An initial reading of EU competition law jurisprudence and literature may suggest that there might be a competition-related freedom in the EU, expressed along the lines of ‘freedom of competition’ or ‘freedom to compete’. If competition is to be protected as a ‘freedom’ rather than merely as a ‘policy’, what this freedom involves should be established. It is important to establish the role of ‘freedom’, since it has been argued that EU competition law is a product of or has been significantly influenced by ‘ordoliberalism’. Under ordoliberalism, protecting the ‘economic freedom’ of market actors is the aim of competition policy. This paper examines the entire jurisprudence of the EU Courts to establish the role of ‘freedom’ in EU competition law as perceived by the EU Courts. This inquiry establishes whether ordoliberalism has so fundamentally influenced the jurisprudence that welfare-based objectives cannot be adopted as an/the objective of EU competition law. This is the first such comprehensive study regarding ‘freedom’ in EU competition law. The paper demonstrates that there is little quantitative or qualitative support for the ordoliberal argument when one considers the relevant jurisprudence. A quantitative analysis of the case-law and in particular the historical trend raises serious doubts concerning the validity of the conventional ordoliberal-influence thesis.

This paper evaluates the role being adopted by the European Court of Human Rights when confronted with claims arising from the extreme restriction of access to abortion services in certain Member States. It will be argued that in response to such claims the Court has been prepared to find that the suffering of the applicants can be captured as forms of rights violation, but it has sought to avoid taking a stance as to foetal life, leading it to adopt a highly deferential approach and to avoid the substantive issues at stake, of protection for female reproductive health, dignity and autonomy, in favour of focusing mainly on procedural ones. Having considered such issues as the missing gender-based aspects of the abortion jurisprudence, this paper concludes that its restrained and largely procedural stance has enabled the Court to provide some limited protection for women, on healthcare grounds, but that the opportunity to recognise that highly restrictive abortion regimes systematically and persistently create especially invidious discrimination based on gender has so far been missed.

Following the enactment of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995, a new Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme came into force, replacing the non-statutory version that was introduced in 1964. The statutory Scheme retained the occasions for compensation but broke the link with common law damages, providing instead for payments to be made on the basis of a tariff of injury awards. But it continued to make payments for loss of earnings, special expenses and additional compensation in fatal cases. Minor revisions were made in 2001 and 2008, but following the government's consultation, ‘Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses’, a major revision took effect in November 2012. Made largely to reduce public expenditure, this revision substantially limits both the numbers of victims of violent crime to be compensated and the levels of their awards. While this marks a further shift away from the original common law model, the 2012 Scheme remains a unique taxpayer-funded response to victims of violent crime, again prompting the question: why, and to what, extent should the state make financial provision for victims of violent crime that goes beyond welfare? This paper analyses the implications of the government's answer for the Scheme's scope and implementation.

At the heart of the voluntary corporate governance code in the UK and elsewhere is the concept of ‘comply or explain’. It provides that a company is to comply with a code's provision; but if it does not do so, then it is to state that it does not and explain why it does not. There is no provision in the UK for any statements by companies to be assessed by any regulatory body. It is incumbent on the markets generally and the company's shareholders specifically to determine whether the response of the company to code provisions does enough, and then to take some action if they do not. The aim of comply or explain is to empower shareholders to make an informed evaluation as to whether non-compliance is justified, given the company's circumstances. This paper assesses whether the present scheme, which relies on the stewardship of shareholders and the efficiency of the markets, should continue, or whether a regulatory body should be empowered to determine whether companies are in fact complying with code provisions or, if not, whether they are providing adequate explanations for not complying.

This paper makes two claims. First, it claims that there are various trends within academic law that discourage legal scholars from learning about their predecessors. These trends are explained. Secondly, it claims that there are a number of benefits which could flow from addressing this neglect. Several of these benefits have been acknowledged elsewhere. For example, some scholars maintain that ideas are best treated historically before being dealt with analytically. The more scholars read whole bodies of their predecessors' works, the better their interpretations and understandings of such works become, thus strengthening the intellectual integrity of the discipline. While agreeing with this argument, the purpose of the second section of this paper is to articulate other, perhaps less obvious, benefits. It is argued that by learning about a wider range of past academic endeavour, legal scholars are encouraged to challenge existing notions of academic standing and consider not only what the legal academy has become but also what it ought to be. Learning about scholarly predecessors could help scholars better contextualise current challenges. Such learning could be empowering in the context of a discipline whose scholarly practices have meant that there has been little reason to look to the past.

Four of the better-known unfair dismissal cases involve dismissals of employees for behaviour outside work. All four of those dismissals were held to be ‘fair’. This paper looks afresh at the subject matter of dismissals for behaviour outside work. It will argue, first, that employment tribunals should apply a separate framework to dismissals for behaviour outside work and not just apply the normal framework that is designed for dismissals for behaviour at work. Secondly, the paper will construct this separate framework to apply to dismissals for extramural behaviour. It will be argued that there should henceforth be a presumption that dismissals for behaviour outside work will be unfair unless the employer has a strong reason for thinking that the extramural behaviour of the employee will damage the business of the employer. The purpose of this paper is to suggest legal reasons for change to this area of unfair dismissal law as an addition to previously discussed normative reasons for change. In particular, the paper will develop the analogy between unfair dismissal cases on behaviour outside work and breach of personal confidence cases since the Human Rights Act 1998.