Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 July 2009
The variety of notions of responsibility and liability, used by many publicists, continues to be a source of confusion. It would, therefore, be very clarifying to introduce one meaning for one concept and, thus, use the notions as the ILC defines them. The survey of the several 1LC reports on responsibility and liability shows that the concepts have become more and more interrelated. A different approach might be needed on the subject of international liability in order not to diminish the usefulness these rules can have within the environmental fiel.
1. Draft Articles on Slate Responsibility, II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980); First Report on State Responsibility Special-Rapporteur R. Ago, II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/217 (1969).
2. E.g. Grotius, who was in favour of the fault concept referring to Roman culpa notion, see Bedjaoui, M., Responsibility of Stales: Fault and Strict Liability, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 10 EPIL 358, 359 (1987); see also for a thorough study on the culpa notion, the 2nd Report on State Responsibility by the new special rapporteur, G. Arangio-Ruiz, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425/Add. 1 (1989) at 4.Google Scholar
3. This approach was launched by Anzilotti and has been followed by writers like Brownlie, Jiménez de Aréhaga, O'Connell and Schwarzenberger, see e.g. I. Brownlie, State Responsibility, Part 1: System of the Law of Nations 39 (1983); this doctrine of objective responsibility has also been applied by the General Claims Commission in the Neer claim 4 U.N.R.I.A. A. 61–62 (1926); the Roberts claims id. at 80; see also the Caire claim 5 U.N.R.I.A.A. 529–531 (1929).
4. See Borchard, Theoretical Aspects of the International Responsibility of States, l Zaö VR 223,226 (1929); see also Starke, Imputability in International Delinquencies, 19 Brit.Yb.Int'l Law 104 (1938).
5. Draft Article 3 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N.Doc. A/35/10 (1980) states: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when; a. conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and b. that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”;.
6. E.g. L. Goldie has stated: “liability connotes exposure to legal redress once responsibility and injuryarising from a failure to fulfill that legal responsibility have been established”;, Goldie, L., Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk, 16 Neth. Yb.I.L. 175, 176 (1985); see also OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution 306 (1977).Google Scholar
7. Article 139 and see also Arts. 235 and 263 of this Convention, 211.L.M. 1261 (1982); See L. Goldie, supra note 6, at 180; Quentin-Baxter concludes that “liability, no less than responsibility refers in this Convention to the content of a primary obligation”;, II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 170 (1984).
8. H. Lauterpacht, 1 International Law 400–402 (1970); Benrubi, G., State Responsibility and Hazardous Products Exports: A Solution to an International Problem, 13 Calif.W.I.LJ. 135 (1983).Google Scholar
9. A direct application of absolute liability is made in Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, which provides that a launching state “is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight”;, New York, Nov. 29,1972,101.L.M. 965 (1971). This is the first example of an international agreement imposing such absolute liability on States in their capacity as states, New York, November 29,1972,10 I.L.M. 965 (1971).
10. Jiménez de Aréchaga, E., International Responsibility, in M. Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law 531 (1968).Google Scholar
11. Smith, B., State Responsibility and the Marine Environment 115 (1988).Google Scholar
12. Id. at 117.
13. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, New York, Nov. 29, 1972,101.L.M. 965 (1971).
14. 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy; 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships; 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, with 1984 Protocol.
15. See Art. 4( 1) of the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, May 21,1963,21.L.M. 727(1963).
16. See, e.g., Handl, G., State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AJIL 525, 541 (1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
17. Quentin-Baxler wrote in his Preliminary Report that: “[i]t remains to notice that the contrasted descriptions ‘fault’ and ‘no-fault’, or ‘fault’ and ‘risk’, often employed as a shorthand method of distinguishing the regime of responsibility for wrongful acts and that of liability in respect of acts not prohibited by international law. The antinomy of ‘fault’ and ‘no-fault’ may be regarded merely as labels – and unsuitable ones for the Commission's purpose, because the great unruly concept of ‘fault’ has been to some extent sublimated in modem international law.”;, see II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 215, Para. 15 (1980); But see also Akehurst, M., International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, 16 Neth.Yb.I.L. 9 (1985), where he submits that this analysis is wrong.Google Scholar
18. Jiménez de Aréchaga, E., International Responsibility, in M. Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public Inter-national Law 569, 579 (1986).Google Scholar
19. A due care obligation is an obligation of a state to take all reasonable measures regarding the circumstances to prevent an event (an individual from committing a wrong) while it is shown that the state was capable of preventing it; see B. Smith, supra note 11, at 34–44; see infra Para. 2.2..
