Recent government proposals seeking to the reform of the law of gambling are likely to have unintended consequences for the law of insurance. This paper considers the likely impact of the judicial enforcement of wagers on the divisions between insurance and gambling and, in particular, the doctrine of insurable interest.

Historically, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has influenced in the debate over the reform of personal property security law in England. The revision to Article 9 has provided some further impetus to the issue of reform. A central feature of Article 9 which has been adopted in recent reform proposals for English law is the development of a generic unitary concept of the security interest and the specific rejection of formalism in security transactions. The impact upon the common law environment in England and Wales of the adoption of such an approach is considered in this paper. It is argued that the unitary concept of a ‘security interest’ is too blunt a concept and is over inclusive in that it wrongly assumes that all security interests perform an identical function. Furthermore, the development of functionalism seen in Article 9 has blurred an important distinction drawn under the common law between relative property rights and in this way fails to distinguish between what are essentially different transactions. In turn, this invites scrutiny of the usefulness in this context of notice filing and the first-to-file priority rule which is at the heart of an Article 9 regime.

The legal profession has experienced enormous upheaval over the last 30 years and this paper suggests that legal professional associations have failed to come to grips with this ‘brave new world’. This paper argues that the Law Society's current difficulties in performing its traditional roles are not simply examples of passing contemporary problems. Rather they represent the declining ability of the Law Society to serve as the fulcrum of the profession's collective advancement. Professional control may exist but on an individual and contingent basis alongside a reduced role for the Law Society.

Labour came to power in 1997 with a commitment to constitutional reform and joined-up government. New Labour has indeed produced significant constitutional change: devolution to Scotland and Wales, the Human Rights Act 1998, partial reform of the House of Lords, elected Mayors, a Freedom of Information Act, an Electoral Commission and more. Joined up it was not. Nothing better illustrated this than the (arguably) botched Cabinet reshuffle on 12 June 2003. On that day, Downing Street announced the resignation (or sacking) of Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor since 1997, and the abolition of his post, and, in its place, the establishment of a Department of Constitutional Affairs, and, finally, the creation of a Supreme Court.

New Labour's recent ‘Welfare to Work’ policies encourage people with disabilities, where possible, to enter and participate in the workplace. The current policy of ‘inclusion’ is supported by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA), which came into force in December 1996 providing those who are discriminated against on the grounds of their disability with an action against their employer. Drawing upon recently decided case law, this paper considers what the DDA offers those who are discriminated against because of a mental illness. I argue that policy-makers, courts and tribunals, because the relationship between physical and mental impairments is often misunderstood, fail to reflect the varied nature of or understand the stigma associated with, mental ill health. The law is thus at present incapable of providing adequate protection for mentally impaired individuals who attempt to participate or remain in the labour market, and new approaches, which are sensitive to the diverse nature of disability, need to be considered.

The authority of the classic Diceyan approach to parliamentary sovereignty has, as is well known, been called into question as a result of the UK's membership of the EU and human rights legislation. However, this paper focuses on the implications of Scottish devolution for the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The constitution, and the legislative supremacy of Westminster within it, remains a controversial political issue in Scotland. Accordingly, rather than hypothesising inductively from constitutional doctrine, consideration is given to the nature of the interaction between the socio-political forces which underlie Scottish devolution and the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. It is contended that the foundations of the Scottish political order have shifted in a way which is already presenting significant challenges. Moreover, looking to the future, the pressure on the orthodox Diceyan approach is likely to intensify over time. In this context, it is questionable whether constitutional conventions of the sort which are already evolving or the possible development by the courts of more formal constitutional norms will, in the long term, be able to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty with Scottish political reality. Indeed, it is argued that — from a Scottish perspective at least — the viability of classic, Diceyan parliamentary sovereignty as a meaningful constitutional doctrine will be called into question in the years to come.

This paper examines the developing and complex legal relationship between universities and students, or would-be students, who have mental health problems. Discussion takes account of the wider social and policy contexts, including the extent of mental ill-health among the student population, the market for higher education, and government policies towards universities. It contends that the legal position of students with mental health problems demonstrates that there is a need for the relationship between students and universities to be conceptualised with reference to the citizenship ideal rather than the consumer paradigm with which it has tended to become associated in public policy terms.

The Government's Consultation Paper does not have a question mark in its title. It does not purport to be a serious discussion of the role of a Supreme Court in a democracy. This is scarcely to be expected of such a document or its respondents, so I propose to respond in its own terms rather than on the loftier plane usually adopted by contributors to this journal. More unexpectedly, the Consultation Paper does not even put forward a serious set of options to consider. At the Law Commission, we always had (at least a metaphorical) question mark in our title because we almost always put forward two options which do not appear in this consultation: the ‘do nothing’ and the ‘let’s abolish it' options. Both have a lot to be said for them here.

In the UK, home education, or home-schooling, is an issue that has attracted little public, governmental or academic attention. Yet the number of children who are home educated is steadily increasing and the phenomenon has been referred to as a‘quiet revolution’. This paper neither celebrates nor denigrates home educators; its aim, rather, is to identify and critically examine the two dominant discourses that define the way in which the issue is currently understood. First, the legal discourse of parental rights, which forms the basis of the legal framework and, secondly, a child psychology/common-sense discourse of ‘socialisation’, within which school attendance is perceived as necessary for healthy child development. Drawing on historical sources, doctrinal human rights and child psychology and informed by post-structural and feminist perspectives, this article suggests that both discourses function as alternative methods of governance and that the conflicting ‘rights claims’ of parents and children obscure public interests and fundamental questions about the purpose of education.

