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VAGUENESS, INTERPRETATION, AND THE LAW*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Ólafur Páll Jónsson
Ólafur Páll Jónsson*
Affiliation:
University of Iceland
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Abstract

It is widely accepted that vagueness in law calls for a specific interpretation of the law—interpretation that changes the meaning of the law and makes it more precise. According to this view, vagueness causes gaps in the law, and the role of legal interpretation in the case of vagueness is to fill such gaps. I argue that this view is mistaken and defend the thesis that vagueness in law calls only for an application of the law to the case at hand, leaving the meaning of the law intact.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 193 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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