguards agreements, concluded with parties to the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Treaty of Rarotonga provide that the agreement shall remain in force for as long as the state is party to the respective treaty. All three treaties provide for a right of withdrawal (See NPT, Art. X(l); Treaty of Tlatelolco, Art. 30; and Treaty of Rarotonga, An.13).

16. See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153, supra note 14. Although these guidelines were initially developed for safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT, they have also been used as guidelines for other comprehensive safeguards agreements with states that have undertaken a similar, binding non-proliferation commitment.

17. The rights and obligations of the IAEA and the state under this category of agreements are also based on guidelines adopted by the Agency's Board of Governors (See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, supra note 14). Safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66 are currently in force with four states, viz. Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

18. A nuclear-weapon state for the purpose of the NPT “is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” (Art.19). See, e.g., 1977 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/288 (1981).

19. For a detailed discussion of IAEA safeguards approaches and implementation, See IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitations, Achievements, IAEA Doc. IAEA/SG/INF/4 (1983); IAEA Safeguards: An Introduction, IAEA Doc. IAEA/SG/INF/3 (1981); and IAEA Safeguards, Implementation at Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, IAEA Doc. IAEA/SG/INF/6 (1985).

20. See INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, supra note 14.

21. See Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)/17 (1994).

22. See IAEA Press Release PR.95/4 (1995).

23. UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 32 ILM 800 (1993).

24. See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.

25. See, e.g., text of a Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty submitted by Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament, Conference on Disarmament Doc. CD/1232/CD/NTB/WP.33 (1993).