20. Arangio-Ruiz in his Second Report on State Responsibility, II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n Para. 163, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425/Add.l (1989).
21. II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, Para. 39 (1973).
22. II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 233 (1969); II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 248 (1980).
23. II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 233, Para. 83 (1969). In the words of the Commission: “Owing to the entirely different basis of the so-called responsibility for risk and the different nature of the rules governing it, as well as it content and the forms it may assume, a joint examination of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to grasp.”;; II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, Para. 38 (1973).
24. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 203, Para. 20 (1971).
25. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 179, Para. 11 (1970).
26. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 203, Para. 20 (1971).
27. II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169–170, Paras. 40–43 (1973).
28. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 53, Para. 8 (1982).
29. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, Paras. 17,31 and 54 (1983).
30. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 220, Para. 65 (1983).
31. See supra note 28, Para. 31, at 58; and see infra Para. 3.1.
32. See II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 250, Para. 12 (1980).
33. The international criminal responsibility in a draft code of offences against peace and security of mankind can be regarded as the third ‘source of responsibility’ which the ILC wished to codify separately. Criminal responsibility distinguishes itself from the other sources of responsibility by the fact that it only concerns obligations owed to the international community as a whole instead of obligations owed to states individually. See II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 210 (1981); see also D. Thiam, Special Rapporteur, First Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 137 (1983).
34. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 173 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980).
36. Draft Article 23 of the Draft Rules on State Responsibility states: “When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention, by means of its own choice, of the occurrence of a given event, there is a breach of that obligation only if, by conduct adopted, the State does not achieve that result.”;, see II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 82 (1972).
37. II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 53, Paras. 9–10 (1982); The emphasis was not alone upon reparation but upon prevention as well, because the Commission gave preference to “the duty, wherever possible, to avoid causing injuries, rather than to the substituted duty of providing reparation for injury caused”;.
38. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 55, Para. 19 (1982).
39. This is an example given by the Commission in the comment on Draft Article 23, II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 170 (1973); II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37–52, Paras. 20–50 (1978).
40. I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 23–40 (1975); See, e.g., the Alabama case where the United States asserted a claim against Great Britain for violation of a neutral's obligation to prevent conduct of an individual supportive of a belligerent, the Alabama case (United States v. Great Britain) 1872 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser. A).
41. II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 82–83 (1978).
42. II-2 Y.B. Im'l L. Comm'n 82, Para. 94 (1978), commentary to Draft Article 23.
43. See for further reading, Dupuy, P.-M., Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability, in OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution 369–377 (1977).Google Scholar
44. H-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 119–121, Paras. 68–72 (1981); II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 160, Paras. 64–65.
45. II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 121, Para. 72 (1981).
46. As the Special-Rapporteur Barboza explains with regard to the duty of care: “it is contingent upon the occurrence of injury. Only if injury occurs do the consequences of the breach come into play, and they do so within the regime of liability for risk, becoming a new obligation of compensation whose scope is modified (increased) by the incidence of the unfulfilled obligations.”; II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 160, Para. 64 (1986).
47. See J. Barboza, Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423, April 25, 1989, Paras. 43–44 at 17–18.
48. E.g. acts precluding wrongfulness, which are most of the time unforeseeable events, do not entail state's responsibility, however, the state can still be held liable. See infra Para. 2.4..
49. l.e. the duty to prevent, inform, negotiate and repair, see infra Para. 3.1..
50. Draft Articles 5–15 of the Draft Rules of State Responsibility draw a boundary between acts of private persons and acts of the slate, II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 210 (1971), see especially Paras. 122–130.
51. Draft Article 3 of the liability rules was initially headed ‘attribution’, but used that term in a different sense from that employed in the responsibility rules. It reads: “The source State shall have the obligations imposed on it by the present articles, provided that it knew or had means of knowing that an activity involving risk was being, orabout to be, carried out in areas under its jurisdiction or control”. See Barboza's Fourth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/413, at 7,22–29 Paras. 56–84; In Barboza's fifth Report the title has been changed into “Assignment of obligations”, in order to make a distinction with attribution used in the draft on state responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/423, at 11, 15–16, Paras. 35–37.
52. Cf. Island of Palmas arbitration (Netherlands v. USA), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 839 (1928); Judge Huber, the Spanish Zone of Morocco arbitration (UK v. Spain), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 642 (1925); Corfu Channel (Merits) case (UK v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 18–23.
53. Especially with regard to developing countries where the means for effective monitoring might be lacking.
54. Barboza's Fifth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423 (1989) at 11, 16, Para.37.
55. Barboza's Fourth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/413 (1988) at 24–28, Paras. 61–81; see infra Para. 3.2..
