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Policy and Relationality in Tort Law: Contractualist Foundations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2025

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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between relationality and policy in tort law from an evolutionary perspective. While, as part of the regulatory system, tort law must evolve in response to structural and allocative policy concerns, its ability to do so is limited by the relational normative structure through which it operates and claims moral authority. This tension is often obscured in mainstream tort theory. Drawing on contractualist philosophy—which traces the implications of mutual recognition and respect across structural, allocative, and relational normative contexts—the article develops a principled reasoning framework that avoids rigid hierarchies and ad hoc balancing: negative policy reasons not to adopt tort norms take precedence in choices of regulatory regimes, while positive policy reasons must be diluted and integrated with relational reasons to shape the content of tort norms. This normative framework illuminates tort law’s ability to respond to complex normative challenges while retaining its integrity and unique value as a regulatory tool.

Keywords

Tort LawPluralismContractualismPolicyRelationality
Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 2024 , pp. 199 - 228
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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68 Id., at 11–12.

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76 Id., at 195, 202–203.

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101 Id. at 180.

102 Id. at 184–188.

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105 On this form of guidance, see generally Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law 58, 65 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); Avihay Dorfman, Foreseeability as Re-Cognition, 59 Am. J. Juris. 163 (2014).

106 See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1539 (1997).

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114 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 7(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2012).

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116 See Feinman, supra note 8; Dobbs, supra note 9.

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119 See Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality 13–14 (2002).

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121 See Julian Jonker, Contractualist Justification and the Direction of a Duty, 25 Legal Theory 200 (2019).

122 See generally George P. Fletcher, The Fault of Not Knowing, 3 Theoretical Inq. L. 265, 279–282 (2002); Leslie Kendrick, Culpability and Negligence, in Oxford Studies in Private Law Theory: Volume 1 137, 150–157 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020).

123 See also Avihay Dorfman, Can Tort Law Be Moral, 23 Ratio Juris 205, 213–217 (2010).

124 See Robert E. Goodin, Apportioning Responsibilities, 6 L. & Phil. 167 (1987).

125 See Andrea C. Westlund, Answerability Without Blame?, in Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility 253 (Katrina Hutchinson, Catriona Mackenzie & Marina Oshana eds., 2018).

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127 Christopher Essert, The Value of the Neighbour Relation, in Private Law and Practical Reason: Essays on John Gardner’s Private Law Theory 297 (Harry Psarras & Sandy Steel eds., 2023).

128 Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1765 (2009); Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 17 (2011). See also Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. Tort L. 405, 407–408, 419–420 (2018).

129 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100–101 (N.Y. 1928).

130 Oberdiek, It’s Something Personal, supra note 16; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 299 (2011).

131 Keating, supra note 4, at 53.

132 On this substantive constraint, see also Oberdiek, Structure and Justification, supra note 90, at 120; Andrew Robertson, Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law, in The Goals of Private Law 261, 274–279 (Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds., 2009).

133 Michael Selmi, Indirect Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Mandate, in Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law 250 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). I address this issue at greater length in Tom Kohavi, Discrimination Law as Private Law, Alb. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2025).

134 See John Oberdiek, Wrongs, Remedies, and the Persistence of Reasons: Re-Examining the Continuity Thesis, in Private Law and Practical Reason: Essays on John Gardner’s Private Law Theory 161 (Haris Psarras & Sandy Steel eds., 2023).

135 See Giulio Fornaroli, Neglecting Others and Making it up to Them: The Idea of a Corrective Duty, 29 Legal Theory 289 (2023).

136 See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 145 (2010); Jenny Steele, Regulating Relationships: The Regulatory Potential of Tort Law Revisited, in Taking Law Seriously 211 (James Goudkamp, Mark Lunney & Leighton McDonald eds., 2021).

137 See also Andrew Robertson, Justifying Liabilities and Duties, in Justifying Private Rights 201, 219 (Simone Degeling, Michael Crawford & Nicholas Tiverios eds., 2020).

138 On thresholds, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 893 (2000).

139 On lexical priority, see Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 Ethics 503, 513 (1989).

140 On indirect consequentialism, see Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman eds., 2023).

141 Oberdiek, Structure and Justification, supra note 90, at 105.

142 On the distinction between general and special norms, see H.L.A. Hart, Are There any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil. Rev. 175, 183–188 (1955).

143 See Dorfman, Foreseeability as Re-Cognition, supra note 105, at 189–193.

144 Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826–827 (Cal. 1989).

145 See, e.g., Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 983 (2019).

146 For a flexible approach to this issue, see Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy Based Limitation of the Ordinary Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 899 (2009).

147 See Tom Kohavi, Moral Pluralism and Constitutional Horizontality, 37 Can. J. L. & Jur. 475, 485–487 (2024).

148 Stelios Tofaris & Sandy Steel, Negligence Liability for Omissions and the Police, 75 Camb. L. J. 128 (2016).

149 Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921).

150 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

151 See Nathan F. McGuire, When Does a University Have a Duty to Protect Students from Campus Harms? The Fall of the Bystander Era and the Rise of a Special-Relationship Theory of Duty, 55 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 405, 406–422 (2022); Betsy J. Grey, Preventing Student Suicide: Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 16 J. Tort L. 107 (2023).

152 Kohavi, Discrimination Law as Private Law, supra note 133.

153 Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011).

154 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 62, at 93–101, 293–301.

155 Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49.

156 Bull v. Hall [2013] UKSC 73.

157 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1887 (2010).

158 Keating, supra note 4, at 223–225, 268–282.

159 See generally Peter Chau, Tort Law and Contractualism, 43 L. & Phil. 393, 401–407 (2024).

160 Robertson, Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law, supra note 132, at 263–264.

161 See Kohavi, Moral Pluralism and Constitutional Horizontality, supra note 147.

162 New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

163 See John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk 137–150 (2017).

164 See Christopher J. Robinette, Harmonizing Wrongs and Compensation, 80 Md. L. Rev. 343 (2021).

165 W. Bradley Wendel, In the Duty Wars, I’m Switzerland, 18 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 35, 58 (2023).

166 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1123, 1134–1137 (2007).

167 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).

168 See Richard W. Wright, Private Nuisance Law: A Window on Substantive Justice, in Rights and Private Law 491, 503–505, 515–523 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012).

169 Thomas Nagel, Pluralism and Coherence, in The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin 105, 109–110 (Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin & Robert Silvers eds., 2001).

170 For concerns in this regard, see Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights 308–314 (2007); Peter Jaffey, Policy and Principle and the Character of Private Law, 11 Juris. 387 (2020).