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The United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority – occupation by proxy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2019

Amy Elizabeth Chinnappa*
Affiliation:
La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia

Abstract

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq from 2003 following Resolution 1483 of the UN Security Council. This Resolution affirmed that Iraq was in a state of occupation and that there were occupying powers. The Resolution referred to the United States of America and the United Kingdom as ‘occupying powers under the unified command of the “Authority”’, the ‘Authority’ being the CPA. However, the legal status of the CPA and its relationship to the US (the focus of this article) is not entirely clear, both under US domestic law and international law. This lack of clarity could have significant implications for the US’s responsibility for the CPA’s conduct. As with private military companies, a CPA-style administration of territory could become a tool for states to quarantine their risk under the law of occupation. This article contends that the theory of occupation by proxy may help clarify the legal status of the CPA and its relationship to the US and could assist in closing the identified gap in responsibility. To support this argument, this article establishes a legal framework for the theory of occupation by proxy which is then applied to the CPA and US.

Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Copyright
© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2019 

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References

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2 J. Negroponte and J. Greenstock, Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/538 (8 May 2003).

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).

6 Ibid., at preamble.

7 Ibid.

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17 UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).

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19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., at 40 (emphasis added).

21 Ibid.

22 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14.

23 Ibid., at 40, para. 62.

24 Ibid.

25 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment of 26 February 2007, [2007] ICJ Rep., at 43, para. 206.

26 Ibid., at 128, para. 205.

27 Ibid., at 128–9, paras. 205–6.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., at 129, para. 206.

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36 Dobbins, supra note 16, at 11.

37 Halchin, supra note 34, at 8.

38 Ibid., at 5.

39 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (2009), at 61.

40 Ibid., at 12.

41 United States ex rel. DRC Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC [2006] 1:04cv199-A 17.

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43 Roberts, supra note 10, at 612.

44 Negroponte and Greenstock, supra note 2.

45 Dobbins, supra note 16, at 13.

46 A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq : Winning the War, Losing the Peace (2007), at 106.

47 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 131.

48 Ibid., at 136.

49 Ibid., at 131–2.

50 Ibid., at 135.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., at 149.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Nicaragua case, supra note 22.

56 Ibid., at 64, para. 115.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Bosnian Genocide case, supra note 25, at 208, para. 400.

63 CPA, Order Number 2 ‘Dissoulution of Entities’, Doc. CPA/ORD/23May2003/02.

64 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 140.

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68 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 131.

69 See Section 2.2 of this article.

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72 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135, Art. 29.

73 Ibid.

74 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to Geneva Convention IV (1958), at 211.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., at 212.

78 Ibid.

79 UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).

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93 Tadić case, supra note 92, at 72, para.162.

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97 Additional Protocol II, supra note 96, Art. 1.

98 Gal, supra note 15, at 8.

99 Additional Protocol II, supra note 96, Art. 1.

100 Y. Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1986), at 135.

101 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T.Ch., 3 March 2000, at 51, para. 149.

102 See, for example, Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (2009), at 37; Benvenisti, supra note 88, at 278; and generally C. Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, (1998) YIHL 1, at 3.

103 Dinstein, supra note 102, at 62.

104 UN Doc. S/RES/1244, (1999), at para. 11.

105 Ibid.

106 Roberts, supra note 10, at 612.

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109 Ibid., at 256.

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114 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Judgement, Case No IT-98-34-T, T.Ch., 31 March 2003, at para. 215.

115 1907 Hague Regulations Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, Art. 42.

116 Ferraro, supra note 86, at 143.

117 Dinstein, supra note 102, at 39.

118 Whether this would legally meet the requirements of Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations and therefore, is a requirement for establishing effective control, is beyond the scope of this article. See in this regard Benvenisti, supra note 88, at 53.

119 Dinstein, supra note 102, at 44.

120 Ibid., at 35.

121 Benvenisti, supra note 88, at 47.

122 Ibid., at 50 (emphasis in original).

123 Armed Activites on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, [2005] ICJ Rep. 168, at 196, para. 43.

124 Ibid.

125 Ferraro, supra note 14, at 19; Naletilić and Martinović case, supra note 114, at 75, para. 221.

126 Dinstein, supra note 102, at 43.

127 Armed Activites case, supra note 123, at 230, para. 173.

128 Gal, supra note 15, at 74.

129 Ibid., at 73.

130 Pictet, supra note 74, at 21; Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and Its Interaction with International Human Rights Law (2009), at 13.