56. See II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 114 (1980); consent (Article 29), countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act (Article 30), force majeure and fortuitous event (Article 31), distress (Article 32), state of necessity (Article 33) and self-defence (Article 34).
57. II-2 Y.B.Int'lL.Comm'n61, 111 (1980); see also II-I Y.B.Int'l L.Comm'n 152, Paras. 32–33 (1986).
58. See for an elaboration of this subject, Jagota, S. P., State Responsibility: Circumstances precluding wrongfulness, 16 Neth. Yb. l. L. 249–277 (1985); see also II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 66–126, Paras. 1–257 (1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
59. Chorzów Factory (Indemnity case), 1928 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser. A, No. 17, 47–48).
60. J. Barboza's Fifth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423, at 23, Para. 71.
61. See infra Para. 4.1..
62. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 212–213, Paras. 40–42 (1983).
63. Draft Article 6 on the Draft Rules on State Responsibility, II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2 (1984).
64. The balance of interests is a balance which takes into account the shared expectations, the principles, relevant factors, guiding matters and the state's actions with regard to the duty to prevent, inform and negotiate; Quentin-Baxter's Second Report on International Liability, ‘SchematicOutline’, II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 63, Sections 4 and 5 (1982).
65. Id., Sections 6 and 7.
66. R. Quentin-Baxter in his Preliminary Report, II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 263, Para. 56 (1980).
67. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER A/1978/Add 1 in II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 14 (1978).
68. II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 and Add. 1 and 2 (1980) (Preliminary Report); II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 103, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346 and Add. 1 and 2 (1981) (2nd Report); 11–1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (1982) (3rd Report); III Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 201, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (1983) (4th Report); II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383 and Add. 1(1984) (5th Report).
69. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 and Corr. I (1983), II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (1982).
70. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 97, U.N. Doc.. A/CN.4/394 (1985) (Preliminary Report); id., 145, U.N. Doc.. A/CN.4/402 (1986) (2nd Report); id., 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/405 (1987) (3rd Report); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/413 (1988) (4th Report); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423 (1989) (5th Report); UN Doc A/CN.4/428 (1990) (6th Report).
71. See supra note 64, Section 5, Para. 3 of the Schematic Outline.
72. Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5–16, 1972, A/CONF.48/14; Schematic Outline, supra note 64, Para. 11, at 53.
73. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 201, Paras. 17,31,48,52 and 54, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (1983).
74. II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 55, Para. 17 (1982).
75. Schematic Outline, supra note 64, Article 1, Section 1, at 62.
76. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 59–60, Paras. 36–42 (1982).
77. This will change in his Fourth Report in which he includes ‘situations’, referring lo both man-made and natural events, such as fire, flood, pests etcetera, see infra Para. 3.1. ‘Modifications of QuentinBaxter's Fourth Report’.
78. This is because a lack of state practice regarding those other activities, II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 205, Para. 17 (1983).
79. It includes activities conducted on board a ship or aircraft of one state and not within the territory or control of another state; see Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 68, at 43–47.
80. Namely in situations where jurisdiction is evenly shared, e.g. with regard to aship in innocent passage and an aircraft in authorized overflight; II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 60, Para. 43–45 (1982); II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 150, Paras. 184–186 (1981).
81. An example more recently is the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq; Barboza's Fourth Report, supra note 70, at 10, Para. 19.
82. For instance, immaterial damage suffered by the affected state if it has been blamed internationally for environmental pollution for which the source state is responsible.
83. Schematic Outline, supra note 64, Article 2, Section 2, at 62–63.
84. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 59, Para. 34 (1982).
85. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 68, Paras. 48 and 54, at 215–217.
86. See, e.g., Barceló, J., The International Legal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CILJ 155 (1986)Google Scholar; and Hayashi, M., The Antarctic Question in the United Nations, id., at 275; and C. Joyner, S. Chopra, (eds.). The Antarctic Legal Regime (1988).Google Scholar
87. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 70, at 210 and 215, Paras. 29 and 48; and id., at 220, Para. 65.
88. Schematic Outline, supra note 64, at 63, Section 2, Para. 8, at 63.
89. Id., Section 2.
90. Id., Section 3.
91. Compare Section 2 with Section 3 of the Schematic Outline.
92. Schematic Outline, supra note 64, Section 2, Para. 8, at 63.
93. Riphagenhas referred to these as ‘non-obligations’, see Riphagen, A., State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations, in R. Macdonald & D. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, 594–596 (1983).Google Scholar
94. ‘Shared expectations’ means that in the process of negotiation for reparation, statements expressed during earlier communications between the states concerned or common standards existing within both states can be relied upon in good faith, II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 59, Para. 35 (1982). Barboza further elaborated this concept in his Second Report, supra note 70, at 150, Para. 22.