Use of the term ‘informed consent’ is commonplace in both bioethics and medical law. In the legal context the term may be referred to as ‘the doctrine of informed consent’ but the way that this latter term is used raises doubt as to its value as a legal concept. In this paper I explore the concept of the ‘doctrine of informed consent’ and suggest that it may be useful, but only if limited to the autonomy-driven duty to disclose rather than as a more general referent. Having established the nature of the concept I then consider whether the doctrine - which is applied in a minority of US states, Canada and Australia - has crossed the Atlantic and become part of the law in England and Wales. In particular, I analyse Lord Woolf MR's judgment in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust and suggest that the law has moved towards the doctrine but that it still falls short of the disclosure required by the reasonable patient standard.

First and foremost, I welcome the move to establish a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, separate from the House of Lords. I have favoured this for years, and I regard the Government's proposals as a real step forward. It is a piece of long-unfinished business nearly achieved by the mighty reformers of 1873-75. Their shades must rejoice to see it at last being tackled. All my other comments hereafter should be seen in that positive context.

This paper considers the possible reform of the law governing property rights upon the termination of a close personal relationship, taking as its point of departure the Law Commission's Discussion Paper on Home-Sharing (2002). Having considered the reasons for the inconclusive outcome of the Law Commission's project (and the Discussion Paper's comments on the law of trusts), the paper moves on to consider the possible shape of future reform. It examines first the preliminary question of whether possible legislation should focus on unmarried cohabitees or whether a wider range of relationships should be encompassed (with or without a cohabitation requirement), The paper then looks at the form which a legislative scheme might take, examining the possibility of focusing on contributions (along the lines of New South Wales’ legislation) and the Law Society's proposals for a regime based on‘economic advantage and disadvantage’. The experience of the courts in the matrimonial context is considered with a view to extracting relevant lessons. In general, rather defending one particular model for reform, the paper attempts to identify and explore key issues which will be of relevance across a variety of approaches to reform.

There is increasing concern with the cost effectiveness of charities' fund-raising activities. Using a recent decision of the US Supreme Court as a backdrop, this paper examines the regulation of professional fund-raising and the associated issues relating to fund-raising costs. Whilst there are no legal limits on fund-raising costs in England and Wales, there are some elements of legal regulation which may indirectly impose some limitations on costs. As well as these legal tools, a number of other mechanisms, both current and proposed, which may help donors to decide which charities to support, taking into account their fund-raising efficiency, will also be considered. The paper finally acknowledges that whilst limiting the costs of fund-raising is a desirable objective, achieving this aim is by no means simple. It is hoped that current and proposed measures based on the theory of ‘let the donor’ decide will help to achieve this aim.

This paper explores the reasons for the proposed abolition of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and its replacement by a new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. It focuses on the principal justification now advanced for the project, namely the need to institute full judicial independence. It does so very much in the spirit of the argument recently made by Lord Steyn in Counsel (although it comes to a very different conclusion from Lord Steyn's): even if there is a clear commitment to the reform of the United Kingdom's highest judiciary, the nature of that reform should depend entirely on the reasons for change. It is necessary to be clear on those reasons and to weigh them carefully.

The ‘accountability revolution’ has lead to an expansion in the concept of accountability and the application of accountability practices to an ever-wider range of public authorities. In a mature democracy, those who exercise significant public power ought to hold themselves open to account, and judicial power should not be excluded from this imperative. In the UK, there are three schools of thought about accountability of judges. ‘Opponents’ argue that the notion of an ‘accountable judge’ is an oxymoron. ‘Re-conceptualists’ point out that courts already engage in a number of practices that make them accountable. The ‘radical’ claim is that new forms of accountability are needed. To understand the debate better, we need to map out types and levels of accountability. First, a distinction may be drawn between the personal accountability of individual judges and the accountability of courts as institutions. Secondly, we may differentiate formal mechanisms for securing accountability and informal, ‘non-state’ practices, including scrutiny of judgments and judges by the news media and academics. Thirdly, different levels of accountability may be identified, relating to the ‘probity’, ‘performance’, ‘process’ and ‘content’ of the judicial function. The final part of the paper considers the design of accountability mechanisms for a new UK Supreme Court.

Academic lawyers have commented extensively on the judicial interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998, but the reaction of politicians to it has received less attention. This paper examines the trends in parliamentary attitudes to human rights by analysing Commons and Lords debates on the Human Rights Bill itself, the Terrorism Bill 1999–2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill 2002. It also considers MPs' response to the Thompson and Venables and Anderson judgments, as well as Conservative attempts to amend the Human Rights Act. Against this background, it argues that the British polity can be characterised as a ‘contestatory democracy’, in which the system of fundamental rights protection is incomplete since it neglects Parliament's vital role in defining the Convention rights.

To be recognised as a legal person is to be individualised: it is to be rendered a separate and distinct being, the unitary bearer of rights and duties. By contrast, to be assigned a legal sex is to be grouped with others, to be placed within one of only two sexes, as either a man or a woman, a necessarily crude dichotomy. It is to be legally defined by the characteristics we are said to share with half the human population rather than regarded as an individual in our own right. This paper entails a critical comparative analysis of the legal concept of person and the legal concept of sex: of maleness or femaleness. It questions the logic and defensibility of this double characterisation of our legal lives. How can law reconcile its deep commitment to individualism with its persisting commitment to a two-sex system?