Devolution is usually described in terms of the transfer of powers from central to regional and subordinate authorities. Attention then tends to focus on one dimension of relational power, namely that between the sovereign ‘principal’ and its ‘devolved’ agent. In this paper, and without seeking to assert that devolved institutions are sovereign, it is suggested that we need to develop an additional dimension to our studies of devolution, namely the relational power between government and governed in devolved contexts. Taking the example of devolution to Scotland and the exercise of devolved law-making powers to repeal ‘section 28’ of the Local Government Act 1988, it is argued that in the process of exercising legal and political authority, contestation and conflict over government can produce important constitutional discourses that normativise what counts as an appropriate or inappropriate exercise of devolved governmental power. The process of contesting devolved government is productive of what it means to govern and be governed under conditions of devolution, thereby producing and reproducing devolution itself.

This paper considers the written statements provided to the Bristol Inquiry by parents whose children underwent cardiac surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1984 and 1995, seeking to learn from their experiences, opinions, feelings and expectations. The law regulating the relationship between healthcare professional, parent and child is considered in light of these accounts. The limitations of the existing law are such that a new legal framework is required which fosters the relationship between healthcare professional, parent and child, supporting them in the shared endeavour of caring for the child. Of central importance within this new framework would be recognition of each child as a distinct individual and of the expertise which parents can contribute to the care of their child.

An important demographic and social trend is becoming indisputably evident in the UK. The population is ageing, and a clearly discernible group of elderly persons is growing. As this trend continues, it will be necessary to reconsider the effectiveness and application of the law from the perspective of the elderly claimant. While it has been recognised that there must be a legal scheme to oversee the care and protection of persons, including elders, who are unable to care for their interests due to severe disability, it is becoming evident that even elders who are apparently healthy and able may be vulnerable. Undue influence inter vivos is a significant legal doctrine upon which elderly people have relied in recent times to set aside gifs, contracts and guarantees which they (or their representatives) have considered in hindsight were not in their best interests. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of and contribute to an understanding of the doctrine of undue influence from the perspective of the elderly claimant in the UK. The paper considers actual and presumed undue influence and the impact of the House of Lords decision in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No2). It will be argued that the law of undue influence inter vivos is in transition from a nineteenth-century doctrine which did not confer a special legal status on the elderly to one which is applied in the context of an increasing recognition that the events leading up to the transaction and the circumstances of the case may indicate that elders need the relief which the doctrine affords. Nevertheless, the transition to a modem system of undue influence for the elderly is incomplete. There remain outstanding issues which need consideration before it can be said that there is a comprehensive or logically coherent approach to elders and undue influence.

This paper drawls on the experience of the authors during a TACIS project in Russia. Part of the project involved assisting Russian legal experts in drafting a law on the reorganisation of companies. The methodology adopted was split into three stages: identification of the concepts of reorganisation in different jurisdictions, the policy and economic context of the proposed reform and examination of the institutional background. At each of these stages it was necessary to discover the underlying cultural, economic and philosophical issues which were formative of laws in each of the five jurisdictions that were examined and offer a menu of possible solutions to the risk-balancing exercise which this area of law presents.

Repeated comments are made as to the similarity between the common intention constructive trust and proprietary estoppel, but there remains considerable confusion over the precise nature of this interrelationship. The constituent elements of each doctrine bear close comparison and, although their respective modes of operation remain distinct, they may lead to similar results. The recent redefinition of the Pallant v Morgan equity provides an opportunity to probe once more the interrelationship between these doctrines. The Pallant v Morgan1 equity explores the operation of the Rochefoucauld v Boustead2 doctrine in the context of the joint acquisition of land and demonstrates the enforceability of express oral intention based upon a wider range of unconscionablity than the detriment based conduct which dominates both the common intention constructive trust and estoppel.

Patient autonomy is one of the central values in medical ethics. It is generally understood as recognition of patients' rights as free individuals answerable only to themselves. This emphasis on the individual leaves open the question of the position of the patients' ‘loved ones’, that is of families and significant others. The authors examine this question in three areas of law and medical ethics. Organ donation offers an example of preference given by medical ethics to family views, notwithstanding an expressed wish of the deceased to donate, and the legal position protecting such a request. Decisions concerning the treatment of incompetent patients illustrate consideration for the family in medical ethics, but hesitations in both law and ethics in accepting family views once expressed. And the tension between the interests of patients and family members over the access to genetic information usually results in respecting the patient's right to confidentiality. This individualistic perception of autonomy, as adopted by medical law, overlooks the patient's relationships with others and is too narrow to face the complexities of human lives.