95. Schematic Outline, supra note 64, at 63, Section 4.
96. Article 1 (Scope of the present articles), Article 2 (Use of terms), Article 3 (Relationship between the present articles and other international agreements), Article 4 (Absence of effect upon other rules of international law) and Article 5 (Cases not within the scope of the present articles), see II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 155–156(1984).
97. II-I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 165–166, Paras. 27–28 (1984).
98. See infra Para. 3.1., “The Schematic Outline’.
99. See infra Para. 4.2., ‘Explanatory Scheme’.
100. Second Report by Barboza, supra note 70, at 151–161.
101. Third Report by Barboza, supra note 70, at 47–57.
102. This title was first ‘attribution’ in Barboza's Fourth Report, supra note 70, at 7, Paras. 56–84; In Barboza's Fifth Report the title has been changed into “Assignment of obligations”, in order to make a distinction with attribution used in the draft on state responsibility, supra note 70, at 11,15 and 16, Paras. 35–37.
103. The relation to state responsibility was elaborated above, infra Chapter 2, Para. 2.3.
104. This appears to be a reiteration of case law, namely the Corfu Channel case, supra note 52, at 18–23; and the Island of Palmas arbitration, supra note 52, at 839.
105. Barboza's Fourth Report, supra note 70, at 11–12 and 28–29, Paras. 24–27 and 82–84.
106. Barboza's Fourth Report, supra note 70, Articles 6–10, at 32–37, Paras. 92–116; Freedom of action and the limits thereto (Article 6), duty to cooperate in good faith (Article 7), right to participation by other affected states (Article 8), principle of prevention (Article 9) in relation to the principle of reparation (Article 10).
107. See infra Chapter 3, Para 3.1., “The Schematic Outline’.
108. Barboza's Fifth Report, supra note 70, at 20–45, Paras. 60–148.
109. Consequently this might serve as a basis for a legal regime between the states concerned (Article 10). In turn the state that believes it might be affected can request this notification (Article 12).
110. The procedure of these articles broadly correspond to the procedure in Quentin-Baxter's Schematic Outline, see infra Para. 3.1., “The compound primary obligation”.
111. Barboza's Fourth Report, supra note 70, at 12–13, Para. 30.
112. Barboza's Fifth Report, supra note 70, at 10–11 and 14, Article 2 and Para. 27.
113. Barboza's Sixth Report of March 15 1990, supra note 70, at 4.
114. Barboza's Sixth Report, id., Paras. 11–14, at 10.
115. I.e. measures taken to contain or minimize the transboundary effects; of an activity involving risk, after the accident has occurred of an activity with harmful effects after those effects have arisen; id., at 14–18, Paras. 22–25.
116. Id., at 18–19, Paras. 29–30.
117. Id., Article 17 (h); and id., at 26–27, Paras.44–48; The basis for this reduction derives from the belief, that an unjust enrichment of one state should be avoided in order not to violate the fundamental principle of equality of states. This was elaborated in previous Reports, e.g. II-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 50–51, Paras. 15, 24–30 (1987).
118. Barboza's Sixth Report, supra note 70, at 26, Para. 13; the same phrase has been used in the new Article 5; id., at 42.
119. II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 233 (1969); and II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 211, Para. 37 (1973).
120. Barboza's Sixth Report, supra note 70, at 51–52, Articles 28–33; and id., at 34–38, Paras. 62–70.
121. Id., Article 29, at 51.
122. Id., Article 26, at 50; and id., at 31–33, Paras. 56–59.
123. Id., at 31–33, Paras. 56–59.
124. H-2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 61, Para. 1 (1980), of the commentary to Draft Article 35.
125. II-1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 105, Para. 9 (1981).
126. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 105–106, Para. 10 (1981).
127. Originally Article 4 of Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 68, at 155,170–172, Paras. 39–43.
128. The Trail Smelterarbitration, (USA v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); and see on this attribution problem, I. Brownlie, State Responsibility, Part 1: System of the Law of Nations 159–171 (1983).
129. See also Read, I.E., The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 Can. Yb. I. L. 222 (1963).Google Scholar
130. II-l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 58–59, Paras. 31–33 (1982).
131. II-l Y.B. Infl L. Comm'n 150–160, Paras. 42–69 (1986).