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133 Pictet, supra note 74, at 59.

134 Ferraro, supra note 14, at 31.

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136 Ibid., at 75, para. 222.

137 Ibid., at para. 221.

138 Ibid., at para. 30.

139 A. Gross, ‘Rethinking Occupation: The Funcational Approach’, (2012) Opinio Juris Blog, available at opiniojuris.org/2012/04/23/rethinking-occupation-the-functional-approach/ (accessed 25 March 2019); Zwanenburg et al., supra note 131, at 45.

140 Gal, supra note 15, at 74.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

145 Zwanenburg et al., supra note 131, at 34.

146 ILC Articles, supra note 18, at 47.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, at para. 205.

150 Ibid., at para. 584.

151 Tadić case, supra note 92, at 51, para. 124.

152 Ibid., at 51, para. 124 (emphasis in original).

153 Ibid., at 56, para. 132.

154 Ibid., at 56, para. 131.

155 Ibid., at 72, para. 162.

156 Blaškić case, supra note 101.

157 Ibid., at 51, para. 149.

158 Naletilić and Martinović case, supra note 114, at 72, para. 214.

159 Ferraro, supra note 86, at 58; Gilder, supra note 86, at 64.

160 Armed Activites case, supra note 123, at 168.

161 Bosnian Genocide case, supra note 25, at 43.

162 Armed Activites case, supra note 123, at 226, para. 160.

163 Ibid., at 226, para. 160.

164 Ibid., at 230–1, para. 177.

165 Ibid.

166 Bosnian Genocide case, supra note 25, at 209, para. 403.

167 Ibid.

168 Ibid., at 210, para. 404.

169 Ibid., at 210, para. 406.

170 Ibid., at 209, para. 402.

171 Benvenisti, supra note 88, at 62.

172 Ibid., at 62.

173 Ibid.

174 Pictet, supra note 74, at 212.

175 In 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross instigated a review of the law of occupation and other forms of territorial administration by an expert panel, see Ferraro, supra note 14. The report posits the theory of indirect effective control.

176 Ibid., at 160.

177 Ibid., at 160; Gal, supra note 15, at 64.

178 Milanovic, M., ‘The Applicability of the Conventions to “Transnational” and “Mixed” Conflicts’, in Clapham, A., Gaeta, P. and Sassòli, M. (eds.), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (2016), 27, at 39.Google Scholar

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180 Both Milanovic, supra note 178, and A. Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’, (2007) 18 EJIL 650, describe the policy benefits of the overall control test.

181 Tadić case, supra note 92, at 49, para. 120.

182 Dobbins, supra note 16, at 264.

183 Ferraro, supra note 86, at 143.

184 Ibid.

185 CPA, Regulation Number 1 (2003).

186 CPA, Order Number 7 Penal Code (2003), Doc. CPA/ORD/9June2003/07.

187 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 132, Art. 64.

188 CPA, Order Number 1 De-Ba Athification of Iraqi Society (2003), Doc. CPA/ORD/16May2003/01.

189 Geneva Convention (IV) supra note 132, Art. 51.

190 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 131.

191 Tadić case, supra note 92, at 69, para. 156.

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid.

194 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 131–2.

195 Halchin, supra note 34, at 19.

196 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 135.

197 Bremer, supra note 67, at 39.

198 Dobbins, supra note 16, at 117.

199 Dobbins, supra note 31, at 131.

200 Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 35.

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203 Gal, supra note 15, at 77.

204 Ibid., at 64.

205 For a discussion on private military companies and the law of state responsibility see V. Ballesteros Moya, ‘The Privatization of the Use of Force Meets the Law of State Responsibility’, (2015) 30 AmUIntlLRev 795.

206 Gal, supra note 15, at 79.

207 Klabbers and Trommer, supra note 71, at 75.

208 Oswald, supra note 70, at 317–18.

209 Tadić case, supra note 92, at 50, para. 122.

210 Bosnian Genocide case, supra note 25, at 210, para. 406.